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e-Honesty: when does it pay?

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Abstract

We consider a model of strategic reputation for online sales using an exchange format. In the model sellers can sell a cheap good to build up reputation, and then cheat when selling a more expensive good. We identify conditions under which a seller will always be honest.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, 2107 CEBA, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, 70803, USA

    Georgiy Lyudyno & Sudipta Sarangi

  2. DIW Berlin, Germany

    Sudipta Sarangi

Authors
  1. Georgiy Lyudyno
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  2. Sudipta Sarangi
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Correspondence to Georgiy Lyudyno.

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Lyudyno, G., Sarangi, S. e-Honesty: when does it pay?. Netnomics 6, 209–219 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11066-005-2305-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11066-005-2305-x

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