Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 579–603

The value of cognitivism in thinking about extended cognition


DOI: 10.1007/s11097-010-9184-9

Cite this article as:
Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. Phenom Cogn Sci (2010) 9: 579. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9184-9


This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.


CognitivismExtended cognitionCoupling-constitution fallacyNon-derived contentMental representation

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Linguistics and Cognitive ScienceUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyCentenary College of LouisianaShreveportUSA