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Self and other: from pure ego to co-constituted we

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Abstract

In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution.

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Notes

  1. Meltzoff and Moore (1995, p. 88).

  2. Meltzoff and Moore (1995, p. 88).

  3. Metzinger (2003, p. 1).

  4. Metzinger (2003, p. 626; 2011, p. 280).

  5. Metzinger (2011, p. 294).

  6. Metzinger (2011, p. 293).

  7. Sartre (2003, p. 100).

  8. See, for instance, Husserl (1973b, p. 351), Sartre (2003, p. 100), Henry (1963, p. 581), Zahavi (2005, 2009).

  9. Dretske (1995, pp. 100–101).

  10. Dretske (2003, p. 8).

  11. See Zahavi (2014).

  12. Taylor (1989, p. 49).

  13. Korsgaard (2009, p. 43).

  14. Schechtman (2011) and Rudd (2012).

  15. Cf. Husserl (1952, p. 97).

  16. Husserl (1973b, p. 351).

  17. Husserl (1952, p. 97).

  18. Husserl (1976, p. 179).

  19. Prinz (2003, p. 515).

  20. Prinz (2012, p. 35, 182).

  21. Prinz (2003, p. 517).

  22. Prinz (2003, p. 526).

  23. Maclaren (2008).

  24. See Zahavi (2010, 2011, 2012).

  25. Dennett (1987, pp. 153–154).

  26. Cf. Gurwitsch (1979, pp. 24–25), Stein (1989, pp. 21–24).

  27. Husserl (1952, p. 375)—translation modified.

  28. Husserl (1959, p. 176).

  29. Husserl (1973a, p. 352).

  30. Cialdini et al. (1997).

  31. Husserl (1950, p. 144; 1973b, p. 631).

  32. Husserl (1973a, pp. 8–9, 442). See also Scheler (2008, pp. 46, 49).

  33. Fink (2012, p. 295).

  34. Scheler (2008, pp. 65–66)—translation modified.

  35. Scheler (2008, pp. 9–10).

  36. Cassirer (1957, pp. 63, 65).

  37. Heidegger (2001, p. 145), Gurwitsch (1979, pp. 104, 108, 112).

  38. Husserl (1973a, pp. 140, 287; 1952, p. 168), Stein (1989, pp. 61–62).

  39. Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. 369).

  40. But see Zahavi (2014).

  41. Frith (2007, p. 175).

  42. See Zahavi (2001).

  43. Reddy (2008, pp. 97–98).

  44. Reddy (2008, p. 91).

  45. Reddy (2008, pp. 92, 98).

  46. Tomasello (2001, p. 90), Hobson (2002, p. 82).

  47. Reddy (2008, p. 145).

  48. Reddy (2008, pp. 126–7, 137, 143, 203).

  49. Mead (1962, p. 138).

  50. Sartre (2003, pp. 287, 291, 451, 544).

  51. Husserl (1952, pp. 167–169; 1959, pp. 136–137; 1973b, pp. 13, 665).

  52. Neisser (1991, pp. 203–204).

  53. Carr (1986, p. 161).

  54. Schutz (1967, pp. 156–157).

  55. Zahavi (2014, 2015).

  56. Husserl (1973a, p. 211).

  57. Husserl (1952, pp. 242, 250).

  58. Hobson (2008, p. 386).

  59. Hobson and Hobson (2007, p. 415).

  60. Hobson (2007, p. 270), cf. Reddy (2008).

  61. Schmid (2005, pp. 145, 149, 296).

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Zahavi, D. Self and other: from pure ego to co-constituted we. Cont Philos Rev 48, 143–160 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9328-2

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