A reflection on analytical work in marketing: Three points of consensus
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This article presents three points of consensus about game-theoretic work in marketing: First, equilibrium analysis is necessary for studying situations that have strategic interactions. In many cases, empirical examination of these strategic scenarios is difficult or impossible, at least without the guidance of an equilibrium model. Second, more general models are not necessarily “better,” because institutional details matter. Thus, the appropriate compromise between generality and specificity depends on the scope of the research question. Finally, there should be a two-way road between theory and empirics—theory is necessary to interpret empirical results, while empirical findings should guide theoretical modeling choices.
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- A reflection on analytical work in marketing: Three points of consensus
Volume 23, Issue 2 , pp 381-389
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- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer US
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- Analytical work
- Game theory
- Equilibrium analysis
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. UCLA Anderson School of Management, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, 90095-1481, CA, USA
- 2. Berkeley Haas School of Business, Berkeley, CA, USA
- 3. Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT, USA
- 4. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
- 5. Jones School of Business, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
- 6. Duke Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC, USA
- 7. School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA
- 8. Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
- 9. Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA, USA