Minds and Machines

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 423-439

First online:

Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

  • Jon CogburnAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Louisiana State University Email author 
  • , Jason MegilAffiliated with

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We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.


Mechanism Church’s thesis Computational theory of mind Dualism Inferentialism Platonism Lucas-Penrose argument Brandom Dummett Detlefsen Wright