Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 44, Issue 5, pp 551–571

The Logics of Strict-Tolerant Logic

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10992-014-9342-6

Cite this article as:
Barrio, E., Rosenblatt, L. & Tajer, D. J Philos Logic (2015) 44: 551. doi:10.1007/s10992-014-9342-6
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Abstract

Adding a transparent truth predicate to a language completely governed by classical logic is not possible. The trouble, as is well-known, comes from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry. Recently, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have put forward an approach based on a non-transitive notion of consequence which is suitable to deal with semantic paradoxes while having a transparent truth predicate together with classical logic. Nevertheless, there are some interesting issues concerning the set of metainferences validated by this logic. In this paper, we show that this logic, once it is adequately understood, is weaker than classical logic. Moreover, the logic is in a way similar to the paraconsistent logic LP.

Keywords

Transparent truth Strict-tolerant logic Semantic paradoxes Transitivity Substructural logic 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Scientific and Technical Research CouncilUniversity of Buenos AiresCiudad de Buenos AiresArgentina
  2. 2.National Scientific and Technical Research CouncilUniversity of Buenos AiresCiudad de Buenos AiresArgentina

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