This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
Nichols (2004) and Prinz (2007) formulate their theories in terms of emotions and sentiments rather than in terms of intuitions. The way in which these feature in their theories, however, matches the way in which moral psychologists use the term ‘intuition’ and how they conceive of their relation to emotions. Discussing their theories in terms of intuitions facilitates an insightful comparison to other positions.
In section 1.1 I consider whether reasoning plays other more positive roles in some versions of Subjective Sentimentalists.
Sentimental Rationalism is to be distinguished from Rational Sentimentalism. Rational Sentimentalism is the view that values are constituted by sentiments that are subject to rational assessment (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). Sentimental Rationalism, in contrast, is the view that affect and cognition can contribute to the justification of moral beliefs together. Note that Rational Sentimentalism is not restricted to moral values, but extends to (judgments about) non-moral values. Sentimental Rationalism is not restricted to moral value judgments but also encompasses other moral judgments including those about right and wrong.
Ever since Davidson (1963), philosophers typically take rationalizations to consist of explanations that successfully explicate the reasons on the basis of which the agent acted. In contrast to this, Haidt uses the term in a derogatory way to designate bad or biased arguments. Confabulations are invented arguments that have no basis in reality at all (see also Nisbett and Wilson 1977, Wilson 2002, and Johansson et al. 2005).
Haidt’s (2012) Moral Foundations Theory encapsulates the claim that moral judgments are based on emotions. According to his Social Intuitionist Model, moral reasoning is mostly post hoc rationalization or confabulation.
See Evans (2008) for a review of Dual System Theories.
I follow Kahneman (2011) in talking about the two systems as distinct entities without committing myself to the claim that they are more than analytically distinct.
Nichols (2004) presents his Sentimental Rules Theory according to which an affect-based normative theory provides the basis for moral judgment. Prinz’s (2007) Constructive Sentimentalism is a subject relative form of sentimentalism that focuses instead on individual dispositions to experience moral emotions. Another difference worth noting here concerns the object of intuition. Whereas Nichols holds that moral intuitions pertain to norms or principles, Prinz and Haidt take moral intuitions to concern particular kinds of actions.
There is in fact little room to maneuver here for Prinz. He rejects an analysis of sentiments in terms of normal conditions for normal subjects (Prinz 2006, 2007). This means he cannot appeal to the conditions under which a moral judgment is made in order to explain why it is wrong. Hence, the space for moral error in Prinz’s theory is rather small.
Haidt clarifies the relation between emotions and intuitions as follows: ‘Moral emotions are one type of moral intuition, but most moral intuitions are more subtle; they don’t rise to the level of emotions.’ (2012: 45) Later he adds that ‘most of our affective reactions are too fleeting to be called emotions’ (ibid.: 55). In addition to appraisals, affective intuitions encompass alterations of attention and vigilance (ibid.: 329n40). This is why I use the term ‘affective response’.
Audi (2013) hold that moral intuitions can also concern particular cases.
Cowan combines statements (1)–(3) when he defines MI as follows: ‘Normal ethical agents can and do have epistemically independent non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs that is the result of substantive ethical thinking.’ (forthcoming)
Roeser (2011) forms an exception in this respect. According to her Affectual Intuitionionism, the non-inferential moral beliefs that form the foundation of moral knowledge are emotions. Audi (2013: 123–124) denies that affective responses can be intuitions. He does, however, regard them as a source of intuitions and he allows for the possibility that intuitions partly constitute emotions (ibid.: 172 and 133).
Haidt, Koller and Dias (1993) distinguish four kinds of justifications: autonomy, community, divinity, or norm statements. They regard appeals to disgust as divinity statements, and claims to the effect that an action is wrong as norm statements.
In a similar vein, Ditto, Pizarro and Tannenbaum (2009: 323) observe that people feel more pressure to provide justification for moral claims as compared to aesthetic claims. Their explanation is that, whereas aesthetics is usually seen as a matter of taste, most people are naive moral realists most of the time.
Haidt makes a similar claim when he maintains that ‘we care more about looking good than about truly being good’ (2012: 190).
Social psychologists distinguish accuracy, impression, and defense motivation. Rather than about accuracy, agents sometimes care primarily about the image or impression others have about them or about their self-image and whether it remains defensible (Chaiken et al. 1996). In these terms, the argument presented in the main text comes down to the claim that impression and defense motivation sometimes have effects that are rather similar to those that accuracy motivation would have.
This is confirmed by research concerning dishonesty. When people are in the position to be dishonest, they behave dishonestly but only to a relatively small extent. The line they do not cross is that beyond which they can no longer maintain their self-image as honest people (Haidt 2012: 83; Mazar et al. 2008).
See Bandura et al. (1996), and Bandura (1999). Four mechanisms of moral disengagement pertain to conduct and its consequences: moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic labeling, disregarding or distorting the consequences. Both displacement and diffusion of responsibility pertain to the agent. Dehumanization, and attribution of blame pertain to the victim.
Agreeing or disagreeing with a statement is indicative of moral disengagement only when the statement conflicts with the moral commitments of an agent. Osofsky, Bandura, and Zimbardo (2005) do not measure such discrepancies directly. They do, however, interview the participants and discuss their emotional reactions in preparation, during, and after an execution and the ways in which they tried to manage their stress (ibid.: 381, 389–390). To the extent that their stress is indicative of cognitive dissonance, the interviews provide indirect evidence in support of moral disengagement.
As it happens, age is the only one of these factors that makes a difference in the study just discussed (Osofsky, Bandura, and Zimbardo 2005: 381 and 387).
According to Aquino and Reed (2002), people can have a moral identity in the sense that their moral standards can play a role in their self-conception. They provide evidence that people who have a strong and accessible moral identity violate their moral standards less often than others.
All we know is that the individual features correlate with propensity to morally disengage. This can be true even if some combinations of these features do not.
This line of reasoning suggests that it is too simple to think, as is often thought, that System I is fast but unreliable, and System II slow but normatively superior. Note also that on my view affect and cognition can each play a role in both systems.
See the introduction for other proposals that combine elements from sentimentalism and rationalism. Note 4 comments on how SR relates to Rational Sentimentalism.
Audi (2013: 155) acknowledges that emotions can contribute to the formation of reliable intuitions. However, as mentioned in note 16, he denies that affective responses can be intuitions.
See Craigie (2012) for another Dual Systems account of moral reasoning and moral judgment.
Fine makes a similar point when she argues that currently automatic responses might be influenced by prior conscious reflection or reasoning (2006: 85 and 93).
This line of argument presupposes that each of the two systems has its good and its bad side, a view that is defended, for instance, by Kahneman (2011). The idea is that the heuristics of System I can be conducive to adequate responses in some circumstances, and lead to biased responses in other. They can be quick and dirty, but they can become more sophisticated over time.
Sentimental Rationalism has affinities not only with Moral Intuitionism, but also with Aristotelian virtue ethics.
See also Fine (2006: 90–92), who argues that controlled processes can interfere with automatic processes, and that prejudices can in principle be overcome in this way.
References
J. Allman and J. Woodward, “What Are Moral Intuitions and Why Should We Care About Them? A Neurobiological Perspective,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 164–85.
K. Aquino and A. Reed, “The Self-Importance of Moral Identity,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 1423–40.
R. Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intrinsic Value (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004).
R. Audi, Moral Perception (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013).
A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G.V. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (1996): 364–74.
A. Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Humanities,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 3 (1999): 193–209.
C.D. Batson, D. Kobrynowicz, J.L. Dinnerstein, H.C. Kampf, and A.D. Wilson, “In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral Hypocrisy,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (1997): 1335–48.
C.D. Batson, E.R. Thompson, G. Seuferling, H. Whitney, and J.A. Strongman, “Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (1999): 525–37.
M.S. Bedke, “Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics,” Philosophy Compass 5 (2012): 1069–83.
S. Chaiken, R. Giner-Sorolla, and S. Chen, “Beyond Accuracy: Defense and Impression Motives in Heuristic and Systematic Information Processing,” in P.M. Gollwitzer and J.A. Bargh (eds.), The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior (New York, Guilford Press, 1996), 553–78.
S. Clarke, “SIM and the City: Rationalism and Psychology and Haidt’s Account of Moral Judgment,” Philosophical Psychology 21 (2008): 799–820.
D. Copp, “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory,” in R. Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 7 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–36.
R. Cowan (forthcoming) “Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism,” European Journal of Philosophy, doi: 10.1111/ejop.12031.
J. Craigie, “Thinking and Feeling: Moral Deliberation in a Dual-Process Framework,” Philosophical Psychology 24 (2012): 53–71.
J. D’Arms and D. Jacobson, “Sentiment and Value,” Ethics 118 (2000): 722–48.
D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 685–700.
P.H. Ditto, D.A. Pizarro, and D. Tannenbaum, “Motivated Moral Reasoning,” in D.M. Bartels, C.W. Baliman, L.J. Skitka, and D.L. Medin (eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, vol. 50 (2009): 307–38.
J.S.B.T. Evans, “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology 59 (2008): 255–78.
L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957).
C. Fine, “Is the Emotional Dog Wagging Its Rational Tail or Chasing It?,” Philosophical Explorations 9 (2006): 83–98.
J.D. Greene, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2008), 35–79.
J.D. Greene, R.B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen, “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science 293 (2001): 2105–08.
J. Haidt, F. Björklund, and S. Murphy (2000) “Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No Reason,” Unpublished Manuscript.
J. Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108 (2001): 814–34.
J. Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics And Religion (Pantheon Books, 2012).
J. Haidt, S.H. Koller, and M.G. Dias, “Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is it Wrong to Eat Your Dog?,” Attitudes and Social Cognition 56 (1993): 613–28.
M. Huemer Ethical Intuitionism (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
P. Johansson, L. Hall, S. Sikström, and A. Olsson, “Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task,” Science 310 (2005): 116–19.
D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Thinking Slow (London, Allen Lane, 2011).
N. Mazar, O. Amir, and D. Ariely, “The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance,” Journal of Marketing Research 45 (2008): 633–44.
D. Moore, “Moral Disengagement in Processes of Organizational Corruption,” Journal of Business Ethics 80 (2008): 129–39.
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1903).
S. Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
R. Nisbett and T.D. Wilson, “Telling More than We can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231–59.
M.J. Osofsky, A. Bandura, and P.G. Zimbardo, “The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution Process,” Law Human Behavior 29 (2005): 371–93.
J. Prinz‚ “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments,” Philosophical Explorations 9 (2006): 29–43.
J. Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).
J.M. Paxton, L. Ungar, and J.D. Greene, “Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment,” Cognitive Science 36 (2012): 163–77.
T. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 1969 [1785]).
S. Roeser, Moral Emotions and Intuitions (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1930).
H. Sauer, “Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgment,” Philosophical Explorations 15 (2012a): 255–75.
H. Sauer, “Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2012b): 95–115.
H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London, MacMillan, 1874 [1907]).
T. Wheatly and J. Haidt, “Hyponotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe,” Psychological Science 16 (2005): 780–84.
T.D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge (MA), Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).
L. Zagzebski, “Emotion and Moral Judgment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 104–124.
Acknowledgments
I thank Jochen Bojanowski, Joel Rickard, Sabine Roeser, Hanno Sauer, Markus Schlosser, and Peter Timmerman for helpful comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hindriks, F. Intuitions, Rationalizations, and Justification: A Defense of Sentimental Rationalism. J Value Inquiry 48, 195–216 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9419-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9419-z