Abstract
We analyze the effect of a large group on a public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with preferences in which people only care about their private consumptions and the total supply of the public good, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences of the warm-glow type, the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, but in general they do not yield first-best levels. Our results are important to clarify why in general governments do not rely on lotteries for a large part of the revenue creation for public good provision. They are also useful to understand why lottery proceeds are earmarked to worthy causes, where warm glow is likely to be larger.
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Notes
These preferences are called by Andreoni (1990) purely altruistic.
Olszewski and Siegel (2013) provide a general way to find equilibrium outcomes of contests with a large (but finite) number of competitors and prizes. This is done by approximating the equilibrium with a particular incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms.
These are called by Andreoni (1990) impurely altruistic preferences.
In the USA, for example, Lotto revenues are earmarked for the provision of education (see Landry and Price 2007).
Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) also provide a recipe for constructing quasi-concave functions of this form, and a diagnostic test to determine whether a given function of this form is quasi-concave.
It seems natural that private good is complementary to the public good. Also, since in a large society, the public good is likely to become large, a separable \((\omega _{i}-x_{i})+H(G)\) term would lead to the utility of private good consumption becoming very small as compared to \(H(G).\)
As in Morgan (2000) and Duffy and Matros (2012), in our setting, the public good is provided only when the wagers are sufficient to cover the cost of the prize; otherwise, the lottery is called off, and the wagers are refunded. It is important that the prize \(R\) is an amount fixed ex-ante. If the prize were a fraction of lottery revenues, the utility of the players would be isomorphic to the one with voluntary contributions and the lottery would not change the outcome of the game.
Similarly as what happens between private and public goods, it seems natural that warm glow is complementary to the public good. And as in the previous case, since in a large society, the public good is likely to become large, a separable \(h_{i}(G)+g(x_{i})\) term would lead to warm-glow utility \(g(x_{i})\) becoming very small as compared to \(h_{i}(G).\)
We are grateful to a referee for this observation.
References
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Acknowledgments
Cabrales acknowledges the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under Grant ECO2012-34581. Lugo acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under Grant ECO2013-42710-P.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof
This proposition is already shown in Morgan (2000), we merely add it here for completeness.
\(G^{*}\) solves
and we also obtain \(G^{V}\) by adding first-order conditions of optimization problems for each agent \(i\),
It is then easy to verify that \(G^{V}<G^{*}\). Also \(G^{L}\), solves the sum of first-order conditions.
Comparing expressions (8) and (9), Morgan (2000) remarks that the two expressions differ by the term associated with the negative externality of the lottery multiplied by \(H(G)\). Thus, \(G^{V}<G^{L}\). Taking the limit of (9) as \(R\rightarrow \infty \), expression (9) becomes identical to (7). \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof
At an interior maximum, the first-order condition of (2) with respect to \(x\),
The equilibrium level of public good provided by voluntary contributions with the presence of warm glow giving, solves the sum of first-order conditions,
Then, we have
Compare expressions (8) and (11) to verify that the result holds. The two expressions differ by the term associated with the effect of the warm glow. \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof
Take the first-order conditions of (4) with respect to \(x_{i}\) to find
The public goods provision \(G^{wgL}\) solves the sum of the first-order conditions,
We have
Notice that expressions (11) and (12) differ by the term associated with the negative externality of the lottery multiplied by \(H(G)\). Similarly as to the model without warm glow, the public goods provision under the lottery is greater than under voluntary contributions. That is, \( G^{wg}<G^{wgL}\). \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof
To obtain the optimal level of provision, we use the first-order conditions from the problem
which yield
which using linearity of \(H\left( .\right) \) and \(h_{i}\left( .\right) \) can be expressed as
We now take limits for \(n\) large and assuming that \(G^{wg*}\) is of \( O\left( n\right) \) (something we later establish) we have
which means that
so that
when \(f\left( x\right) =\ln \left( x\right) \)
when \(f\left( x\right) =\frac{1}{1-\alpha }\left( x\right) ^{1-\alpha }\)
Note that this also establishes \(G^{wg*}\) is of \(O\left( n\right) \).
The first-order condition of (12) with respect to \(x_{i}\) is,
using linearity this is equivalent to
We now take limits for \(n\) large and assuming that \(G^{wgL }\) is of \( O\left( n\right) \) (something we later establish) we have
which means that
when \(f\left( x\right) =\ln \left( x\right) \)
when \(f\left( x\right) =\frac{1}{1-\alpha }\left( x\right) ^{1-\alpha }\)
Assume, by way of a contradiction, that \(G^{wg*}=G^{wgL},\)then
This entails a contradiction, and the result follows. \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof
The first-order condition,
where \(\widehat{x}=\sum x_{i}\) noting that \(H^{\prime }\) and \(h^{\prime }\) are bounded by concavity and assuming that \(\widehat{x}-R\) is of \(O\left( n\right) \) (something we later establish) as \(n\rightarrow \infty \), we obtain
so that
so that we have the desired result
Note also that from Eq. (16) if \(g_{1}=0,\) it must be the case that \(\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\left( \widehat{x}\!-\!R\right) /\widehat{x}\!=\!0\) so that \(\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\widehat{x}/n=\rho \). \(\square \)
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Cabrales, A., Lugo, H. A public good model with lotteries in large groups. Int Tax Public Finance 23, 218–233 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-015-9359-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-015-9359-y