Abstract
Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a “good explanation” of E. The paper surveys four known schemes for abduction that can be used in both fields. Its first contribution is a taxonomy of these schemes according to a common semantic framework based on belief revision. Its second contribution is to produce, for each non-trivial scheme, a representation theorem linking its semantic framework to a set of postulates. Its third contribution is to present semantic and axiomatic arguments in favor of one of these schemes, “ordered abduction,” which has never been vindicated in the literature.
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Walliser, B., Zwirn, D. & Zwirn, H. Abductive logics in a belief revision framework. J Logic Lang Inf 14, 87–117 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-004-2319-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-004-2319-z