The influence of executive age, career horizon and incentives on pre-turnover earnings management
- First Online:
- Cite this article as:
- Davidson, W.N., Xie, B., Xu, W. et al. J Manage Governance (2007) 11: 45. doi:10.1007/s10997-007-9015-8
In this paper we hypothesize that CEOs will be motivated to manage earnings prior to a turnover decision. This motivation comes from the horizon problem for CEOs nearing retirement age and for CEOs whose profit-based bonus is a large portion of their total compensation. We find that firms in which CEOs are nearing retirement age have large discretionary accruals in the year prior to turnover. Although we find firms with a larger proportion of profit-based bonus pay have larger discretionary accruals, this result is not robust with the inclusion of control variables in the regressions.