Abstract
Without doubt, there is a great diversity of scientific images both with regard to their appearances and their functions. Diagrams, photographs, drawings, etc. serve as evidence in publications, as eye-catchers in presentations, as surrogates for the research object in scientific reasoning. This fact has been highlighted by Stephen M. Downes who takes this diversity as a reason to argue against a unifying representation-based account of how visualisations play their epistemic role in science. In the following paper, I will suggest an alternative explanation of the diversity of scientific images. This account refers to processes which are caused by the social setting of science. What exactly is meant by this, I will spell out with the aid of Ludwik Fleck’s theory of the social mechanisms of scientific communication.
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Notes
In the following text, I will use the terms ‘visualisation’, ‘visual representation’ and ‘image’ interchangeably.
A detailed discussion of these theoretical approaches is offered by Scholz (2009, ch. 2 and 3).
Perini (2010) makes a suggestion in this way by highlighting the explanatory capacities of a semiotic conception of visual representations to solve the diversity problem (see ibid., 139ff.).
An introductory overview concerning Fleck’s theory correlated with important facts about his life is presented by Leszczyńska (2009).
Helpful introductions to his work are offered by Schäfer and Schnelle (1980), and Sady (2012). Further additional information—letters, testimonies, etc. concerning Fleck’s life, his discussions with scientific peers and critics, and newly translated articles—is presented in Werner and Zittel (2011).
The set of beliefs which these people might share belongs to what Fleck calls “thought style”.
A more detailed analysis is presented in Mößner (2011).
Hagner (2012) explains the relevance of gestalt psychology to Fleck’s theory of perception and its similarities to Michael Polanyi’s theses in this context. The link between Fleck’s theory of perception and gestalt psychology is also discussed in a special issue of “NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin” vol. 22 (1/2) (2014). Moreover, Löwy (2008) discusses the possible origin of Fleck’s conception of scientific observation in the Polish scientific community of his time.
In this sense, Wojciech Sady states that “[a]n expert sees differently than a layperson because she went through a special training during which she was familiarized with many examples […]” (Sady 2012, ch. 5).
Of course, one has to be careful here with the strong thesis that “Fleck adopted Kant’s thesis” as there are no supporting references mentioned in Fleck’s work.
In accordance with this, Leszczyńska (2009) points out that one of Fleck’s important insights was that the cognitive processes in science leading to a true proposition do not differ that much from processes leading to scientific errors (see ibid., 31f.).
Fleck does not explicitly mention the involved parties here. First and foremost, he connects this communicative aim with the individual’s detachment from the communicated thought (see Fleck 1936, 86). However, his examples of this process (see e.g. Fleck 1979, 120f.) suggest that it is a discussion between experts.
As with regard to other instances too (e.g. the boundaries between esoteric and exoteric circle), there is a problem of demarcation here. Unfortunately, Fleck does not explain why and how this difference between information and legitimisation appears. His suggestion of a separate discussion seems to be plausible, though further investigations on the topic are necessary—but beyond the scope of the current analysis.
Zittel thinks that scientific training and other kinds of initiating a pupil into a given thought style also belong to the realm of propaganda (see Zittel 2012, 64). Fleck remains silent about this topic. It can be contested, however, that he would agree with Zittel’s claim. A hint to support my critique here can be seen in the fact that Fleck conceives of textbooks which are necessary for educational purposes as belonging to the esoteric circle of a certain thought collective. This categorising excludes them, however, as proper media of propaganda which, according to Fleck, cannot appear within this realm of science. The point is that propagating an idea means that the recipient’s cognitive shortcomings with respect to the prevalent thought style are taken for granted by the communicating party. Therefore, the aim of this communicative act is not understanding in the same sense as it will be required of students when introduced to their teacher’s research domain. Laymen are not expected to be able to repeat an experiment or to notice what is of importance to members of a certain collective during scientific observations—contrary to students. Laymen who are the audience of propaganda will remain what they are—laymen.
Admittedly, it can be asked whether a genuine case of propaganda can ever take place. Fleck himself takes it for granted that there are overlaps between the different purposes of communication and that seldom, if ever, the mentioned purposes appear in their pure form (see Fleck 1986b, 88). However, there seems to lurk a greater difficulty here. Fleck also points out that communication—as performed during an act of propaganda—always leads to the construction of a new thought collective including the communicating parties. Consequently, they will form a new common collective during their exchange, whereas the concept of propaganda seems to presuppose that they belong to different communities. I owe this point to Ludger Jansen.
In this context, Fleck also introduces the term incommensurability (see Fleck 1979, 62). This difficulty of translation and understanding arises when the members of the two communicating collectives are too far away from each other. The distance between both can be meant in a temporal or (and) a spatial sense, thus “[…] a lack of understanding manifests itself not only where a physicist and a metaphysician or astrologer meet [this would be the spatial distance, as these thought styles belong to totally different topics, NM], but also when today’s scientists read the works of their ancestors from the distant past [this is the temporal distance, as the people involved belong to different stages of one developing thought style, NM]” (Sady 2012, ch. 8). Fleck’s theses about diachronic and synchronic problems of understanding are discussed in greater detail in Mößner (2011).
Instead of vademecum I will mainly use the more common term handbook in this article.
A detailed analysis of Fleck’s conception in comparison to Thomas S. Kuhn’s ideas about the relevance of textbooks in science is offered by Brorson and Andersen (2001).
A serious critique with regard to the collective authorship, defended by Fleck, is put forward by van den Belt (2011). In a detailed examination of one of Fleck’s empirical case studies, namely the development of the Wassermann reaction, van den Belt argues for an interactionistic interpretation of the process. Contrary to Fleck who emphasises that in the end no individual inventor of the new serological method can be discerned and, thus, the thought collective has to be given the credit for its invention, van den Belt points out that in some instances Fleck wrongly neglected the crucial role of the individual researcher. In this sense, he states that the interaction between different scientists has to be taken into account here as an explanation for certain developmental stages. Otherwise these instances will remain unexplained in Fleck’s theory that merely emphasises the role of the collective. In this sense, van den Belt also highlights the relevance of the social setting of science but, nonetheless, keeps a crucial part for the individual to play here.
An interesting overview of attempts focusing on images and pictures in different meta-disciplines of science (history, sociology, philosophy) and Fleck’s place therein is offered by Dommann (2004).
As completeness is beyond the scope of this article, I only want to present some crucial aspects here.
Coming to know about these differences is the crucial virtue of Fleck’s comparative epistemology (see Fleck 1936, 98, 1979, 38). In this context Löwy (2008) states: “Fleck’s epistemology […] may also be seen as an attempt to radically question the ways we perceive and interpret external reality” (ibid., 382).
A sophisticated investigation of photography in science is offered by Wilder (2009).
The concept of objectivity is a somewhat delicate matter in Fleck’s work as he is of the opinion that a judgement of objectivity can only be made correctly within a particular thought style, but not externally. He thinks the same about the concept of truth (see Fleck 1979, 100). Consequently, Fleck is often regarded as defending a kind of relativism. Especially many art historians who investigate the development of scientific visualisations interpret Fleck in such a relativistic way (see e.g. Zimmermann 2009; Bredekamp et al. 2008). This is not the place to discuss this difficulty in detail (Fleck denies being a relativist, see Fleck 1979, 100). Let me just mention Markus Seidel’s article who tackles this problem thoughtfully by interpreting Fleck’s theory as a relational stance comparable to Karl Mannheim’s line of reasoning (see Seidel 2011).
Daston and Galison (1992) claim that scientific illustrations were meant to represent different phenomena at different times, though in each instance these images were regarded as objective depictions by contemporary scientists. Daston and Galison point out that objectivity itself is not a fixed concept, but simply one under construction, including and stressing different aspects at different times.
That Fleck’s thesis is too strong seems to be suggested by the discussion of his own example. If the photographer has a choice to depict a certain entity differently, this also means that she has different ways of access to this entity at her disposal—not just the ones suggested by the predominant thought style. She is not blind to alternative ways of seeing the object. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.
Admittedly, overlaps between both methods might occur rather frequently.
Admittedly, the explanatory benefit of Fleck’s theory might be greater with respect to the former case than to the latter, as the second instance seems to be closer to common-sense expectations. Nonetheless, in the philosophical discussion Fleck’s account is of importance here, too, as it helps to point out the relevance of social mechanisms in shaping the results of scientific cognitive processes.
I want to thank the journal’s editors for making me aware of this difficulty.
This is the core idea of speech act theory, namely that we can perform different illocutionary acts with a particular linguistic expression.
Thus, the mentioned hypothesis is difficult to prove as it might only be accessible via the scientist’s corresponding testimony that may or may not be reliable. I owe this point to Helmut Pulte.
Tufte is no historian, but taught courses in statistical evidence, analytical design, and interface design.
This is only an abbreviated version of the story. Tufte discusses in greater detail which elements in Snow’s line of reasoning are of particular importance to make his argument sound.
Obviously, they do not differentiate between handbook and textbook here, as Fleck suggests. Depending on the scientific discipline this seems to be correct as in some instances handbooks are used for educational purposes and no particular textbooks are produced in those contexts.
Vögtli and Ernst do not argue for this point separately. As scientific practitioners they solely appeal to their peers’ experiences with respect to scientific education and training. They emphasise that in such contexts the presentation of facts is preferred to showing the trials and errors of research itself (see Vögtli and Ernst 2007, 109f.).
It has to be added that from Pörksen’s point of view some visual representations may also skip one or two steps in this developmental schema. As an example he discusses the development of genetics in biology and its accompanying visualisations. For instance, the schema of the double helix, firstly published in a journal article, directly made its way into textbooks and popular science without being significantly modified (see Pörksen 1997, 123f.).
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Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the context of the project ‘‘Visualisierungen in den Wissenschaften—eine wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchung’’ (MO 2343/1-1). For helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper I would like to thank the participants of the research colloquium at the RWTH Aachen University, two anonymous reviewers and the editors of the Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
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Mößner, N. Scientific Images as Circulating Ideas: An Application of Ludwik Fleck’s Theory of Thought Styles. J Gen Philos Sci 47, 307–329 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9327-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9327-y