On-line false belief understanding qua folk psychology?
- Martin Capstick
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In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for the existence of on-line false belief understanding. This demonstrates that folk psychology is not restricted to off-line forms and that folk psychology is more widespread than the phenomenological critics acknowledge. In response, I argue the on-line/off-line distinction is a problematic way of demarcating the phenomenological critics from orthodox accounts of folk psychology.
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- On-line false belief understanding qua folk psychology?
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume 12, Issue 1 , pp 27-40
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Folk psychology
- On-line/Off-line cognition
- Phenomenological critics
- Social understanding
- Martin Capstick (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UK