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Reinterpreting the ‘quickening’ perspective in the abortion debate

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Abstract

Personhood constitutes the pivotal point in the abortion debate. There exists a diversity of views as to when foetal personhood actually starts—from conception and implantation to viability and even birth. One perspective that has lost support for decades is that of quickening, a stance associated with Lord Ellenborough’s 1803 Act. This paper attempts to put quickening back into the limelight, albeit through a new interpretation. After discussing its philosophy and underpinning rationale, I will assess a number of arguments that have been directed against quickening as a viable point of distinction. I conclude by suggesting that according to modern proponents of quickening proponents, rational soul ensoulment begins after a certain degree of cerebral cortical formation has been realized, thus marking foetal volition, which promotes foetal interests, for the first time.

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Notes

  1. Locke believed in the prohibition of abortion at whatever stage as a matter of first principles. However, on the question as to when the rational soul or ‘I’— and thus personhood may I add—arises, he writes “and it is so hard to imagine the rational soul should presently inhabit the yet unformed embryo…” (see [17, p. 127]). Interestingly, the formed foetus according to Hippocrates, and therefore maybe Locke as well, occurred at 3-4 months (depending on the gender), a stance closely linked with quickening (see [2, p. 20]).

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Correspondence to Farrokh B. Sekaleshfar.

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Sekaleshfar, F.B. Reinterpreting the ‘quickening’ perspective in the abortion debate. Theor Med Bioeth 30, 161–171 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-009-9102-8

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