Abstract
The statement that an important dualism runs throughout sociological literature belongs to what can be called extended “sociological common sense”. In this context, Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology is often used critically as a paradigmatic example of subjectivism, as it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on actors’ “subjective” interpretations, thereby neglecting “objective” social structures such as power relationships. This article proposes that not only do those characterizations have dualistic grounds, but they also disregard the explicit intention of phenomenology to overcome the dualism between subjectivism and objectivism. The various criticisms directed at the Schutzian paradigm will be confronted with an analysis of the phenomenon of power based on Schutz’s theory of the life-world, in particular his theory of relevance. This theoretical perspective will be replenished by reflections on power as a meaning selection, which specifically allow the hiatus of subjectivism and objectivism to be overcome.
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Notes
From the field of ethnomethodological analysis, Lynch (1993) advocates that a subset of the criticisms of ethnomethodological approach refers to questions of power and emancipation. Fundamentally, he reviews Habermas, Giddens, and Bourdieu’s critical appraisals since, for those authors, the ethnomethodological study of social praxis “seems relevant to the long-standing problem of how to bridge the gap between Marxist theory and everyday experience in late-capitalist society” (1993: 31). Along the same lines, we show in the case of Habermas, Bourdieu, and Bauman a similar project regarding Schutzian phenomenological thought. See also Belvedere (2011) for an insightful analysis of the “orthodox dissent,” which attributes Schutz’s work a subjectivist, constructivist, and idealist insight.
For a detailed discussion on the connection between habitus and practices see Bourdieu (1990a).
In a letter to Schutz, Parsons recognizes this shortcoming; however, he clarifies its irrelevance in relation to the differences between both conceptions: “I cannot yet feel that my relative ignorance of your fields of interest is a sufficient explanation of our differences” (Schutz and Parsons 1978: 108). According to Wagner (1979), Parsons was not conversant with the phenomenological psychology presented by Schutz, because the fundamental principle of intentionality alone secures full attention to the subject-object polarity of consciousness.
Schutz clearly refers to the Husserlian notion of phenomenology. In his Intellectual Biography, Wagner (1983) presents a detailed description of how Schutz begins his contact with Husserl’s work and mentions the texts that laid the foundation of his project. According to Wagner, “during the Bergsonian period, Felix Kaufmann had repeatedly reminded Schutz that he would have to turn to Husserl for a reliable foundation for his endeavor. But it was only in 1928, after he had to put the project of the life forms aside, that he agreed to do so. The latter’s Vorlesungen zur Philosophie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (Lectures on Inner Time-Consciousness) had just been published, and he and Kaufmann decided to study them together. From this book, they reached for the Formale und trancendentale Logik (Formal and Transcendental Logic), which was published in 1929. In 1930, Schutz went back to Ideen I (Ideas I) and the Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations). Altogether, the friends spent two years on their most intensive study of Husserl’s work” (1983: 35).
For a detailed analysis of Schutz’s early project to transcend dualisms see López (2014), where the author analyses Schutz endeavor “as a response to several dualisms: that of the Austrian School, that of Max Weber and of Henri Bergson, so from the beginning of his reflection, it was affected by the problem of dualism in the production of knowledge and its solution was at the heart of his conceptual scheme” (2014: 7).
Much has been said about the dichotomy between apriorism and empirism—or theory and history—that Schutz inherited from the Austrian Tradition in Economics (Boettke 1998; Lavoie 1994; Storr 2010a, 2010b). However, there is a consensus on the Schutzian overcoming of such dualisms, as stated by Boettke (1998): “the universalistic approach based on purpose—rational action is made possible by introducing degrees of typification, including the most abstract and anonymous typification to the more concrete typification of the historical agents” (1998: 63), and also by Storr: “There is, for Schütz, a meaningful distinction but not a stark dichotomy, as Mises frequently suggests, between theory and history” (2010b: 173).
The notion of reification refers to a mental process, which consists of assuming the “objective existence” of what is, in fact, a complex conceptual product of sifting the limited personal experience (Bauman 1976: 64).
As Baxter points out, the distinction between system and life-world “depends upon an equivocation in the concept of the life-world” (1987: 40).
For a fruitful discussion of the links between phenomenological life-world analysis and empirical social sciences see Eberle (2012).
The concept of power used for this argumentation differs from Hannah Arendt’s action theoretical and phenomenologically informed perspective on power, which discovers power only within actions and interactions of human beings and which “springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse” (1958: 200). We argue that objectified knowledge structures contain power structures which—from a phenomenological perspective—influence the subjective perception of the individual actor. Power is not only present when concrete action takes place.
From the field of Economics, Bruce Pietrykowski argues that imposed relevances are simply intrinsic relevances of the other interaction participant. Negotiation of these (presumably) conflicting relevances is a matter of “the readiness with which individuals accept or resist the imposition of the other’s relevance systems” which “differs from situation to situation” (1996: 239).
Of course, power as meaning selection is expressed in different forms which come along with different possibilities to confront and act against the imposed meaning structures. Structural domination through imposed meaning systems can be confronted based on intrinsic motivations of individual actors in association with others to, e.g., start the revolutionary process. The individual initiative according to the interplay of imposed and intrinsic relevances allows the questioning of and confrontation with opposed objective power structures. If power is exerted as bodily violence—as power of action—on the individual actor, a different form of meaning selection is imposed on the mutilated person with a different, restricted selectivity to oppose imposed violence structures.
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Dreher, J., López, D.G. Subjectivity and Power. Hum Stud 38, 197–222 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-014-9338-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-014-9338-9