Abstract
In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre’s exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre’s theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following theory: self-deception is to be accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states. The latter are self-deceptive in so far as they claim certainty while nevertheless being accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. For Sartre, developing this rather peculiar account of self-deception, is, as we will see, not primarily intended as an end in itself. Rather, Sartre thereby hopes to illuminate the nature of self-awareness as (i.) epistemically super-secure, (ii.) pre-reflexive, (iii.) non-positional and “embryonic” knowledge that (iv.) does not necessitate but can still ground epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge, and (v.) that can replace Freud’s notion of unconscious knowledge. As an account of self-deception, Sartre’s suggestion, however, comes at a high price. Apart from the presuppositions Sartre makes in the theory of consciousness and intentionality, his account is deflationist with regard to local cases of self-deception.
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Notes
Sartre, Jean-Paul (2010, p. 56).
See Sartre (2010, Introduction part VI).
“[L]' être par qui le néant vient au monde doit être son propre néant.” Sartre (2010, p 57).
Sartre speaks of “une néantisation qui serait exercée au sein même de l'immanence; c'est dans l'immanence absolue, dans la subjectivité pure du cogito instantané,” Sartre (2010, p. 80).
Sartre (2010, p. 63).
Sartre (2010, p. 64).
“L'angoisse est donc la saisie réfléxive de la liberté par elle-même,” Sartre (2010, p. 74).
See the following homology claim for the relation between the two alternatives. Sartre often speaks of a denial of anxiety, which is a bit unclear, since anxiety is explicitly introduced as reflexive consciousness, not as pre-reflexive consciousness. What is denied in impure reflection is not anxiety as reflexive consciousness but the kind of consciousness that were to result in an anxious reflexive consciousness were it accessed in impure reflection.
Sartre (2010, p. 75).
“[J]e puis me rendre de mauvaise foi dans l'appréhension de l'angoisse que je suis et cette mauvaise foi, destinée à combler le néant que je suis dans mon rapport à moi-même, implique précisément ce néant qu'elle supprime.” Sartre (2010, p. 79).
“[L]e mari révèle à Stekel que sa femme a donné des signes objectifs de plaisir et ce sont ces signes que sa femme, interrogée, s'applique farouchement à nier.” Sartre (2010, p. 89).
“Pareillement les confessions que Stekel sait provoquer nous apprennent que les femmes pathologiquement frigides s'appliquent à se distraire par avance du plaisir qu'elles redoutent,” Sartre (2010, p. 89).
In the Stekel case, these distractions are meant “pour se prouver qu'elle est frigide.” Sartre (2010, p. 89).
Sartre cites terms like “belief“, “possibility” or “I” that play a part in concealing the quasi-givens of apprehension.
I omit the term “knowledge” since, as we will see, pre-reflexive apprehensions are not really knowledge. Sartre regards philosophical accounts of psychological determinism as a clear-cut case concerning (CFii.) (see Sartre (2010, pp. 75f); his example of the waiter would be a clear (CFiii.)-case. See Sartre (2010, pp. 94ff).
On a more fine-grained discussion see Chisholm, Roderick M. and Thomas D. Feehan. (1977).
Sartre (2010, p. 83).
Sartre (2010, p. 83).
Sartre also hopes to rule out accounts pertaining to false consciousness or collectives as primary epistemic agents (I borrow this term from Rorty, Amély Oksenberg (1994). As he points out, ideologies or belief collectives can only get a grip on the individual upon an initial permission from her side. I will not comment on Sartre's point here. On Sartre's early stance towards ideologies and mauvaise foi see Geyer, Paul. (1999).
See a.o. Davidson, Donald. (2004).
The third one centers around Sartre's reading of Freud's censorship for which, as Sartre points out, the question of self-deception re-emerges. See Sartre (2010, pp. 87f).
Kearney, Richard. (1998, p. 256); Wood, Allen W. Wood 1988; Soll, Ivan. 1981); Gennaro, Rocco J. (2002). See also Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick in their Introduction to the English edition of La transcendence de l' ego (Williams, Forrest, and Robert Kirkpatrick (1960, p. 17). But see Flynn, Thomas (2003, p. 73).
On the selectivity problem, see Bermúdez, José-Luis. (2000).
Knowledge seems to come in on different levels as other-deception exposes. Assuming that deception is intentional, I should minimally know that I deceive you about a certain fact (e.g. that Juergen Habermas has just been awarded the Nobel Prize). But this is not all. If I want to be successful in my deceptive enterprise, I should should also be able to detect counter-warrants as counter-warrants to my deceptive enterprise in order to re-interpret them, play them down or let them disappear (e.g. the newspaper announcing the real winner). Thus, deceivers should know extremely well where to scent danger for their project.
What would ruin Freud's basis for assuming psychic resistance.
“[A]cquiring a belief is a long-term process involving much carefully focusing of attention, selective evidence-gathering, acting as if the belief was true, and so forth. It seems likely that the further in one is in the process, and the more successful one has been in the process of internalizing the belief, the more likely one will be to have lost touch with the original motivation [to have a certain belief …],” Bermúdez (2000, p. 314). For a pretense-adaption of the processual account see Gendler, Tamar Szabó. (2007).
Furthermore, processual accounts seem to have to take recourse to unconscious states or intentions. But, if the processual account requires a Freudian unconscious, Sartre will repeat his first line of objection. If not, Sartre will ask for an alternative account of the unconscious or of unconscious states or intentions. For a concession of this requirement, see Bermúdez, who holds: “An action can be performed unknowingly even though the intention that gave rise to it was (at the time it was formulated) fully conscious […] The fact that an action is precipitated by a conscious intention does not entail that while carrying out the action one remains constantly conscious of the intention that gave rise to it.” Bermúdez (2000, p. 314).
For a detailed critique see Wood (1988, pp. 209–213). When Wood points out that Sartre requires a notion of the unconscious, he is right, but misses the point that Sartre tries to come up with his own version.
I will neglect Sartre's crucial reinterpretation. For this see Zahavi, Dan. (2008).
“Pourtant la condition nécessaire […] pour qu'une conscience connaissante soit connaissance de son objet, c'est qu'elle soit conscience d'elle-même comme étant cette connaissance. C'est une condition nécessaire : si ma conscience n'était pas conscience d'être conscience de table, elle serait donc conscience de cette table sans avoir conscience de l'être ou, si l'on veut, une conscience qui s'ignorerait soi-même, une conscience inconsciente – ce qui est absurde.” Sartre (2010, p. 18).
“La conscience de soi n'est pas couple. Il faut, si nous voulons éviter la régression à l'infini, qu'elle soit rapport immédiat et non-cognitif de soi à soi […] tout conscience positionnelle d'objet est en même temps conscience non-positionelle d'elle-même.” Sartre (2010, p. 19).
“Ist dies richtig, so liegt darin ein neuer Grund zu unendlicher Verwickelung, insofern wir […] eine unendliche Reihe von Phänomenen enthalten, in der die einzelnen Glieder selbst mehr und mehr in's Unendliche sich verwickeln. Das scheint nun aber eine sehr missliche Annahme; ja die Annahme ist offenbar absurd.” (Brentano, Franz. 1974, p. 160).
I will not evaluate Sartre's attack of Higher Order Theories of Consciousness (HOT). It has even been claimed that Sartre himself offers a version of HOT. See Gennaro. If Gennaro concludes that Sartre is logically committed to unconscious thoughts in some sense, he is right. But Sartre never says that he is not.
At one point, Brentano points out that assuming a non-intentional consciousness is more absurd than a state not accompanied by self-awareness: “Eine Vorstellung des Tones ohne Vorstellung des Hörens wäre, von vorn herein wenigstens nicht undenkbar; eine Vorstellung des Hörens ohne Vorstellung des Tones dagegen ein offenbarer Widerspruch.” Brentano (1974, p. 167).
Sartre (2010, p. 20). Obviously, this has to be read as: intentionality (or: an intentional act) implies self-consciousness and not that a conscious act implies self-consciousness.
I speak of Cartesian knowledge in a rather broad sense which refers to something like doubt-immune and possibly foundational reflexive knowledge, a sense that Sartre seems to endorse.
To get rid of a misunderstanding; Sartre does not wish to say that we have a special kind of knowledge (say: infallible, incorrigible and immediate) of the entirety of our psychic states and can never be mistaken about, say, our wishes, desires and the like. For one thing, Sartre grants that there is such a thing as impure reflection; for another thing, Sartre makes a sharp difference between the psychic life of the ego in a broad and the life of consciousness in the narrow sense. On this see Sartre, Jean-Paul. (1966).
Sartre seems to assume that once we can account for epistemically-super-secure reflexive knowledge, we have all reason to assume that there is such a thing as epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge.
Sartre (2010, p. 191).
Sartre (2010, p. 19).
Sartre (2010, p. 111).
According to Haight, self-deception breaks the neck of Sartre's account (see Haight, Mary Rowland. 1980. A Study of Self-Deception. New York: Harvester Press). Morris makes a rather implausible attempt to defend Sartre in drawing a difference between transparency and Sartre's notion of translucent consciousness. Morris, Phyllis Sutton. (1992).
Sartre (2010, p. 84).
Sartre (2010, p. 80).
Many discussions of Sartre's account of self-deception begin with Sartre's enigmatic examples, which he develops in the second part of his discussion. As valuable as they may be, they overlook that Sartre does not regard his phenomenological survey as sufficient to set these cases apart from ordinary lying. See Sartre (2010, p. 102). See also Wood (1988).
Sartre (2010, p. 103).
For an astute etymological reflection see Geyer (1999).
I use the expression state for what Sartre would call “a singular consciousness“. On Sartre's notion of state see Sartre (1966).
Sartre defines croyance (which is equivalent to foi alias belief*) as “l'adhésion de l'être à son objet, lorsque l'objet n'est pas donné ou est donné indistinctement,” Sartre (2010, p. 103), see also Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2005, p. 315). L'Imaginaire introduces a further difference between the objects in so far as there can be belief* in objects as realities and belief in objects not as realities. Whereas the former specification pertains to the mode of belief* under consideration here, the latter is the property of dreams. See Sartre (2005, p. 315). This difference is important to make sense of Sartre's claim that croyance is “fascination sans position d’existence,” Sartre (2005, p. 326). This can, obviously, only refer to the second kind of belief*, i.e. belief* in objects-as-no-realities (i.e. dreaming).
“[I]l lui conférais un existence crue ou croyable,” Sartre (2005, p. 315). Sartre assumes that in their reflexive character, they pertain to an affirmation on the part of the subject. See Sartre (2005, p. 315) and Sartre (2010, p. 103). It might seem that Sartre is thereby prone to an account of mauvaise foi in terms of epistemic voluntarism. For reasons not given here, I do not think this is the case.
Sartre (2010, p. 103).
All phenomena emerging from impure reflection belong here. On the possible identification of impure reflection and reflecting de mauvaise foi see Sartre (2010, p. 196) (“En un mot la réflexion est de mauvaise foi en tant qu'elle se constitue comme dévoilement de l'objet que je me suis.“) On this kind of reflection, see Sartre (2010, pp. 185–208) as well as Sartre (1966).
For the conditioning, see La Transcendence de l'ego, where Sartre points out that impure reflection, whose evidential mode seems to be equivalent to belief*, is constitutive. See also Sartre (2010, p. 198) for an exceptional claim that psychic states can be evidentially given.
On le besoin see Sartre (2005, p. 314). On the specific interest in what these states disclose, see e.g. Sartre (2010, p. 200). To adopt Sartre's example: If I declare that my husband loves me, I can think of him as if his future were in a way determined as that of a lover-of-me which, in turn, gives me security.
“Lorsque je perçois une table, je ne crois pas à l'existence de cette table. Je n'ai nul besoin d'y croire, puisqu'elle est là en personne.” Sartre (2005, p. 314).
See Sartre (2010, p. 103). Sartre unfortunately frames these specification in a highly voluntarist vocabulary, which goes against the idea of the specifications gathered so far and would, in fact, make Sartre's attempt regressive. Sartre hopes to stop the regress by pointing out: “La décision d'être de mauvaise foi n'ose pas dire son nom,” Sartre (2010, p. 103).
Sartre stresses the importance of ambiguity under II when he calls mauvaise foi “un certain art de former des concepts contradictoires, c'est-à-dire qui unissent en eux une idée et la négation de cette idée.” Sartre (2010, p. 91).
“… un terme indifféremment utilisé pour indiquer l'inébranlable fermeté de la croyance […] et son caractère désarmé et strictement subjectif.” Sartre (2010, p. 104).
Sartre (2005, p. 314).
One might try to say that only what Sartre calls sincerity is blind trust whereas self-deception is something over and above sincerity in so far as mauvaise foi is reflexive. But this does not help. If sincerity is nothing but mauvaise foi's pre-reflexive mode of being, it has to be mauvaise foi and our problem re-emerges.
I take this expression from Kemmerling, Andreas. (2012).
See a.o. Husserl, Edmund. (1976, §44).
See Introduction III; see also Sartre (2010, p. 190): “Sa connaissance est totalitaire, c'est une intuition fulgurante et sans relief, sans point de départ ni point d'arrivée. Toute est donné à la fois dans une sorte de proximité absolue.”
Sartre (2010, p. 104).
Sartre (2005, p. 313).
With regard to the givens of impure reflection, Sartre introduces a second kind of unconscious knowledge as is evident in the following passage: “si le projet fondamental est pleinement vécu par le sujet et, comme tel, totalement conscient, cela ne signifie nullement qu'il doive être du même coup connu par lui, tout au contraire; nos lecteurs se souviendront peut- être du soin que nous avons mis dans note Introduction à distinguer conscience et connaissance [unconscious 1 ]. Certes, nous l'avons vu aussi, la réflexion peut être considérée comme une quasi-connaissance. Mais ce qu'elle saisit à chaque instant, ce n'est pas pur projet du pour-soi tel qu'il est symboliquement exprimé [unconscious 2 ] […] c'est le comportement concret lui-même […] Elle saisit à la fois symbole et symbolisation […] Mais [elle] ne s'ensuit pas qu'elle dispose des instruments et des techniques nécessaires pour isoler le choix symbolisé, pour le fixer par des concepts et pour le mettre tout seul en pleine lumière.” Sartre (2010, p. 616).
Given that subjectivity is pre-reflexively aware of its projects and intentions without positing them as known and without apprehending itself as knowing them, there is unconscious knowledge 1.
As Sartre has pointed out in La transcendence de l'ego, this realm of pure reflection is restricted to the Erlebnis as an instantaneous quasi-given and does not pertain to psychic states, actions and qualities that essentially transgress the boundaries of presentistic pure reflection in so far as they are temporally perspectival objects (Sartre speaks of psychic states as “l'unité organisée” “d'un Passé, d'un Présent et d'un Avenir”, Sartre 2010, p. 200). Given that these self-ascribable states are only the objects of impure reflection and, as Sartre furthermore notes, constituted in impure reflection, the ontology of these psychological entities undermines the fact that there can be pre-reflexive awareness of them in the first place. Thus, we can lack self-knowledge of these states and still appear to others as acting upon them. This results in a new sense of unconscious knowledge 2.
The latter lack of self-knowledge cannot, however, ground self-deception. In itself, it is a mere lack of knowledge. To turn this lack into a moment of self-deception, one would have to say that one is acting truly on the third-personally ascribed belief. Sartre cannot assume this for the reason that, for him, psychic states (including standing beliefs) are not motivational grounds but retrospective folk psychological projective reification which are, as Sartre further assumes, themselves nothing but functions of self-deception. (“Ainsi, bien se connaître', c'est fatalement prendre sur soi le point de vue d'autrui, c'est-à-dire un point de vue forcément faux.” (Sartre 1966, p. 63). Thus, this lack of self-knowledge can only be self-deceptive in so far as it points back to our above analysis in the following way: Given that pre-reflexive awareness has an inbuilt standard of knowledge which is domain-sensitive (i.e. it is sensitive to the limits of pure reflection), one must be pre-reflexively aware that the objects of impure reflection transcend the realm of doubt-immune knowability. If subjects self-ascribe psychic states and feel warranted in doing so, they are self-deceived in so far as they are somehow aware that their ‚certain' self-ascriptions transcend the realm of the certain.
See also Wider, Kathleen. (1989).
Sartre (2010, p. 103).
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Thanks to an anonymous referee whose feedback helped me to clarify many points of the paper.
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Neuber, S. Self-awareness and self-deception: a Sartrean perspective. Cont Philos Rev 49, 485–507 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-016-9368-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-016-9368-2