Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Against ‘Realism’

  • Published:
Foundations of Physics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

We examine the prevalent use of the phrase “local realism” in the context of Bell’s Theorem and associated experiments, with a focus on the question: what exactly is the ‘realism’ in ‘local realism’ supposed to mean? Carefully surveying several possible meanings, we argue that all of them are flawed in one way or another as attempts to point out a second premise (in addition to locality) on which the Bell inequalities rest, and (hence) which might be rejected in the face of empirical data violating the inequalities. We thus suggest that the phrase ‘local realism’ should be banned from future discussions of these issues, and urge physicists to revisit the foundational questions behind Bell’s Theorem.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Bell J.S. (2004) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  2. Maudlin T. in Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, Cushing J.T. Fine A. and Goldstein S. eds. (Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1996).

  3. Zeilinger A. (2005). Nature 438: 743

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  4. Price H. (1994). Mind (New Series) 103(411): 303–336

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Shimony A. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: Symposia and Invited Papers, Vol. 1980, issue 2, pp. 572–580, 1980.

  6. d’Espagnat B. (1979). Scientific Am. 241(5): 158–181

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Rowe M.A. et al. (2001). Nature 409: 791–794

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Mermin N.D. (1980). Phys. Rev. D 22: 356–361

    Article  ADS  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Ferrero M., Marshall T.W., Santos E. (1990). Am. J. Phys. 58(7): 683–688

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  10. Aspect A. (1999). Nature 398: 189–190

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  11. Wikipedia entry on “Bell’s theorem,” June 9, 2006, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell’s_theorem.

  12. Gibson J.J. (1966) The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Houghton Mifflin, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  13. Daumer M., Dürr D., Goldstein S., Zanghi N. (1996). Erkenntnis 45: 379–397

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  14. Mermin N.D. Phys. Rev. Lett. 65(27), 3373–3376 (1990); Mermin N.D. Rev. Mod. Phys. 65(3), 803–815 (1993).

  15. Proofs of Bell’s Theorem (i.e., derivations of Bell’s inequality) which use this Naive Realist approach include Bell’s own discussion in “Bertlmann’s socks and the nature of reality” in Ref.1; Mermin’s derivation in “Is the moon there when nobody looks? Reality and the quantum theory,” Phys. Today, April 1985, pp. 38–47; and many other papers and textbooks including, for example, Sakurai J.J. Modern Quantum Mechanics (Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, 1994).

  16. T. Norsen, quant-ph/0601205, Found. Phys. Lett. 19(7), 633–655 (2006).

  17. Clauser J.F. Horne M.A., Shimony A., Holt R.A. (1969). Phys. Rev. Lett. 23: 880

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  18. Norsen T. “Counter-factual meaningfulness and the Bell and CHSH inequalities,” quant-ph/0606084.

  19. Boyd R. “Scientific realism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

  20. For a detailed philosophical defense of Perceptual Realism, see Kelley D. The Evidence of the Senses: A Realist Theory of Perception (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1986).

  21. Albert D., Loewer B. (1988). Synthese 77: 195–213

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  22. The clearest philosophical work on the Many Worlds Interpretation has been done by David Albert. For a more systematic discussion of the claim that MWI necessitates a rejection of Perceptual Realism, see Albert D. Quantum Mechanics and Experience (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992).

  23. This point is mentioned also in David Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, op cit.

  24. Chiao R., Garrison J. (1999). Found. Phys. 29: 553–560

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  25. Peikoff L. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (Dutton, New York, 1991), pp. 129–141.

  26. M. Smerlak and Rovelli C. “Relational EPR,” quant-ph/0604064.

  27. A. D. Sokal, Lingua Franca 62–64 (1996).

  28. I. Born, trans., The Born–Einstein Letters (Walker, New York, 1971).

  29. N.D. Mermin Phys. Today, April 1985, pp. 38–47.

  30. For a recent attempt to clarify and revive the EPR argument, see Norsen T. Am. J. Phys. 73(2), 164–176 (2005).

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Travis Norsen.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Norsen, T. Against ‘Realism’. Found Phys 37, 311–340 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-007-9104-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-007-9104-1

Keywords

Navigation