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Democratic Authority and Respect for the Law

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Abstract

In recent years, scholars have argued that democratic provenance of law establishes moral requirements to obey it. We argue against this view, claiming that, rather than establishing moral requirements to obey the law, democratic provenance grounds only requirements to respect it. Establishing what we view as this more plausible account makes clear not only exactly what democracy itself contributes to requirements to obey the law but also important difficulties proponents of democratic authority must overcome in order successfully to make their case. To establish our claims, we focus on Thomas Christiano’s book, The Constitution of Equality, and a recent article by Daniel Viehoff.

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Correspondence to George Klosko.

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Frye, H., Klosko, G. Democratic Authority and Respect for the Law. Law and Philos 36, 1–23 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-016-9278-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-016-9278-9

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