Abstract
Many philosophers believe that agents are self-ruled only when ruled by their (authentic) selves. Though this view is rarely argued for explicitly, one tempting line of thought suggests that self-rule is just obviously equivalent to rule by the self. However, the plausibility of this thought evaporates upon close examination of the logic of ‘self-rule’ and similar reflexives. Moreover, attempts to rescue the account by recasting it in negative terms are unpromising. In light of these problems, this paper instead proposes that agents are self-ruled only when not ruled by others. One reason for favouring this negative social view is its ability to yield plausible conclusions concerning various manipulation cases that are notoriously problematic for nonsocial accounts of self-rule. A second reason is that the account conforms with ordinary usage. It is concluded that self-rule may be best thought of as an essentially social concept.
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Notes
C.f. Hobbes: ‘nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to to himselfe onely, is not bound’ (1996: 184). As Cohen (1996: 168–70) notes, there may be a thin sense in which one is bound by a law one can repeal, until one repeals it. Yet the significance of this fact decreases with the ease of repeal and, in the limiting case where one has only to will it for it to be so, the fact is of vanishing significance. For this reason I leave it aside.
These are of course not the only possible accounts: for another, see e.g. the ‘positive’, ‘whole-self’ account suggested in Part I of Mele 1995. Indeed, nothing said here prevents such a view from being combined with the view proposed below.
‘This is the sense in which everything is attributable to me that occurs in my conscious life or figures in the best overall explanation of my conscious life and behaviour’ (Scanlon 2002: 170). Note that some theorists, such as Korsgaard (2010), sometimes deny that beings ‘naively conceived’ in this way are agents at all, reserving the term ‘agent’ as an honorific for beings ruled by their deep selves. However, this disagreement is merely terminological (even Korsgaard allows that lower animals are agents in an extended sense (2010: 81–108)).
Thus in denying the deep self view of self-rule I do not thereby also deny the importance of rule by the deep self to other important phenomena, such as true agency or moral responsibility. Rather, my argument’s implication is simply that insofar as these things require rule by the deep self, they do not thereby require self-rule.
According to Laura Ekstrom, for instance, ‘we all agree that autonomy… is opposed to rule-from-without’ (2005: 155).
Sarah Buss (2005) makes similar points with respect to deception and manipulation.
Many but not all people. In particular, some deep self theorists accept the main claim of this section, that manipulation need not undermine the rule of one’s deep self, and conclude, not (as I do) that self-rule is therefore not a matter of rule by one’s deep self, but instead that self-rule is consistent with manipulation (Buss 2005). For those who feel no (even prima facie) resistance to this latter claim the argument of this section will lack persuasive force, and, as regards such people, I must rest my case solely on the considerations presented elsewhere in this paper.
Note that not even Susan Wolf (1990) holds that autonomy requires true belief—for her, autonomy requires only the capacity to track the truth.
Mele (1995: 187) requires, as part of a sufficient condition for autonomy, that ‘the agent’s beliefs are conducive to informed deliberation about all matters that concern him’. For the reasons just given, this is too strong to serve also as a necessary condition, and it is difficult to see how Mele could attenuate it in a plausible way without incorporating some inherently social requirement.
Notice also that the problem applies regardless of one’s stance on determinism. No sane incompatibilist denies that an agent’s choices should be influenced by her relevant beliefs, and that these, in turn, should be the appropriate effects of certain features of the world. (For more on the incompatibilist’s trouble with manipulation, see Mele 2006: 138–44.)
Again, they struggle regardless of their stance on determinism. Suppose that Ernie’s decision to stab the intruder is not fully determined by prior causes, but that Diana has arranged both Ernie and his environment so as to make it extremely likely that he does so, and he does so. Ernie’s autonomy is compromised all the same.
To be precise, Mele urges compatibilists to bite the bullet, since this case enters his discussion simply as a possible argument against compatibilism.
See, for instance, Boud 1981: ‘A collection of essays that examines ways in which teachers in higher education can enable students to become more autonomous in their learning: that is, how students can learn without the constant presence or intervention of a teacher.’
And some may wish to challenge the lesson I draw from these considerations. For instance, it might be expected that few would be willing to accord full autonomy to a distressed lunatic screaming in the street (as we must on a negative social account). But consider this: when the new Director of a mental institution declares that he supports an increase in ‘patient autonomy’, this is not normally just a roundabout way of saying that he wants his patients to get better. Rather, it more likely means that he thinks that patients should have more of a say in how they are treated, and should be less subject to the rule of the doctors and nurses.
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Acknowledgments
Early versions of this paper were presented at both the Birkbeck work-in-progress workshop and the Birkbeck postgraduate seminar: I thank all those in attendance for the helpful discussions. Many thanks are also due to various anonymous referees for invaluable comments on previous drafts.
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Garnett, M. Taking the Self out of Self-Rule. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16, 21–33 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9316-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9316-5