This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008), p. 205.
Cass R. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law,” Social Research 74 (2007): 1–24, p. 4.
Jennifer C. Rubenstein, “Pluralism about Global Poverty,” British Journal of Political Science 43 (2013): 775–97, p. 777.
Simon Caney, “Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens,” Journal of Political Philosophy 22:2 (2014): 125–49.
Simon Caney, “Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds,” in Human Rights and Climate Change, ed. by Stephen Humphreys (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 69–90, pp. 166, 169.
Ibid., p. 173.
Simon Caney, “Human Rights, Responsibilities, and Climate Change,” in Global Basic Rights, ed. by Robert E. Goodin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 227–47, p. 234.
Victor Tadros, “Obligations and Outcomes,” in Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility, eds. R. Cruft, M.H. Kramer, and M.R. Reiff (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 173–92, p. 181.
Nozick writes: “Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice. For example, lacking much historical information, and assuming (1) that victims of injustice generally do worse that they otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited from the injustice (assumed to be better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a rough rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up being the least well off in that society.” Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 231.
Daniel Butt, “On Benefiting from Injustice,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007): 129–52, p. 143.
Jonathan Pickering and Christian Barry, “On the Concept of Climate Debt: Its Moral and Political Value,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2012): 667–85.
Of this “contagion” Waldron writes: “If one person behaves unjustly, particularly in the context of a market, the injustice will have an effect not only on her immediate victim, but—via the price mechanism—on all those who trade in the market in question. Some will gain and some will lose as a result of the injustice, and any attempt at rectification—any attempt to implement the state of affairs that would have obtained but for the injustice—will involve interfering with those holdings, as well.” Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historical Injustice,” Ethics 103 (1992): 4–28, p. 12.
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 7.
Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 23.
Ibid., p. 30.
Article 25 declares that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,” which is typically understood not to be an exhaustive list of the means of subsistence.
Onora Nell (O’Neill), “Lifeboat Earth,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1975): 273–92.
Andrew Dobson, “Thick Cosmopolitanism,” Political Studies 54 (2006): 165–84.
Eric Neumayer, Weak Versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing Paradigms (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2003).
Herman E. Daly, “On Wilfred Beckerman’s Critique of Sustainable Development.” Environmental Values 4 (1995): 49–55.
Beitz (1975), p. 371.
Pogge, (2008), p. 209.
Hillel Steiner, Essay on Rights (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 271–72.
Beitz (1975), p. 370.
Steiner (1994), pp. 271–72.
Beitz (1975), p. 372.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Pogge (2008), p. 203.
Steiner (1999), p. 184.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vanderheiden, S. Human Rights, Global Justice, or Historical Responsibility? Three Potential Appeals. J Value Inquiry 51, 397–415 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9585-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9585-2