Advisors and Deliberation
- Steven Arkonovich
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The paper has two goals. First, it defends one type of subjectivist account of reasons for actions—deliberative accounts—against the criticism that they commit the conditional fallacy. Second, it attempts to show that another type of subjectivist account of practical reasons that has been gaining popularity—ideal advisor accounts—are liable to commit a closely related error. Further, I argue that ideal advisor accounts can avoid the error only by accepting the fundamental theoretical motivation behind deliberative accounts. I conclude that ideal advisor accounts represent neither a substantial departure from, nor a substantial improvement upon, deliberative accounts.
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- Advisors and Deliberation
The Journal of Ethics
Volume 15, Issue 4 , pp 405-424
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Practical reasons
- Michael Smith
- Bernard Williams
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Reed College, Portland, OR, USA