Abstract
The aim of this article is to discuss the nature of disagreement in scientific ontologies in the light of case studies from biology and cognitive science. I argue that disagreements in scientific ontologies are usually not about purely factual issues but involve both verbal and normative aspects. Furthermore, I try to show that this partly non-factual character of disagreement in scientific ontologies does not lead to a radical deflationism but is compatible with a “normative ontological realism.” Finally, I argue that the case studies from the empirical sciences challenge contemporary metaontological accounts that insist on exactly one true way of “carving nature at its joints.”
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Ludwig, D. Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies. J Gen Philos Sci 45, 119–131 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9234-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9234-4