Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

The cross-border hostile bid fight between Scania in Sweden and the two German companies MAN and Volkswagen: institutional change and the mandatory bid rule

  • Published:
Journal of Management & Governance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

International hostile takeovers provide a unique context for studying how corporate governance mechanisms migrate across countries. This paper is prompted by a case study of the cross-border takeover fight between the target companies Scania (Sweden) and MAN (Germany) and the involvement of the owners of Volkswagen, Porsche (both Germany) and Investor (Sweden), 1999–2014. It reveals how incumbent owners in Germany and Sweden—two countries with a history of corporate control through blockholdings, corporatist-governance, state control (Germany) and multiple voting shares (Sweden)—manage to take advantage of the minority shareholders through arbitraging the differences in implementation of a new governance device across borders. The study focuses in particular on the mandatory bid rule (MBR) that forces a shareholder who passes a certain threshold of ownership to bid for the rest of the shares. The study reveals over twenty incidents of breaches of the idea of the MBR, to the detriment of minority shareholders. Building on institutional theory and sociology, the study provides useful insight into how incumbent actors may use bargaining power to capture a new regulation and circumvent it. Furthermore, the case illustrates the importance of legitimacy in the efforts to converge corporate governance systems. Thirdly, it adds to the critique of the mandatory bid rule in countries with a governance system supporting blockholders. Overall, the study raises a number of important issues regarding how national politics shape corporate governance and responds to new actors and coalitions of actors entering the scene. A convergence of takeover regulation not compatible with the legal framework might result in a less efficient than anticipated outcome of the market for corporate control. These results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective that key actors may have a vested interest in resisting change.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Ahead of the adoption of the EU Takeover Directive of 2004 there was pressure to stop the system of differential voting shares. The equal treatment of all shareholders is further addressed through the voluntary Breakthrough Rule (Article 11 of the Takeover Directive).

  2. This line of reasoning relates to compensation in cases where minority shareholders act as free riders and the controlling shareholder wishes to receive part of the bid premium in a sale (Grossman and Hart 1980). In some circumstances, it may even be preferable to allow for different prices, to ensure that the deal goes through (Easterbrook and Fischel 1981).

  3. This was named NBK, Näringslivets börskommitté, Commerce Stock Exchange Committee. It was founded in 1968, as a joint initiative by the Confederation of Swedish Industries and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce with the aim of promoting good practices on the Swedish stock market.

  4. Among actors exempted excepted from the MBR because ownership surpassed 30 % were a number of foundations and families with high societal standing (for a list see SIS Ownership service Ägarservice 2003).

  5. “The MBR becomes the new law”. News agency TT, 16 February 2006. This and subsequent translations from Swedish media are the author’s own.

  6. The SFSA has delegated to the Swedish Securities Council the duties referred to in Ch. 7 § 10 of the Act on Public Takeover Offers on the Stock Market (FFFS 2006:4). This means that it is incumbent upon the Council to rule on a number of issues related to the mandatory bid rule.

  7. Finland settled for a 30 % trigger as well as a 50 % trigger, Denmark and Italy apply a 33 % threshold and a 50 % threshold. Norway let companies from EU members comply with their domestic thresholds. For domestic companies and companies outside the EU thresholds are set at 33, 40 and 50 %.

  8. Hopt and Leyens (2004) offer a number of accounts of the development of German corporate governance; also in Fligstein (2001).

  9. For an account on German Takeover regulation see Cioffi (2002), Gordon (2004) and Hopt and Leyens (2004).

  10. Other examples are the creation of antitrust issues, change of the financing structure, counter-offer for the takeover of the bidder (‘Pac Man’ offer), severance packages for management board (‘golden parachutes’) and agreements on change of control clauses.

  11. German Corporate Governance Code (2006) and German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (2004), WpÜG.

  12. The years 1998–2008 I covered Scania in a previous role as financial journalist for different media in Stockholm. The study here, however, is based solely on publicly available material.

  13. Swedish media is full of examples of Östling’s negative stance on consolidation in the industry, e.g. Swärd, L and Larsson Ask, B. “The Volvo–Scania deal: An all Swedish solution put thousands of jobs in danger”, Svenska Dagbladet, 17 January 1999.

  14. “Scania CEO shuns merger”. Reuters wire service, 2 October 2003.

  15. Nachemson-Ekwall, S. “Ready to step down”. Dagens Industri, Dimension, 1 July 2010.

  16. See e.g. Hammarström, M. “Investor, largest investor in Ainax”. Dagens Industri. 15 June 2004; Billing, A. “Investor can circumvent mandatory bid”. Veckans Affärer, 23 August 2004; Ibid. “Scania. Hidden share purchases by the Wallenbergs”. Veckans Affärer. 8 November 2004.

  17. The sell-out was part of the unwinding of the crossholding in German industry. An account of the modernization and marketization of German AG is offered in Jenikins, P. and R. Milne, R. “Binding German companies to foreign interest”, Financial Times, 31 March 2005.

  18. The term ‘free float’ refers to the portion of a firm’s shares that are available for trade, i.e. not part of long-term shareholdings. Obviously, the shares in a firm that are subject to trade can change.

  19. Nachemson-Ekwall, S. “Document: the fight over Scania: Handelsbanken left in the cold by Investor”. Dagens Industri. 6 December 2006.

  20. Ibid.

  21. Nachemson-Ekwall, S. “Scania and MAN—an industrial logical merger can never be stopped”. Dagens Industri. 13 September 2006.

  22. Mackintosh, J and Milne, R. “Pischetsrieder dismisses MAN bid”. Financial Times, 26 September 2006.

  23. Björk, M, Jonsson, J and Nachemson-Ekwall, S. “Merger rumours grow in Scania/MAN”. Dagens Industri, 6 October 2006. “Investor: Does not rule out counter bid on MAN”, Newswire Direkt, 12 October 2006.

  24. Nachemson-Ekwall, S., 6 December 2006.

  25. Reported in all papers, see Dagens Nyheter, 25 September 2006; Realtid.se, 12 October 2006; Affärsvärlden, 31 October 2006.

  26. See e.g. Betts, P. and Milne, R. “Volkswagens feuds”. Financial Times, 8 November 2006.

  27. Nachemson-Ekwall, S. “VW gains clearance to buy more in Scania”. Dagens Industri, 29 September 2007.

  28. Nachemson-Ekwall, S. “Secret plan for MAN-purchase”, Dagens Industri, 18 October 2007.

  29. The Swedish Financial Authority discussed the VW exception from the Mandatory Bid Rule in a statement of April 10 2008, “MAN does not need to bid for Scania”. According to SFSA it could be claimed that MAN’s holding should be added to VW’s holding, which would then trigger the Mandatory Bid Rule. However as no party had objected to the decision by the Securities Council, SFSA could not act on its own. To this was added that VW in the next step was not to be hit by the MBR as VW had already been granted a general exception to the MBR.

  30. Pehrson, J. “Parliament must listen to the Swedish Securities Council”. Dagens Industri. 7 March 2008; Tandan, E. “DI Debate: Introduce a mandatory bid at 50 and 67 %”. Dagens Industri. 7 March 2008; Andersson, M., Lagerqvist, M. Norman, P. and Grefbäck, P. “Treat all shareholders equal”. Dagens Nyheter, 5 April 2008.

  31. The issue is still very delicate in Sweden but is supported by a number of anecdotal reports and anonymous comments in the Swedish media.

  32. Robur and Alecta, joint press release 19 March 2010.

  33. ”Volkswagen moves key step closer to integrated commercial vehicles group”. VW Press Release, 9 November 2011.

  34. Hägerstrand, A. “VWs coup at the AGM—Institutional investors outraged over German activities in Scania”. Dagens Industri, 5 May 2012.

  35. “Outrage over VW’s abandonment of nomination committee”. Svd.se, 6 May 2013.

  36. VW Press Release, “Volkswagen announces a cash offer to the shareholders of Scania”. 21 February 2014.

  37. “Morgan Stanley Fairness Opinion”, 16 March 2014.

  38. “Swedbank says yes to VW”. Swedbank Press Release. 24 April 2014.

  39. There were other market places, such as the Nordic Growth Market, an exchange, and Aktietorget, an authorized market place that did comply with the SSE’s listing requirements. If Ainax had been listed there, shareholders would have had to flag.

  40. It is fair here to mention that the Swedish Social Democratic government had acted in support of the Swedish model with multiple voting rights during the work with the 13th Takeover Directive.

  41. The complication is mentioned in a statement from the Swedish Securities Council (AMN 2006a:44).

  42. AMN (2007a:08); “Exemption to the mandatory bid”, public on 7 March 2007). Also, VW asked for exception when increasing shareholding in Scania up till 49.9 % (AMN 2007b:36, September 28).

  43. Ibid.

  44. 4 October 2006 VW bought 15 % of the shares in MAN. On 11 October 2006 MAN announced that it had acquired 14.27 % voting interest (11.48 % of capital) in Scania. VW increased its shareholding in MAN from 15 % until 29.9 % on 27 February 2007. At the time VW had 18.7 % of capital and 34 % of votes, and the offer was based on the capital holding alone.

  45. Ibid.

  46. SFSA, 10 April 2008, “Decision regarding a possible mandatory bid in Scania AB, FI Reg. no. 08-3068.

  47. Selznick (1996) questions the focus on shareholder value and profit maximization as an overreaching goal for managers rather than what is good for the company and its stakeholders.

References

  • Angblad, J., Berglöf, E., Högfeldt, P., & Svancar, H. (2001). Ownership and control in Sweden: Strong owners, weak minorities, and social control. In F. Barca & M. Becht (Eds.), The control of corporate Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aoki, M. (2001). Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aoki, M. (2006). Whither Japan’s corporate governance? In M. Aoki, G. Jackson, & H. Miyajima (Eds.), Corporate governance in Japan: Institutional change and organizational diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bebchuk, L. A., & Hamdani, A. (2009). The elusive quest for global governance standards. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157, 1263–1317.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bebchuk, L., & Roe, M. (1998). A theory of path dependence in corporate governance and ownership. Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper, 131. 4 July.

  • Becht, M. (2003). Reciprocity in takeovers. ECGI Law Working Paper, 14.

  • Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2002). Corporate governance and control. ECGI Finance working paper 2. http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=343461.

  • Berglöf, E., & Burkart, M. (2003). European takeover regulation. Economic Policy, 18(36), 171–213.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berle, A. A., & Means, C.G. (1932/1968). The modern corporation and private property. New York: MacMillan.

  • Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (2006). Minority blocks and takeover premia. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 162(1), 32–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burkart, M., & Lee, P. (2008). One share, one vote: The theory. Review of Finance, 12, 1–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burkart, M., & Panunzi, F. (2008). Takeovers. In X. Freixas, P. Hartmann, & C. Mayer (Eds.), Financial markets and institutions: A European perspective (pp. 265–297). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • CEPS, Centre for European Policy Studies (MARKT/2012/10/F) The takeover bid directive assessment report. Report for the European Commission. Together with Marcus Partners & Mazar’s Group.

  • Cioffi, J. (2000). Governing globalization, the state, law and structural change in corporate governance. Journal of Law and Society, 27, 572–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cioffi, J. (2002). Restructuring Germany inc.: The politics of company and takeover law reform in Germany and the European Union. Law and Politics, 24, 355–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coffee, J. C. (1991). Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate monitor. Columbia Law Review, 91, 1277–1368.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coffee, J. C. (1999). The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93, 641–708.

    Google Scholar 

  • Commission Directive. (2004/25/EC). Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids.

  • Davies, R., & Haldane, A. (2011). The short long, speech at 29th Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money and Finance? Brussels, May.

  • Davies, P., Schuster, E. P., & van de Walle de Ghelcke, E. (2010). The takeover directive as a protectionist tool. ECGI Law Working Paper, 141.

  • DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1991). Introduction. In W. Powell & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 1–38). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook, F., & Fischel, D. (1981). The proper role of a target’s management in responding to a tender offer. Harvard Law Review, 94(6), 1161–1204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Enriques, L. (2003). The mandatory bid rule in the proposed EC takeover directive: Harmonization as rent-seeking? In G. Ferrarini, J. Winter, & K. J. Hopt (Eds.), Reforming company and takeover law in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Enriques, L. (2010). European takeover law: The case for a neutral approach. Fondanzione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working paper, Institutions and Market Series, F. Panunzi (Eds.).

  • Enriques, L. & Gatti, M. (2006). EC reforms of corporate governance and capital markets law: Do they tackle insiders’ opportunism? ECGI Law Working Paper, June 30.

  • Fligstein, N. (1990). The transformation of corporate control. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fligstein, N. (2001). The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of twenty-first-century capitalist societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fligstein, N., & Choo, J. (2005). Law and corporate governance: Annual review. Law Social Science, 1, 61–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. (2009). Ownership: Evolution and regulation. Review of Financial Studies, 22(10), 4009–4056.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • German Corporate Governance Code. (2006). Cromme Commission: Government Commission German Corporate Governance Code. Berlin.

  • German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. (2004). WpÜG. BaFin.

  • Gilson, R. (2006). Controlling shareholders and corporate governance: Complicating the comparative taxonomy. Harvard Law Review, 119, 1641–1679.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goergen, M., Manjon, M. C., & Renneboog, L. (2008). Recent developments in German corporate governance. International Review of Law and Economics,  28(3), 175–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, J. (2004). An American perspective on the new German anti- takeover law. ECGI Law Working Paper, 2.

  • Gourevitch, P., & Shinn, J. (2005). Political power and corporate control: The new global politics of corporate governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–493.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grant J., Kirchmaier, J., & Kirshner, J. (2009). Financial tunnelling and the mandatory bid rule. ECGI Financial Working Paper, 536.

  • Grossman, P., & Hart, O. (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, J. L. (2003). The mandatory bid rule: The rise to prominence of a misconception. In Scandinavian Studies in Law. (pp. 173–192). Stockholm: Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law.

  • Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R. (2001). The end of history of corporate law. Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 439–468.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heine, K. (2013). Inside the black box: Incentive regulation and incentive channelling on energy markets. Journal of Management and Governance, 17, 157–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henrekson, M., & Jakobsson, U. (2005). The Swedish model of ownership and corporate control in transition. In H. Huizinga & L. Jonung (Eds.), Who will own Europe? The internationalisation of asset ownership in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henrekson, M., & Jakobsson, U. (2012). The Swedish corporate control model: Convergence, persistence or decline? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20, 212–227.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Högfeldt, P. (2005). The history and politics of corporate ownership in Sweden. In R. K. Morck (Ed.), A history of corporate governance around the world: Family business groups to professional managers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopt, K. J. (2011). Comparative corporate governance: The state of the art and international regulation. American Journal of Comparative Law, 59, 1–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hopt, K. J., & Leyens, P. C. (2004). Board models in Europe: Recent developments of internal corporate governance structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. ECGI Law Working Paper, 18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, G., & Miyajima, H. (2007). Varieties of capitalism, varieties of markets: Mergers and acquisitions in Japan, Germany, France, UK and the United States. Rieti Discussion Paper Series, June.

  • Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M., & Ruback, R. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kallifatides, K., Nachemson-Ekwall, S., & Sjöstrand, S.-E. (2010). Corporate governance in modern financial capitalism: Old Mutual’s hostile takeover of Skandia. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Langley, A., Smallman, C., Tsoukas, H., & Van de Ven, A. (2013). Process studies of change in organization and management: Unveiling temporality, activity, and flow. Academy of Management Journal, 56(1), 1–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manne, H. (1965). Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 73(2), 110–120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mayer, C. (2013). Firm commitment: Why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in it. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McNulty, T., Zattoni, A., & Douglas, T. (2013). Developing corporate governance research through qualitative methods: A review of previous studies. Corporate Governance: An International Review Special Issue: Qualitative Research, 21(2), 183–198.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nachemson-Ekwall, S. (2012). An institutional analysis of cross-border hostile takeovers: Shareholder value, short-termism and regulatory arbitrage on the Swedish stock market during the sixth takeover wave. Dissertation. Stockholm: Institution for Governance and Management Studies, Stockholm School of Economics.

  • NBK, Näringslivets börskommitté. Commerce Stock Exchange Committee. (2003). Public offer of stock purchases. The Takeover-regulations. September.

  • NBK, Näringslivets börskommitté. Commerce Stock Exchange Committee. (2009). Proposal to the ministry of justice of changes of the mandatory bid rule. September 9.

  • Nenova, T. (2003). The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 325–351.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pacces, A. (2007). Featuring control power: Corporate law and economics revisited. Dissertation. Rotterdam: Erasmus University of Rotterdam.

  • Polanyi, K. (1944/2002). The great transformation (Swedish Trans.). Torhell, S-E. Den stora omdaningen: marknadsekonomins uppgång och fall. Lund. Arkiv Förlag.

  • Ragin, C., & Becker, H. (Eds.). (1992). What is a case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry (pp. 53–82). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (2001). The influence of financial revolution on the nature of firms. American Economic Review, 91, 206–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roe, M. J. (2003). Political determinants of corporate governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scania. Scania Annual Reports, 2006–2013.

  • Schmidt, R., & Spindler, G. (2002). Path dependence, corporate governance and complementarity. International Finance, 5(3), 311–333.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scott, R. W. (2014). Institution and organization:Ideas, interests, and identities (4th ed.). Los Angeles: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selznick, P. (1949). TVA and the grass roots: A study in the sociology of formal organization. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selznick, P. (1996). Institutionalism “Old” and “New”. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(2), 270–277.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, LII(2), 737–783.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. (1957). Administrative behaviour: A study of decision-making processes in administrative organizations. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinani, E., Stafsudd, A., Thomsen, P., Edling, C., & Randoy, T. (2008). Corporate governance in Scandinavia: Comparing networks and formal institutions. European Management Review, 5, 27–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • SIS Ownership Service, Ägarservice, 2003–2015, also Fridsted, D., & Sundqvist, S-I. http://nordic.aktieservice.se

  • Sjöstrand, S.-E. (1985). Samhällsorganisation—en ansats till en institutionell ekonomisk mikroteori. Lund: Doxa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skog, R. (1997). Does Sweden need a mandatory bid rule? A critical analysis. Amsterdam: SUERF.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stattin, D. (2007). Dispenser från budplikt vid Volkswagens köp av Scania-aktier. Juridisk Tidskrift, 4, 873–881.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stattin, D. (2009). Takeover, offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på aktiemarknaden enligt svensk rätt, andra upplagan. Stockholm: Thomson Reuters.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. The Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sudarsanam, S., & Broadhurst, T. (2012). Corporate governance convergence in Germany through shareholder activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange. Journal of Management and Governance, 16, 235–268.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swedish Companies Act. Aktiebolagslagen (2005:551), Svensk författningssamling.

  • Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, SFSA. (2008). Decision regarding a possible mandatory bid in Scania AB (PLC) FI Reg. no. 08-3068. 10 April.

  • Swedish Securities Council, Aktiemarknadsnämnden. (AMN 2006:44). Petition from the Wallenberg Foundations and Investor as regards to stock purchase in Scania. 17 November.

  • Swedish Securities Council, Aktiemarknadsnämnden. (AMN 2006:55). Acceptable actions of takeover defence (Scania). 6 December.

  • Swedish Securities Council, Aktiemarknadsnämnden. (AMN 2007:08). Exception to the mandatory bid. 24 February, public on 7 March.

  • Swedish Securities Council, Aktiemarknadsnämnden. (AMN 2007:36). VW asking for exception to the mandatory bid rule. 28 September.

  • Swedish Takeover Act. (2006:451). Lagen om offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på aktiemarknaden, LUA or the “Takeover Act”. Swedish Parlament.

  • Söderström, H. T. (2003). Ägarmakt och omvandling—den svenska modellen utmanad: Ekonomirådets rapport. Stockholm: SNS Förlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. (2009). City code on takeovers and mergers (the UK “Code”). Bowne International Ltd.

  • Wymeersch, E. (2008). The takeover bid directive, light and darkness. Universiteit Gent Financial Law Institute Working Paper, 1.

Download references

Acknowledgments

This research has been supported by grants from Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation and Torsten Söderberg Foundation. Valuable comments have submitted by Markus Kallifatides, Sven-Erik Sjöstrand, Stefan Einarsson, Yipeng Liu, Trond Randyo and Juan J. Durán.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. PhD Center of Governance and Management Studies, Stockholm School of Economics Institute of Research (SIR), Saltmätargatan 13-17, Box 6501, 113 83, Stockholm, Sweden

    Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall

Authors
  1. Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

Between 1998 and 2008 the author covered Scania as a financial journalist working for a variety of different media in Stockholm.

Appendix: chronology of the deals

Appendix: chronology of the deals

See Figs. 5, 6 and 7.

Fig. 5
figure 5

VW takeover of Scania 2000–2014. Note: the left column illustrates votes % (shares %), the middle row lists dates and activities. The right row mentions relevant board changes

Full size image
Fig. 6
figure 6

VW and MAN 2006–2013. Note: the left column illustrates votes % (shares %), the middle row lists dates and activities. The right row mentions relevant board changes

Full size image
Fig. 7
figure 7

Porsche and VW 2004–2009. Note: the left column illustrates votes % (shares %), the middle row lists dates and activities. The right row mentions relevant board changes

Full size image

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Nachemson-Ekwall, S. The cross-border hostile bid fight between Scania in Sweden and the two German companies MAN and Volkswagen: institutional change and the mandatory bid rule. J Manag Gov 21, 27–62 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-015-9333-1

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-015-9333-1

Keywords

Search

Navigation