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Notes
Berlin’s pluralist views are scattered throughout his work, but major statements include the Introduction and last section of ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Berlin (2002), Berlin (1990), and Berlin (2000). Other accounts of pluralism influenced by Berlin include Raz (1986); Hampshire (1989); Stocker (1990); Nussbaum (1992) chapter 2; Kekes (1993); Gray (1995a, b); Chang (1997); Crowder (2002, 2004); Galston (2002, 2005). In the Continental tradition the concept of value pluralism is often traced to Max Weber (1948).
For a discussion of multiculturalism emphasizing its links with value pluralism, see Crowder (2013).
On Nussbaum’s list the conflict would involve items 7 (affiliation) and 10a (control over one’s material environment).
See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, who argues that the balance between liberty and equality may legitimately be struck in different ways by different liberal democracies: Fukuyama (1992: 293–4). I agree in general, but question whether ‘the individualism of Reagan’s America or Thatcher’s Britain’ is as defensible, on the ground of balance, as some of the alternatives. See my later discussion of classical vs egalitarian liberalism.
Waldron is highly critical of Berlin for his neglect of institutional matters, but the following will suggest that Waldron’s institutional concerns are consistent with Berlin’s basic position and even enhance it by showing how liberal constitutionalism is a sensible modern response to pluralist conflict at the political level.
It might also be asked where the diversity argument leads in the case of another division within liberalism, between toleration-based and personal autonomy-based versions as distinguished by William Galston (2002). Although my position has much in common with Galston’s, including its commitment to both value pluralism and liberalism, I differ with him in holding that liberal pluralism ought to endorse personal autonomy in preference to group toleration. One reason is that value pluralists ought to privilege diversity of values above diversity of cultures or conceptions of the good, another that value diversity ought to apply within as well as among cultural groups: see Crowder (2007).
The same point can be made in relation to the idea of ‘human well-being’. If the plural and incommensurable values are conceived as components of human well-being, as they are by Nussbaum, then ‘well-being’ is not advanced as a discrete value in its own right but only as the human context for the whole range of basic values and their various interpretations.
As Derek Parfit (1984: 431) writes, ‘Must it be true, of Proust and Keats, either that one was the greater writer, or that both were exactly equally as great?’
The relation between Berlin’s value pluralism and Mill’s fallibilism is discussed by Zakaras (2013). Zakaras’s article is followed by responses from Galston and myself, and Zakaras’s rejoinder.
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I am grateful to the editor and two anonymous readers for their stimulating and helpful comments.
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Crowder, G. Value Pluralism, Diversity and Liberalism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 549–564 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9539-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9539-3