Abstract
Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.
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Goodin, R.E. Demandingness as a Virtue. J Ethics 13, 1–13 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-007-9025-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-007-9025-4