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A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators

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Abstract

Most belief change operators in the AGM tradition assume an underlying plausibility ordering over the possible worlds which is transitive and complete. A unifying structure for these operators, based on supplementing the plausibility ordering with a second, guiding, relation over the worlds was presented in Booth et al. (Artif Intell 174:1339–1368, 2010). However it is not always reasonable to assume completeness of the underlying ordering. In this paper we generalise the structure of Booth et al. (Artif Intell 174:1339–1368, 2010) to allow incomparabilities between worlds. We axiomatise the resulting class of belief removal functions, and show that it includes an important family of removal functions based on finite prioritised belief bases.

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Correspondence to Richard Booth.

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Booth, R., Meyer, T. & Sombattheera, C. A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators. J Philos Logic 41, 711–733 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9235-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9235-5

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