Abstract
This paper presents a mathematical model for analyzing long-term infrastructure investment decisions in a deregulated electricity market, such as the case in the United States. The interdependence between different decision entities in the system is captured in a network-based stochastic multi-agent optimization model, where new entrants of investors compete among themselves and with existing generators for natural resources, transmission capacities, and demand markets. To overcome computational challenges involved in stochastic multi-agent optimization problems, we have developed a solution method by combining stochastic decomposition and variational inequalities, which converts the original problem to many smaller problems that can be solved more easily.
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Notes
Any node in the power grid can be an access point as long as there is supporting transmission infrastructure.
For a small example illustrating these flow conservation constraints, please refer to Appendix 1.
Note that since the wholesale prices depend on the production quantities, chain rule of differentiation should be used while taking derivatives to arrive at the VI.
Symmetric assumption and separable investment cost are not required in our model and algorithm.
For the same scenario-dependent problems, PATH, a general-purpose optimization solver for complementarity problems, was unable to obtain solutions.
In this example, ISO is allowed to make short term revenues from transmission services. But eventually, this revenue will be used for transmission investment so that ISO keeps long term profit neutral.
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Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by the Sustainable Transportation Energy Pathways (STEPS) program and the National Transportation Center on Sustainability (NTCS) at University of California, Davis (UC Davis). The authors are grateful to Prof. Roger Wets at UC Davis and Mr. Obadiah Bartholomy at the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) for helpful discussion.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Small Example Illustrating Flow Conservation Constraint (3b)–(3e)
1.1 Network Structure
1.2 OD and Path Information
1.3 Network Flow
1.4 Incidence Matrix
Appendix 2: Subroutine Pseudocode
Appendix 3: Data for Example 2
Appendix 4: Calculation of \(\protect \frac {\partial \rho _{k^{\prime }}}{\partial {g_{i}^{j}}}\)
\({\partial \rho _{k^{\prime }}}/{\partial {g_{i}^{j}}}\) can be computed from the ISO’s optimization problem (3a), where ρ is the dual variables of constraint (3a) and g is parameters. \({\partial \rho _{k^{\prime }}}/{\partial {g_{i}^{j}}}\) is essentially the derivative of dual variables with respect to right-hand side constants. We use the standard notations for convex optimization with linear constraints:
where f(x) is a convex function and \(\boldsymbol {x} \in \mathbb {R}^{n}, \boldsymbol {\lambda }, \boldsymbol {b} \in \mathbb {R}^{m}\), to illustrate the calculating process and our goal is to calculate the Jacobian matrix J λ (b).
Lagrangian of problem (18b) is \(\mathcal {L} = f(\boldsymbol {x}) - \boldsymbol {\lambda }^{T}(A\boldsymbol {x}-\boldsymbol {b})\). The optimality conditions of problem (18b) is:
Take implicit derivatives of Eq. (4) with respect to b :
The unknown variables in Eq. 20a are two Jacobian matrices, J x (b) and J λ (b). The total number of equations is equal to the total number of variables in Eq. 20a, which is n m + m 2. Therefore, as long as these equations are consistent and independent, J λ (b) can be calculated uniquely. Clearly, if function f(x) is in quadratic form of x, \(\nabla ^{2}_{\boldsymbol {x}} f(\boldsymbol {x})\) then only involves constants, in which case J λ (b) can be computed analytically. For general form of f(x), one can solve J λ (b) numerically; one can take an initial guess of b based on historical data and then solve (20a) and Algorithm 2 iteratively until J λ (b) converged.
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Guo, Z., Fan, Y. A Stochastic Multi-agent Optimization Model for Energy Infrastructure Planning under Uncertainty in An Oligopolistic Market. Netw Spat Econ 17, 581–609 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-016-9336-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-016-9336-8