Skip to main content
Log in

Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies

  • Article
  • Published:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The aim of this article is to discuss the nature of disagreement in scientific ontologies in the light of case studies from biology and cognitive science. I argue that disagreements in scientific ontologies are usually not about purely factual issues but involve both verbal and normative aspects. Furthermore, I try to show that this partly non-factual character of disagreement in scientific ontologies does not lead to a radical deflationism but is compatible with a “normative ontological realism.” Finally, I argue that the case studies from the empirical sciences challenge contemporary metaontological accounts that insist on exactly one true way of “carving nature at its joints.”

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bennett, K. (2009). Composition, colocation and metaontology chalmers. In D. Manley & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics (pp. 38–76). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Bird, A., & Tobin, E. (2012). Natural kinds. In Zalta, E. (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

  • Boyd, R. (1989). What realism implies and what it does not. Dialectica, 43, 5–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. (2011). Verbal disputes. The Philosophical Review, 120, 515–566.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D., Manley, D., & Wasserman, R. (Eds.). (2009). Metametaphysics. New essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, J. Q. (2004). Theory of multiple intelligences: Is it a scientific theory? Teachers College Record, 106, 17–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohnit, D., & Marque, T. (2013). Disagreements, Erkenntnis. Online First.

  • Cracraft, J. (1983). Species concepts and speciation analysis. Current Ornithology, 1, 159–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dupré, J. (1981). Natural kinds and biological taxa. The Philosophical Review, 90, 66–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of the mind. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, N. (1978) Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett.

  • Gould, S. J. (1996). The mismeasure of man. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herrnstein, R., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American life. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirsch, E. (2011). Quantifier variance and realism: Essays in metaontology: Essays in metaontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins, C. S. (2010). What is ontological realism? Philosophy Compass, 5(10), 880–890.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins, C. S. (2013). Merely verbal disputes, Erkenntnis. Online First.

  • Kitcher, P. (1984). Species. Philosophy of Science, 51, 308–333.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P. (2007). Does ‘Race’Have a future? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35, 293–317.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • LaPorte, J. (2004). Natural kinds and conceptual change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr, E. (1963). Animal species and evolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

  • Melville, H. (1851/2007). Moby Dick or the whale. Raleigh: Hayes Barton Press.

  • Putnam, P. (1988). Representation and reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2009). Ontological realism. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics. New essays on the foundations of ontology (pp. 384–423). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Sider, T. (2012). Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. (1999). Existential relativity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23(1), 132–143.

  • Spearman, C. (1904). ‘General Intelligence’, objectively determined and measured. The American Journal of Psychology, 15, 201–292.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stanford, K. (1995). For pluralism and against realism about species. Philosophy of Science, 62, 70–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thurstone, L. L. (1938). Primary mental abilities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. (1976). Ecological species, multispecies, and oaks. Taxon 25, Nr. 2/3, 233–239.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to David Ludwig.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ludwig, D. Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies. J Gen Philos Sci 45, 119–131 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9234-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9234-4

Keywords

Navigation