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An Informational Ontology and Epistemology of Cognition

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An Erratum to this article was published on 01 November 2014

Abstract

Despite recent major advances in the neuroscience underlying cognition, the processes of its emergence and evolution are far from being understood. In our view, current interrelated concepts of mind; knowledge; epistemology; perception; cognition and information fail to reflect the real dynamics of mental processes, their ontology and their logic. It has become routine to talk about information in relation to these processes, but there is no consensus about its most relevant qualitative and functional properties. We present a theory of human cognition based on an ontology and epistemology of information and information processes originally proposed by Wu including (1) an ontological doctrine of the different grades of information; and (2) an informational epistemology based on a noegenesis of the doctrine of informational intermediaries that mediate between the cognitive subject and object. This theory is supported by the new, non-propositional logic proposed recently by Brenner. We demonstrate the utility of our approach for the reconceptualization of the virtual properties of reality and cognition. It is strongly anti-representationalist and can provide the basis for the integration of inputs from outside the brain (and body) into cognitive structures. For us, the philosophy of information is a metaphilosophy, implying major changes in both the content and methodology of standard philosophical disciplines. We suggest that this philosophy of information and our informational approach may help guide research in a number of current areas of cognitive science.

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Notes

  1. There are still, of course, contrary views that refer back to the Wiener concept that information is not energy. We note that in a book in press by Logan (2013), the concept of information as energy is excluded, and information is subsumed as a form of negentropy, neglecting the implication of energy transfer that nonetheless follows such an description.

  2. The minimum noticeable difference between two stimuli is proportional to the magnitude of the stimuli. Weber contrast in the difference in luminance divided by the average luminance. The basic role of difference in other forms of contrast is the same.

  3. We can construct seven-color images of the external world, because in our visual receptors are composed of red, green, and blue pigments, and different combinations of three colors can produce seven different colors.

  4. For a recent analysis of the objects of thought, see Priest (2005).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Les Diablerets, Switzerland

    Wu Kun & Joseph E. Brenner

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  1. Wu Kun
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  2. Joseph E. Brenner
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Correspondence to Joseph E. Brenner.

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Kun, W., Brenner, J.E. An Informational Ontology and Epistemology of Cognition. Found Sci 20, 249–279 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9364-0

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