Abstract
This paper proposes the idea of thinking about practical rationality in terms of self-regulation and defends the thesis that self-regulation is a virtue, insofar as we have reason to think it is our highest form of practical rationality. I argue that understanding self-regulation as a virtuous form of practical reasoning is called for given the kinds of limitations we face in developing agency and pursuing our goals, and presents us with several advantages over traditional understandings of practical rationality.
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Notes
I first suggested the importance of self-regulation for eudaimonistic virtue ethics in Besser-Jones (2014).
Knobe and Leiter (2007) argue that practical reasoning has little impact on behavior; Prinz (2007) and Nichols (2002) challenge reason’s motivational capacity and influence on our moral judgements; others (Besser-Jones 2014; Tiberius 2008) see more promise for practical reason but still emphasize the need to take seriously the limitations of reason.
See, for example, the collected discussions of research in Vohs and Baumeister (2010).
Hursthouse (1999, p. 12) makes a similar distinction between understanding the virtues as character traits and understanding virtue as “excellences of character”.
Russell (2015) makes a similar line of argument in suggesting that our understanding of virtue can benefit from the psychology of skill. I see my argument as amenable to his overall line of argument; however, I think the particular skill in question ought to be recognized as self-regulation.
Thus, for example, Doris argues that if we want to avoid engaging in an unwanted flirtation, the best thing to do is to avoid the opportunity and to remove ourselves from tempting situations, for we can’t count on ourselves to resist the temptation once we are in the situation (Doris 1998, p. 516).
While my discussion frames these features of our psychology as limitations, insofar as they limit our capacity to successfully pursue goals, neither of these capacities is inherently negative and we can certainly find explanations of how these features operate as positive mechanisms, especially given the limits of our brainpower. For example, the tendency towards automaticity allows us to expend less cognitive energy on the minutiae of everyday tasks and reserve that brainpower for more urgent and pressing tasks that require an active conscious effort (Bargh and Chartrand 1999).
See Doris (2002) for extended discussion of these influences.
I am grateful to Nancy Snow for the helpful examples.
Thomas Hurka also emphasizes this aspect of generosity: “A generous person tries to benefit others by giving them something that would benefit himself, usually something with a market value such as money. His generosity therefore involves a sacrifice, though a willing one, of his own instrumental good” (2000, p. 106)
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Besser, L.L. Virtue of Self-Regulation. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 20, 505–517 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9800-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9800-7