Law and Philosophy

, 30:353

Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Haifa
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10982-011-9099-9

Cite this article as:
Smilansky, S. Law and Philos (2011) 30: 353. doi:10.1007/s10982-011-9099-9

Abstract

How can hard determinism deal with the need to punish, when coupled with the obligation to be just? I argue that even though hard determinists might find it morally permissible to incarcerate wrongdoers apart from lawful society, they are committed to the punishment’s taking a very different form from common practice in contemporary Western societies. Hard determinists are in fact committed to what I will call funishment, instead of punishment. But, by its nature funishment is a practical reductio of hard determinism: it makes implementing hard determinism impossible to contemplate. Indeed, the social practices that hard determinism requires turn out to be morally bad even according to hard determinism itself. I conclude by briefly reflecting upon the implications.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011