Abstract
Rey does not try to achieve an overall statement of the view he is discussing; rather, he fastens on to a series of individual passages in Reference and Consciousness and expresses disagreement with each of them. Most of his complaints rest on imprecision in his understanding of the relevant passage. To make it easier to match my responses to the detail of Rey’s comments, I have organized my responses to the four sections of his article under the same headings as he uses.
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Reference
J. Campbell (1999) ArticleTitleSchizophrenia, The Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process The Monist 82 609–625
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Campbell, J. Reply to Rey. Philos Stud 126, 155–162 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2143-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2143-6