Verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: The case of enrichment facilities and the role of ultra-trace level isotope ratio analysis

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10967-008-7423-0

Cite this article as:
Glaser, A. & Bürger, S. J Radioanal Nucl Chem (2009) 280: 85. doi:10.1007/s10967-008-7423-0

Abstract

One challenge to a potential verification regime for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would be to assure that enrichment plants are not producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons purposes. Namely in some older enrichment plants, operated in nuclear weapon states, environmental sampling techniques might detect particles from historic HEU production. Determination of the age of these particles would be the most direct confirmation of treaty-compliance. While methods are available to determine the age of nuclear materials based on the concentrations of decay products, micron-sized uranium particles are particularly difficult to analyze. We will review the sensitivity requirements for age determination of HEU particles in an FMCT, and assess the potential of advanced measurement techniques available for this application.

Copyright information

© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Program on Science and Global SecurityPrinceton UniversityPrincetonUSA
  2. 2.DOE New Brunswick LaboratoryArgonneUSA