Abstract
Based on the dual-process theory of moral judgment, it has been suggested that in Footbridge-type dilemmas the anticipation of the emotional consequences of causing intentional harm might contribute to the decision of rejecting utilitarian resolutions. However, no empirical data have been reported on the emotions felt by participants after their decisions, and the role played by emotions in Trolley-type dilemmas remains to be determined. The present study investigated the specific emotions engaged both after decision choices and after the generation of the counterfactual scenario in Trolley- and Footbridge-type dilemmas. The results support the idea that in Footbridge-type dilemmas decision-making is driven by the attempt to minimize the aversive emotional state evoked by the decision outcome. A greater increase in emotional intensity was found overall for Footbridge-type than Trolley-type dilemmas after the counterfactual generation following typical (non-utilitarian) choices, with guilt, regret, and shame being the emotions that increased most. Critically, in Footbridge-type dilemmas only, typical choices were predicted by the increase in regret intensity experienced after counterfactual generation.
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Notes
The different meanings of the specific words depend on their association with responsibility. Specifically, in English, “regret” is associated to both action and inaction, whereas in Italian “rimorso” is associated to regret for action, “rimpianto” is associated to regret for inaction, and “rammarico” refers to a general negative feeling following a negative outcome. In a similar way, the Italian word “disappunto” corresponds to an attribution-independent emotion, whereas “delusione” is associated with the agent’s responsibility, that is, both with action and inaction.
Eight additional subjects were excluded by the statistical program because they did not provide typical responses for any of the two dilemma types.
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Tasso, A., Sarlo, M. & Lotto, L. Emotions associated with counterfactual comparisons drive decision-making in Footbridge-type moral dilemmas. Motiv Emot 41, 410–418 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-017-9607-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-017-9607-9