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Is the brain a memory box?

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Abstract

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.

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Correspondence to Anne J. Jacobson.

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Jacobson, A.J. Is the brain a memory box?. Phenom Cogn Sci 4, 271–278 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4069-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4069-z

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