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Notes
I borrow this delightful phrase from Lupyan (2005). Thanks to Christopher Drain and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this review.
Khalidi gives a few intuitive examples of non-Newtonian fluids to illustrate this property (86). For example, non-drip paint thins out (more flow) when you stir it harder, whereas pudding stiffens (less flow).
Searle (2010, 116–117) has recently acknowledged that there can be ‘third-person fallout facts’ from institutional facts, such as recession, that do not depend on collective recognition for their existence. Contrary to Thomasson (2003) though, on which feature (i) of Khalidi’s ‘continuum hypothesis’ is based, Searle does not think that racism belongs into the ‘fallout’ category. This is because the fact that the members of a racist society may not be consciously aware of their racist practices, and not describe them as racist, is irrelevant. As long as people of different races are, in fact, treated as having different deontic status (i.e., implicitly recognized as having different rights and responsibilities), racism would still constitute an institutional kind for Searle, whether or not this fact is accurately reflected in the beliefs that are transparently held by racists (ibid, 118).
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Theiner, G. Muhammad Ali Khalidi: Natural Categories and Human Kinds. Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. J Gen Philos Sci 47, 247–255 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9309-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9309-5