Original Paper

Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 91-115

First online:

Reference and perspective in intuitionistic logics

  • John NoltAffiliated withPhilosophy Department, University of Tennessee Email author 

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What an intuitionist may refer to with respect to a given epistemic state depends not only on that epistemic state itself but on whether it is viewed concurrently from within, in the hindsight of some later state, or ideally from a standpoint “beyond” all epistemic states (though the latter perspective is no longer strictly intuitionistic). Each of these three perspectives has a different—and, in the last two cases, a novel—logic and semantics. This paper explains these logics and their semantics and provides soundness and completeness proofs. It provides, moreover, a critique of some common versions of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic and suggests ways of modifying them to take account of the perspective-relativity of reference.


Intuitionistic logic Intuitionism Constructivism Reference Kripke semantics