References
Churchland, P. 2011. Braintrust: What neuroscience tells us about morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Crowell, S.G. 2013. Normativity and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Glendinning, S. 1998. On being with others: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida. London: Routledge.
Hrdy, S.B. 2009. Mothers and others: The evolutionary origins of mutual understanding. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Katzman, R. 1976. The prevalence and malignancy of Alzheimer disease: a major killer. Archives of Neurology 33: 217–218.
Kontos, P.C. 2006. Embodied selfhood an ethnographic exploration of Alzheimer’s disease. In Thinking about dementia: Culture, loss and anthropology of senility, ed. A. Leibing, and L. Cohen, 195–217. Piscataway (NJ): Rutgers University Press.
Locke, J. 1869. An essay concerning human understanding. London: William Tegg.
McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and world. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Mead, M. 2013. The sense of an ending. The New Yorker May 13th issue.
Nagel, T. 2012. Mind and cosmos. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. 1975. Mind, language and reality, philosophical papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sacks, O. 1987. The man who mistook his wife for a hat, and other clinical tales. New York: Harper.
Schutz, A. 1967. The phenomenology of the social world. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.
Segal, G.M. 2000. A slim book about narrow content. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Shakespeare, T. 2014. Disability right and wrong revisited, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Tallis, R. 2012. Aping mankind: Neuromania, darwinists and the misrepresentation of humanity. Durham: Acumen.
Varela, F.J., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. 1991. The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lehmann, J., Barilan, Y.M. De-constructing de-mentia: a personal and person oriented perspective of de-personalization and moral status. Med Health Care and Philos 18, 153–158 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-014-9613-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-014-9613-6