Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition
- Richard Menary
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
One thing that has become clear in the last 10 to 15 years of research on cognition is that there are many different dimensions of modelling and explanation at work. Homogeneity there is not. One only needs to think of the differences in emphasis and approach that one finds under the often grouped together labels of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition
This list does not include distributed and situated models of cognition.. One reason that the four E’s are grouped together is that they are all held to reject or at least radically reconfigure traditional cognitivism
Which is usually understood as cognition as the manipulation of representations. Despite Adams’ and Aizawa’s protestations to the contrary, I do not think that cognitivism is committed to anything stronger than this. Indeed, it would be unwise for cognitivists to hold to Adams’ and Aizawa’s stronger version of cognitivism—that only manipulations of representations with underived content count as cogn
- Adams, F. (2010). Embodied cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9175-x.
- Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2010). The value of cognitivism in thinking about extended cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9184-9.
- Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (2007). Philosophy of mind and cognition: An introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Cash, M. (2010). Extended cognition, personal responsibility, and relational autonomy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9177-8.
- Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge Mass: MIT.
- Clark, A. (2005). Intrinsic content, active memory, and the extended mind. Analysis, 65, 1–11. CrossRef
- Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the mind: Embodiment. Action and Cognitive Extension, Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Clark, A., & Kiverstein, J. (2009). Mind, embodied, embedded, enacted: One church or many. Topoi, 28, 1–7. CrossRef
- Dehaene, S. (2007). A few steps towards a science of mental life. Mind, Brain and Education, 1(1), 28–47. CrossRef
- Dehaene, S., Spelke, E., Pinel, P., Stanescu, R., & Tsivkin, S. (1999). Sources of mathematical thinking: Behavioral and brain-imaging evidence. Science, 284, 970–974. CrossRef
- DiPaulo. (2009). Extended life. Topoi, 28, 9–21. CrossRef
- Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: OUP. CrossRef
- Hutto, D. (2008). Folk psychological narratives: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. Cambridge Mass: MIT.
- Jeffares, B. (2010). The co-evaluation of tools and minds: cognition and material culture in the hominin lineage. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9176-9.
- Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249–58. CrossRef
- Menary, R. (2006). Attacking the bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 19, 329–344. CrossRef
- Menary, R. (2007). Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Menary, R. (2008). “Embodied Narratives” in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15(6), 63–84.
- Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman (2003) Niche construction: The neglected process in evolution. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- Rowlands, M. (2010). The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Simpson, D. (2010). Language and know-how. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9183-x.
- Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: extended or scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9174-y.
- Stotz, K. (2010). Human nature and cognitive–developmental niche construction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9178-7.
- Sutton, J. (2010). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind, and the civilizing process. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.
- Sutton, J., Harris, C. B., Keil, P. G., & Barnier, A. J. (2010). The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9182-y.
- Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Thompson, E., & Stapelton, M. (2009). Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories. Topoi, 28, 23–30. CrossRef
- Wheeler, M. (2010). In defense of extended functionalism. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind. Cambridge Mass: MIT.
- Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume 9, Issue 4 , pp 459-463
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- 4E Cognition
- Traditional cognitivism
- Embodied cognition
- Extended cognition
- Richard Menary (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia