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Modeling Sterilized Interventions and Balance Sheet Effects of Monetary Policy in a New-Keynesian Framework

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Abstract

We study a wide range of hybrid inflation–targeting (IT) and managed exchange rate regimes, analyzing their implications for inflation, output and the exchange rate. To this end, we develop an open economy new–Keynesian model featuring sterilized interventions as an additional central bank instrument operating alongside the Taylor rule and affecting the economy through portfolio balance effects in the financial sector. We find that there can be advantages, from a welfare perspective, to combining IT with some degree of exchange rate management via FX interventions. Unlike “pure” IT or exchange rate management via interest rates, FX interventions can help insulate the economy against certain shocks, especially shocks to international financial conditions. However, managing the exchange rate through interventions may also hinder necessary exchange rate adjustments, e.g., in the presence of terms of trade shocks.

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Notes

  1. 1 See Curdia and Woodford (2011), and Gertler and Karadi (2011) for a modelling of the credit policy of the central bank.

  2. 2 Even central banks in several developed countries (including Switzerland, Australia, and Israel, among others) embarked on regular interventions, as a part of their efforts to stabilize domestic financial conditions. See Reserve (Reserve Bank of Australia 2008), (Bank of Israel 2009), and (Swiss National Bank 2008).

  3. 3 Uppercase variables denote nominal variables in levels, while lowercase variables denote real variables or nominal rates such as inflation and interest rates. A ’hat’ \((\hat {*})\) denotes a log-deviation from the steady state.

  4. 5A properly defined steady state requires perfect consistency between nominal targets. In the absence of a trend in the real exchange rate, so that the equilibrium real exchange rate is\(\overline {q}\), π T and S T must satisfy the following identity: \(log(S^{T}/S^{T}_{-1})=log(\overline {q}/\overline {q})+log((P/P_{-1})^{T})-log({(P^{*}/P^{*}_{-1})}^{T})=\uppi ^{T}-\uppi ^{*T}.\)

  5. 5 The interest rate reflects domestic shocks only to the extent that the country’s external risk premium responds endogenously to these shocks, e.g., by being sensitive to movements in the current account or in the country’s net foreign asset position.

  6. 6Blanchard et al. (2005) propose a revival of the portfolio approach, however.

  7. 7 We chose to use as simplistic balance sheets as allowed by the requirements of our analysis. In doing so, we disregarded many sometimes-important practical aspects, sacrificing realism. For instance, our financial sector runs an unhedged short position in FX, which would not be allowed by prudential regulation. Our households are net borrowers, rather than savers. And we assume a central bank with a negative net domestic asset position, which is a necessary condition if the central bank holds a stock of foreign reserves but does not issue reserve money (in a cashless world). However, our exposition can be generalized. For instance, firms borrowing from the financial sector can be added to make households net savers. The financial sector can run separate balance sheets in FX and local currencies, thus assuming partial financial dollarization. And introducing reserve money can make the net domestic asset position of the central bank positive. For the purposes of our exposition these are unnecessary complications, though. What matters is that sterilized interventions affect the degree of exchange rate risk faced by the domestic financial system, which does not depend on whether the central bank’s net domestic assets are positive or negative. In a separate appendix (available upon request) we show how reserve money can be added, but leave the analysis of interventions in the context of financial dollarization for future work.

  8. 8 We analyze the balance sheet operations required to implement interest rate policy in a separate appendix (available upon request).This asymmetry reflects central bank practices as well as some underlying economics. Exchange rate targets are analogous to targets on long-term interest rates, in that both imply setting prices for assets that yield capital gains or losses if prices change and hence that are more subject to speculative attacks than overnight rates (see (Woodford 2005) for the case of long rates). This implies that achieving these targets exactly, as represented by an infinite ω in (3) may strain central bank balance sheets and be difficult to achieve. We return to this point later. For current purposes, however, the implication is that many central banks conduct quantity–based operations aimed at achieving targets for the exchange rate without necessarily hitting the targets exactly. Similarly, recent efforts at “quantitative easing’ in developed countries aim to influence but not precisely target long interest rates.

  9. 9 In the working paper version of this paper, we studied whether such a relation could be derived from a simple portfolio allocation problem as well as a a bank cost function that depended on banks’ holdings of central bank securities and loans. Although these setups went some way toward generating risk premia that was sensitive to holding of various assets, their functional forms differed considerably from the simple relations presented in the text.

  10. 10 If the premium depends on the total stock of domestic assets, then the intervention rule in (3) can be specified in terms of L+O, and the model–based analysis would be the same.

  11. 11 We set l o g L ) to zero for the sake of simplicity.

  12. 12 See Krugman (1979).

  13. 13 The literature on the impossible trinity is time-honored and extensively large. See Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) for a historical perspective.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Olivier Blanchard, Jonathan Ostry, Alex Cukierman, seminar participants at the 2009 Central Bank Macroeconomic Workshop in Jerusalem and the 2010 IMF Workshop on Frameworks for Policy Analysis in Low–Income Countries, two anonymous referees, and the editor, for helpful comments and suggestions. Enrico Berkes provided excellent research assistance.

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Correspondence to Rafael A. Portillo.

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This paper is part of a research project on macroeconomic policy in low-income countries supported by the U.K.s Department for International Development. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF, IMF policy or of DFID.

Appendix

Appendix

Second–order approximation to utility

Starting from the steady state (at period −1), taking a second order approximation to the discounted sum of utility flows yields the following relation:

$$U=E_{0}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t}U_{t}\right]\approx\overline{U}+\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}E_{0}\left[\underbrace{\hat{c}_{t}-(1+\zeta)\hat{y}_{t}}_{A_{t}}\right]-\frac{1+\phi}{\gamma}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}E_{0}\left[\hat{y}_{t}^{2}\right]. $$

Note that \(\hat {c}_{t}-(1+\zeta )\hat {y}_{t}=(1-\omega _{n})\hat {c}_{m,t}-(1-\omega _{n}+\zeta )\hat {y}_{x,t}\). Forward iterations of the balance of payments imply:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}E_{0}\left[A_{t}\right]=(1+\zeta)\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}E_{0}\left[\hat{tot}_{t}-\overline{l}\beta\hat{i}^{*}_{t}\right]=t.i.p., $$

where t.i.p. denotes terms independent of policy. The above relation implies the discounted sum of utility, up to a second–order approximation, is proportional to the discounted sum of squared variations in output:

$$U-\overline{U}\approx-\frac{1+\phi}{\gamma}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}E_{0}\left[\hat{y}_{t}^{2}\right]+t.i.p. $$

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Benes, J., Berg, A., Portillo, R.A. et al. Modeling Sterilized Interventions and Balance Sheet Effects of Monetary Policy in a New-Keynesian Framework. Open Econ Rev 26, 81–108 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-014-9320-1

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