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A Top-down Approach to Stress-testing Banks

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Abstract

We propose a simple, parsimonious, and easily implementable method for stress-testing banks using a top-down approach that captures the heterogeneous impact of shocks to macroeconomic variables on banks’ capitalization. Our approach relies on a variable selection method to identify the macroeconomic drivers of banking variables as well as the balance sheet and income statement factors that are key in explaining bank heterogeneity in response to macroeconomic shocks. We perform a principal component analysis on the selected variables and show how the principal component factors can be used to make projections, conditional on exogenous paths of macroeconomic variables. We apply our approach, using alternative estimation strategies and assumptions, to the 2013 and 2014 stress tests of medium- and large-size U.S. banks mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, and obtain stress projections for capitalization measures at the bank-by-bank and industry-wide levels. Our results suggest that accounting for bank heterogeneity yields expected capital shortfalls that can be over 30 percent larger than in the case where heterogeneity is ignored. Furthermore, we find that while capitalization of the U.S. banking industry has improved in recent years, under reasonable assumptions regarding growth in assets and loans, the stress scenarios continue to imply sizable deterioration in banks’ capital positions.

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Notes

  1. The 2011 CCAR contained only one stress scenario with nine domestic variables and was more limited in scope than it successors. The 2012 CCAR expanded the number of domestic variables, added international variables, and provided the series for both baseline and stressed scenarios. The now-standard format that includes baseline, adverse, and severely adverse scenarios first appeared in the 2013 CCAR and has been followed since.

  2. From a practical point of view, many of these banks do not have sufficiently long series of loan-level data available internally, for their own analyses.

  3. We do apply some sample selection rules on those banks, described in Section 3. The panel of banks we use in our sample represents 77 percent of the assets in the banking system in 2013, and 70 percent of the assets of the banking system from 2000 to 2013.

  4. While, for simplicity, we rely on the conditional forecasts of only two fairly aggregate variables, our methodology can be easily applied to a more disaggregated view of banks’ financial statements.

  5. While this jargon is standard in the United States, some practitioners in Europe refer to supervisory stress testing models as ‘top-down’ and bank-run models as ‘bottom-up’.

  6. For international applications of top-down approaches, see the following country studies: Andersen et al. (2008) for Norway, Burrows et al. (2012), Haldane et al. (2007), Hoggarth et al (2005a, 2005b) for the United Kingdom, De Bandt and Oung (2004) for France, Filosa (2007) for Italy, Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) for Austria, Van den Van den End et al. (2006) for the Netherlands, and Pesola (2007) for a cross-section of European countries, while Henry and Kok (2013) offer the European Central Bank perspective. Schuermann (2014) summarizes the stress tests conducted in the United States and Europe, using both top-down and bottom-up approaches, during the latest financial crisis. Ong (2014) provides a compendium of methods for stress testing financial systems.

  7. In a more general setting, Ergashev (2012) and Abdymomunov et al. (2014) apply scenario-based stress testing to operational risk management.

  8. At the Tier 1 capital ratio of 8 percent, the combined capital shortfall of the 15 bank-holding companies in their sample increases from $86.2b for the fixed-effects model to $98.2b in the quantile regression framework under the assumption of zero asset growth.

  9. We “merger-adjust” lags by recalculating lags so that they reflect the composition of the bank during the current period.

  10. The panel is unbalanced also because there are a small number of missing values for some of the variables used in the analysis, for 87 out of 7,400 observations.

  11. The Tier 1 leverage ratio is defined as (Tier 1 capital)/(average assets net of disallowed amounts); the total risk-based capital ratio as (risk-based capital)/(risk-weighted assets); and the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio as (Tier 1 capital)/(risk-weighted assets). Note that a bank can be deemed adequately capitalized if TRCR is at least 8 percent, and T1LR and T1RCR are at least 4 percent each.

  12. Guerrieri and Welch (2012), Covas et al. (2014), and Hirtle et al. (2014) focus their capitalization analysis on T1RCR.

  13. Note that all the macroeconomic variables are standardized to be mean zero and standard deviation one, using the mean and standard deviation of the series from 1990Q1 to 2013Q3. Even though our sample only includes banks during the period 2000Q1 to 2013Q3, when standardizing and performing principal components analysis of the macroeconomic series, we use data from 1990Q1 to ensure that our procedure is based on the long-run properties of the series. We only use banking data from 2000Q1 because the banking industry underwent considerable structural changes during the 1990s, making that period less comparable to the present banking industry.

  14. Existing literature frequently uses ad hoc selection methods, based on intuition or selecting one variable with the best fit, which ignores the information content available in other variables.

  15. Our results are driven by the use of a variable selection method, but using the LASSO method itself is not crucial. In analyses available upon request, we tried several alternative variable selection methods (Least Angle Regression, forward stagewise, forward and backward stepwise, ridge and elastic net regressions). We found that while the LASSO method weakly dominated those alternative methods in terms of in-sample fit, the differences were small.

  16. For parsimony, important for the time series models, we focus on the first principal component factor. Approaches of this kind have recently become popular in constructing indexes of financial stability or stress using a large number of macroeconomic and financial variables; see, for example, Kliesen and Smith (2010), and Brave and Butters (2011, 2012).

  17. Although the adverse scenarios for these two CCAR vintages capture different types of business cycle disruptions—an inflationary shock in 2013 and a credit risk shock in 2014—their effect on the macroeconomy and the shape of the respective factors make them fall between the baseline and the severely adverse factors in every case considered. Hence we chose to omit them from consideration to conserve space. Linear candidate sets for both vintages produce MPCFs that have worse fit for our final model specification for both PPNR and NCO and thus are not reported here. A graphical representation of these series are available in the working paper version of this article, Kapinos and Mitnik (2015).

  18. Note that the procedure selects actually among potentially 163 variables, when lags are counted, and thus the number of variables used in the construction of the principal component factor are 24 (2013) or 26 (2014) for PPNR, and 6 (2013 and 2014) for NCO.

  19. 19 We follow the existing stress testing literature in restricting our model to a dynamic panel model with only one lag of the dependent variable.

  20. 20 Note that for parsimony we restrict all models to contain one macroeconomic PCF only. We did evaluate the use of a higher number of macroeconomic PCFs, with trivial improvements (less than 0.5 percent) in fit as measured by the SIC.

  21. The data used for this exercise come from the 2014 vintage. The results for the 2013 vintage are virtually identical.

  22. For a detailed discussion of the in-sample fit results, please refer to the working paper version of this article.

  23. The eight largest banks, part of bank holding companies with at least $700 billion in total consolidated assets or at least $10 trillion in assets under custody, will face a 6 percent T1LR threshold by 2018, according to a recently adopted rule (79 Federal (2014)). Given that the calculation of the supplementary T1LR required of these institutions includes off-balance sheet items, by the regulatory agencies calculations, the rule implies that the effective T1LR threshold for these institutions would have been around 8.5 percent in 2014.

  24. For example, Senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter introduced a proposed bill in 2013, the Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act of 2013, which would have increased the minimum leverage ratio to 8 percent for financial institutions with over $50 billion in total consolidated assets.

  25. We take four-quarter averages to smooth out extreme values. Our results are practically unaffected relative to those using quarterly growth rates.

  26. We use 2007Q4 as the beginning period associated to the 2008 crisis, because it coincides with the official starting point of the recession according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).

  27. The occasional $1 billion numbers are the result of rounding up the sum of small positive values across several banks.

  28. For parsimony, we only present ECDFs under the Crisis Growth assumption. Interested readers should refer to the working paper version, Kapinos and Mitnik (2015), to see the equivalent set of results under the 3Q Growth assumptions.

  29. This list of institutions includes Wachovia, which was severely distressed and underwent an unassisted merger with Wells Fargo, and Washington Mutual, which failed during the 2008 crisis.

  30. We concentrate on the CPP and TIP sources of government assistance because they are easy to track, even if provided at the BHC level, not at the bank level. Note that Wachovia and Washington Mutual did not receive any assistance, while HSBC and TD Bank were not recipients because they belonged to foreign bank holding companies.

  31. For the theoretical motivation of this procedure, see Stock and Watson (2012).

  32. Our results are robust to other methods of forming the relevant set of macroeconomic variables. In an earlier version of the paper, we used an Elastic Net criterion that nests LASSO as a special case. Another alternative that we have considered is finding a particular penalty λ that results in the set of included variables being a fixed percentage of the number of total variables, e.g. 20 percent. Our choice of the selection algorithm is primarily driven by parsimony in the number of variables in the relevant set.

  33. Quantities all in uppercase are in terms of dollars; lowercase quantities are shares of total assets, A t , except for net charge-offs that are shares of total loans, L t .

  34. The adjustment includes one-time items such as: losses in available for sale (AFS) securities, AFS equity securities, cash flow hedges, nonqualifying perpetual preferred stock, disallowed goodwill and intangible assets, cumulative change in fair value of financial liabilities, disallowed servicing assets and purchased credit card relationships, disallowed deferred assets, and the negative of qualifying minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries.

  35. Adjusted average assets are calculated by subtracting from quarterly average total assets disallowed goodwill, other disallowed intangible assets, and disallowed deferred assets.

  36. The adjustment factor \(\overline {k^{tr}}\) is calculated in period T as the sum of the Tier 1 capital adjustment (in terms of risk weighted assets), \(\overline {k^{t1l}}(A_{T}/A^{rw}_{T})\), and deductions for total risk-based capital (as ratio of RWA or risk-weighted assets) and subtracting allowable Tier 2 capital and Tier 3 capital allocated for market risk (as ratios of RWA).

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Acknowledgments

Previous versions of the paper were circulated under the title “Can Top-Down Banking Stress Tests be Informative?” We have benefited from detailed comments by the Editor, Haluk Unal, and an anonymous referee, as well as helpful suggestions from Rosalind Bennett, Steve Burton, Gary Fissel, Mark Flannery, Mark Flood, Levent Guntay, Jerome Henry, Vivian Hwa, Kyung-So Im, Stefan Jacewitz, Myron Kwast, Emily Johnston Ross, Benjamin Kay, Troy Kravitz, Paul Kupiec, John O’Keefe, Jon Pogach, Carlos Ramirez, Jack Reidhill, Sarah Riley, Til Schuermann, Iman van Lelyveld, Chiwon Yom, and seminar participants at the FDIC, the 2013 Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting, the 2014 Annual AEA Meeting, the Conference on Enhancing Prudential Standards on Financial Regulation at the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research, the 2015 International Association of Deposit Insurers Research Conference, and the 2015 Stress Testing Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Cody Hyman and Arthur J. Micheli provided excellent research assistance. Any errors are our own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Mitnik completed work on this project while employed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

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Correspondence to Pavel Kapinos.

Appendices

Appendix

1.1 A1. LASSO selection of macroeconomic drivers

We operationalize the method that identifies the set of relevant macroeconomic variables as follows. First, we take the full panel of a banking variable of interest (PPNR or NCO in our case), Y i t , and remove variation associated with its own lag and fixed effects of individual banks by running the following regression, where \(\tilde {Y}_{it}\) represents the residual variation in Y i t :

$$ Y_{it}=\alpha_{i}+\beta Y_{it-1}+\tilde{Y}_{it}. $$
(A.1)

This step identifies the variation of the dependent variable not explained by its own lags and is standard in the macroeconomic forecasting literature.Footnote 31 Our selection of macroeconomic drivers on the basis of the residual variation of the dependent variable reduces the possibility that the variation of a selected macroeconomic driver picks up some of the variation in the dependent variable that could be explained by its own lag. Second, we employ the LASSO framework for variable selection on each candidate variable pool by regressing \(\tilde {Y}_{it}\) on the set of K z candidate macroeconomic variables given by the matrix Z to solve the following problem, with γ denoting the vector of coefficients associated with the candidate variables in the regression:

$$ \min_{\gamma}\left\{RSS(\gamma)+\lambda*\left( \sum\limits_{k=1}^{K_{z}}|\gamma_{k}|\right)\right\}. $$
(A.2)

Z is T×K z where T is the number of time periods in the sample. The parameter λ imposes a penalty factor on reducing the residual sum of squares (RSS) through additional regressors. As this parameter increases, the number of elements of the vector γ set to zero increases as well, signaling that the associated variable is not useful in reducing the residual sum of squares. Since there is no general guidance for the optimal choice of λ, we conduct a grid search over λ ∈ [λ m i n , λ m a x ], where λ m i n (λ m a x ) is the minimum (maximum) value required to drop (keep) at least (at most) one variable from (in) the candidate pool. We keep all variables that appear at least 20 percent of the time over the entire grid. This implies that we only drop the macroeconomic variables that hardly ever explain a given banking variable.Footnote 32 This process defines the set of relevant macroeconomic variables, Z of size \(T\times K_{z}^{*}\) where the optimal number of variables \(K_{z}^{*}\leq K_{z}\) comes out of our LASSO procedure, for a given dependent variable.

1.2 A2. Mapping of macroeconomic scenarios to MPCFs

Having identified Z Z via LASSO, we use the singular value decompostion:

$$ \mathbf{Z^{*}}=\mathbf{F{\Sigma} V'}, $$
(A.3)

where F and V are rotation matrices and # #Σ# # is a rescaling matrix. The columns of F are the principal component factors of Z . We denote the first principal component factor by f. Approaches of this kind have recently become popular in constructing indexes of financial stability or stress using a large number of macroeconomic or financial variables; see, for example, Kliesen and Smith (2010), and Brave and Butters (2011, 2012).

One challenge that arises in evaluating hypothetical future macroeconomic scenarios is that these projections need to be consistent with the principal components obtained from the historical series. If we simply added the scenarios as new data to the historical series, the rotation and rescaling matrices would change and the resulting principal component factors associated with each scenario would have different paths over identical historical periods. To deal with this issue, we generate scenario-invariant rotation and rescaling matrices by relying on the historical series for Z up to the quarter prior to the first scenario period. Using these data, we obtain historical rotation (V ) and rescaling (Σ) matrices. Then, we obtain principal components associated with a particular scenario s, F s, which are consistent with the principal components of the historical data, by using V , Σ, and the macroeconomic data for the relevant macroeconomic variables during the scenario, Z ∗, s:

$$ \mathbf{F^{s}}=\mathbf{Z^{*,s} V^{*} {\Sigma}^{*-1}}. $$
(A.4)

This adjustment allows us to obtain a first principal component factor f (or MPCF) that is the same in the historical portion of the data, across scenarios, and a principal component f s for each scenario, used for forecasting purposes, which is consistent with f.

1.3 A3. LASSO selection of balance sheet and income statement variables

Having obtained the optimal macroeconomic factor f that we refer to as MPCF, we estimate the following fixed-effects model:

$$ Y_{it}=\alpha_{i}+\beta Y_{it-1}+\sum\limits_{p=1}^{P}\gamma_{p} {f_{t}^{p}}+\tilde{\tilde{Y}}_{it}, $$
(A.5)

where the last term represents variation in Y i t not explained by fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable, or macroeconomic factors. Letting X be the T×K x matrix of candidate balance sheet and income statement characteristics, we regress \(\tilde {\tilde {Y}}_{it}\) on X and employ the same LASSO procedure as for the macroeconomic factor construction. We solve the following problem, denoting with δ the vector of coefficients associated with the candidate variables in the regression:

$$ \min_{\delta}\left\{RSS(\delta)+\mu*\left( \sum\limits_{k=1}^{K_{x}}|\delta_{k}|\right)\right\}. $$
(A.6)

Implementing a similar grid-search procedure as the one used for the macroeconomic variables, we keep only those income statement and balance sheet variables that, for a given dependent variable, are not discarded in at least 20 percent of cases. This identifies X X banking characteristics that are relevant for explaining the dynamics of Y i t . We refer to the first principal component x of X as the BPCF.

1.4 B1. Calculations for alternative measures of capitalization

We mimic CCAR requirements by calculating capital for a nine-quarter horizon, h = 1,...,9 quarters, under a stress scenario starting just after time period T.Footnote 33 We first calculate in each quarter the provision for loan and lease losses under the CCAR regulatory requirement that the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) should cover at least the projected net charge-offs (NCO) for the subsequent four quarters:

$$ \widehat{ALLL}_{T+h}=\sum\limits_{\tau=1}^{4}\widehat{NCO}_{T+h+\tau}=\sum\limits_{\tau=1}^{4}\left\{L_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h+\tau}\left( 1+g_{T+\eta}^{L}\right)\right\} \widehat{nco}_{T+h+\tau}. $$
(B.1)

Projections for the charge-off rate (as a share of loans), \(\widehat {nco}_{t}\), are constructed by forecasts from the relevant model taking the CCAR stress scenario path as given, whereas the loan growth rates, \({g_{t}^{L}}\), are given by assumptions that we detail in the article; L T represents the level of loans the quarter before the beginning of the stress scenario. Note that to obtain the ALLL for the nine quarters in the stress scenarios, (B.1) implies that we need to forecast NCO for 13 quarters. This allows us to construct estimates for the provision for loan-and-lease losses as follows:

$$ \widehat{PROV}_{T+h}=\widehat{ALLL}_{T+h}-\widehat{ALLL}_{T+h-1}+\widehat{NCO}_{T+h}, $$
(B.2)

where the formula reflects that current NCO and ALLL increase this quantity whereas the existing ALLL at end of the previous period reduces it. We assume that profits are taxed at the statutory rate:

$$ \widehat{TAX}_{T+h}=0.35\times Max\left( 0,\widehat{PPNR}_{T+h} - \widehat{PROV}_{T+h}\right), $$
(B.3)

where

$$ \widehat{PPNR}_{T+h}=\left\{A_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}(1+g_{T+\eta}^{A})\right\}\widehat{ppnr}_{T+h} $$
(B.4)

is driven by the assumptions on asset growth, \({g_{t}^{A}}\), over the stress period and the model-specific conditional forecasts for the ratio of PPNR to assets. Furthermore, we assume a constant dividend-to-assets ratio at the level of the last quarter prior to the first stress period, \(\overline {div}=div_{T}\):

$$ DIV_{T+h}=\left\{A_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}(1+g_{T+\eta}^{A})\right\} \overline{div} $$
(B.5)

and a constant capital adjustment (as share of assets), \(\overline {k^{t1l}}=k^{t1l}_{T}\), to obtain Tier 1 leverage capital:Footnote 34

$$ K^{t1l}_{T+h}=\left\{A_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}(1+g_{T+\eta}^{A})\right\} \overline{k^{t1l}}. $$
(B.6)

Note that the median bank in our sample paid no dividends as of 2013Q3; hence capitalization numbers derived below cannot be improved much by assuming that banks would cut back on dividends under stress.

We calculate the path for equity as:

$$ \widehat{EQ_{T+h}}=\widehat{EQ_{T+h-1}}+\widehat{PPNR}_{T+h} - \widehat{PROV}_{T+h}-\widehat{TAX}_{T+h}-DIV_{T+h} $$
(B.7)

and Tier 1 capital as:

$$ \widehat{T1C}_{T+h}=\widehat{EQ_{T+h}}-K^{t1l}_{T+h}. $$
(B.8)

Finally, we obtain the Tier 1 leverage ratio by dividing Tier 1 capital by A aa, adjusted average assets:Footnote 35

$$ \widehat{t1lr}_{T+h}=\frac{\widehat{T1C}_{T+h}}{A^{aa}_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}(1+g_{T+\eta}^{A})}, $$
(B.9)

where for simplicity we assume that adjusted average assets grow at the same rate as quarter-end assets, an assumption that roughly holds in practice.

Similarly, we can calculate the total risk-based capital ratio. The main differences with T1LR is that this ratio is normalized by risk-weighted assets, A rw, and requires a different adjustment from equity. In particular, the adjustment factor is given by:Footnote 36

$$ K^{tr}_{T+h}=\left\{A^{rw}_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}\left( 1+g_{T+\eta}^{Arw}\right)\right\}\overline{k^{tr}}, $$
(B.10)

where the growth rate of risk-weighted assets, \(g_{t}^{rw}\), is allowed to differ from that of assets. Total risk-based capital is given by:

$$ \widehat{TRC}_{T+h}=\widehat{EQ_{T+h}}-K^{tr}_{T+h}. $$
(B.11)

The total risk-based capital ratio then is given by:

$$ \widehat{trcr}_{T+h}=\frac{\widehat{TRC}_{T+h}}{A^{rw}_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}\left( 1+g_{T+\eta}^{Arw}\right)}. $$
(B.12)

B2. Calculations of capital shortfall

Using the projected capitalization positions, we construct measures of expected capital shortfall as an approximation to the amount of capital necessary to recapitalize banks under severe stress. First, we construct a measure of bank-quarter expected shortfall relative to a regulatory threshold ρ r , r = {1, 2, 3}, for the T1LR as:

$$ ES^{\rho_{r}, t1lr}_{i,T+h}=\left\{A^{aa}_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}(1+g_{T+\eta}^{A})\right\} Max(0,\rho_{r}-\widehat{t1lr}_{T+h}). $$
(B.13)

For each bank i, we can obtain the maximum T1LR shortfall over the course of the stress testing exercise:

$$ ES^{\rho_{r}, t1lr}_{i}=Max\left( ES^{\rho_{r}, t1lr}_{i,T+1},\ldots,ES^{\rho_{r}, t1lr}_{i,T+H}\right). $$
(B.14)

We construct similar measures for the TRCR as:

$$ ES^{\rho_{r}, trcr}_{i,T+h}=\left\{A^{rw}_{T}\prod\limits_{\eta=1}^{h}(1+g_{T+\eta}^{Arw})\right\} Max(0,\rho_{r}-\widehat{trcr}_{T+h}) $$
(B.15)

for the path of expected capital shortfalls for an individual bank and

$$ ES^{\rho_{r}, trcr}_{i}=Max\left( ES^{\rho_{r}, trcr}_{i,T+1},\ldots,ES^{\rho_{r}, trcr}_{i,T+H}\right) $$
(B.16)

for each bank’s maximum TRCR shortfall over the stress path. We then construct the maximum capital shortfall for each bank as the largest of the T1LR and TRCR shortfalls:

$$ ES^{\rho_{r}}_{i}=Max\left( ES^{\rho_{r}, t1lr}_{i},\;ES^{\rho_{r}, trcr}_{i}\right). $$
(B.17)

Finally, aggregating across banks, we can calculate a measure of shortfall for all banks in our sample (industry shortfall):

$$ ES^{\rho_{r}}=\sum\limits_{i=1}^{N} ES^{\rho_{r}}_{i}. $$
(B.18)

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Kapinos, P., Mitnik, O.A. A Top-down Approach to Stress-testing Banks. J Financ Serv Res 49, 229–264 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-015-0228-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-015-0228-8

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