Abstract
Tool-use behavior is currently one of the most intriguing and widely debated topics in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts of our ability to use tools have been proposed. In the first part of the paper we review the most prominent interpretations and suggest that none of these accounts, considered in itself, is sufficient to explain tool use. In the second part of the paper we disentangle three different types of reasoning on tools, characterized by a different distribution of motor and cognitive ingredients. At the conceptual level, these types of reasoning reflect the distinction between three types of abductive inference as they are described in semiotic studies. At the functional level, we suggest that these types of reasoning on tools may correspond to different mental processes, possibly implemented in different regions of the left inferior parietal lobe. This proposal can account for the different interpretations commonly associated with the role of the left parietal cortex in tool use.
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Notes
Interestingly, the concept of tool selection adopted in the literature is mainly limited to purely functional considerations, while in our daily life tool selection is also driven by an additional series of affective reasons, including aesthetic and sentimental ones. However, these additional elements are intrinsically part of any decision-making process and not only of those concerning tools and, accordingly, they will not be taken into account henceforth. We thank an anonymous reviewer for noticing this often-neglected aspect of tool selection.
“Instructions of use can exist only for familiar tools. Presumably they specify the prototypical action associated with the tool as, for example, screwing for a screwdriver, hammering for a hammer, and pinching and pulling for pincers.” ((Goldenberg and Hagmann 1998); p.582)
“Mechanical problem-solving” and “technical reasoning” will be used as synonyms henceforth.
Such a general description is intended to characterize our mental activities at a very general and conceptual level, but it does not necessarily apply to the very psychological level, or to the level of the neural implementation.
For example, while the use of a hammer is typically due to our recessive knowledge of the standing properties of the hammer (e.g. the hardness of its head) and the nail (its rigidity), our use of the remote is not justified by the recessive knowledge of its properties (we just know it works that way, but we don’t why it works that way) and, as a consequence, it does not represent a case of intelligent tool use. Recessive knowledge concerns both action-related and mechanical constraints because it “regulates the way in which your awareness of the position of the nail affects your modulation of the variable properties of the tool – just how hard you swing when you see that the nail is nearly in” (Campbell 2011; p.172–173).
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We thank Katrin Heimann and Corrado Sinigaglia for valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.
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Fausto, C., Valentina, C. Types of abduction in tool behavior. Phenom Cogn Sci 16, 255–273 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9450-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9450-y