Abstract
It has been argued that prototypes cannot compose, and that for this reason concepts cannot be prototypes (Osherson and Smith in Cognition 9:35–58, 1981; Fodor and Lepore in Cognition 58:253–270, 1996; Connolly et al. in Cognition 103:1–22, 2007). In this paper I examine the intensional and extensional approaches to prototype compositionality, arguing that neither succeeds in their present formulations. I then propose a hybrid extensional theory of prototype compositionality, according to which the extension of a complex concept is determined as a function of what triggers its constituent prototypes. I argue that the theory escapes the problems traditionally raised against extensional theories of compositionality.
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Notes
The prototype theorist might reply that prototypes need not necessarily include any specific features (such as has flat tires in the case of beach bicycle). But the main point here is that a speaker need not grasp any of the emergent features in order to grasp the complex concept beach bicycle; it suffices that she grasps the constituent concepts (as I will argue in what follows).
Even if the intensional representations we form of a complex concept were in fact insufficient to determine its extension, this does not mean that they do not have any role in cognition; they can clearly drive our category inferences, among other things. But if they are incapable of determining reference, then their possession is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for possessing a concept (if by possessing a concept we mean, minimally, that a subject is capable of referring with it).
Deciding which features of an object are salient, or which communicate a significant amount of information, arguably involves some (non-semantic) world-knowledge. This would not be acceptable on a purely extensional account of compositionality, but on a hybrid variety it arguably is.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Jussi Haukioja and Valtteri Arstila for helpful comments and discussions. This work was supported by the Academy of Finland (grants 214088 and 127567).
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Jylkkä, J. Hybrid Extensional Prototype Compositionality. Minds & Machines 21, 41–56 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9217-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9217-8