Abstract
The pessimistic induction over scientific theories (Poincaré in Science and hypothesis, Dover, New York, 1905/1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists (Stanford in Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists (Wray in Synthese 190(18):4321–4330, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories (Park in Organon F 21(1):3–21, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of the success of science (Lyons in Philos Sci 70(5):891–901, 2003) has hidden problems just as its eight predecessors did. In this paper, I (1) criticize the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, (2) introduce a pessimistic induction over antirealist theories, and then (3) construct two new pessimistic inductions. One is a pessimistic induction over antirealists according to which the author of the latest antirealist proposal cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as his antirealist predecessors could not see hidden problems with their proposals. The other is the pessimistic induction over pessimists according to which since past pessimists have been wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, future pessimists will also be wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twenty-first century to the early twenty-second century.
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Notes
‘Present theory’ and ‘future theory’ are temporal predicates referring to theories existing in different periods of time with respect to a certain point in time. Thus, present and future theories do not have to be distinct from one another, i.e., the same theories can be regarded as being both present and future theories.
I am setting aside those realists who accept naturalism that there is no fundamental difference between philosophy and science.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to anonymous referees of this journal for insightful comments as well as to the participants of the third annual SoCal philosophy conference at San Diego State University in 2015.
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Park, S. Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists?. Found Sci 22, 613–625 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-016-9490-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-016-9490-y