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Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics

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Abstract

Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits.

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Notes

  1. For example, see Darley and Batson’s (1973) study, in which situational features such as “degree of hurry” influenced the helping behavior of subjects, or Isen and Levin’s (1972) infamous study in which the contingent consequence of finding a dime created positive mood effects and increased the rate of helping behaviors.

  2. For notable exceptions, see Hutton (2006), Kupperman (2001), and Sarkissian (2010).

  3. Ivanhoe (2000) argues that Xunzi holds a “re-formation” account of self cultivation or moral development because of his view of human nature and the necessity of moral training to overcome one’s desires. Stalnaker (2006) holds a similar account. I think they overstate the case, but this disagreement over theoretical interpretations is far beyond the scope of this present essay.

  4. As a consequence, Aristotelians can avail themselves of these arguments as long as they avoid these problematic assumptions.

  5. For example, see McDowell (1979).

  6. Although Harman and Doris assume that these are competing hypotheses, there are reasons to doubt this claim, which I address later in the paper.

  7. Doris and Harman part company here. Harman explicitly rejects the explanatory value of narrowly individuated or local character traits. He states that “character traits are broad based dispositions that help to explain what they are dispositions to do. Narrow dispositions do not count” (1999, p. 318). He holds that character traits must offer “common explanations” across situations (p. 318). Clearly, cross-situational consistency is an important explanatory value for Harman.

  8. Others have challenged Doris’s distinction between local and global traits. For example, Slingerland rejects “the implicit assumption that we know what we are talking about when we contrast ‘local’ with ‘global’ traits: that is, that there is a clear, principled distinction between the two. This is not at all the case. When offered as an analytic dichotomy, the ‘local’ versus ‘global’ distinction is simply not tenable, because any truly ‘local’ trait would not be a ‘trait’ at all, but merely a single occurrence: John performed behavior X in situation Y at this particular time and place. The sorts of local traits that Doris thinks worthy of our attention count as ‘traits’ because they are already abstract to various degrees” (2011, 399).

  9. Although Doris’s 1998 and 2002 texts make more circumspect claims, in an article with Stich he appears to agree with Harman’s stronger conclusions: “the Aristotelian conception of traits as robust dispositions…is radically empirically undersupported…[so that] programmes of moral education aimed at inculcating virtues may very well be futile” (Doris and Stitch, 2005, p. 119–120, my emphasis).

  10. Xunzi’s birth and death dates are unknown, and these dates are mere guidelines for comparison. For example, it is known that Xunzi held an administrative position in the state of Chu until his ruler was assassinated in 238 BCE, and that he then retired. However, scholars have no actual date for his death.

  11. For more detailed information on Xunzi and the Classic period of Confucianism, please see Ivanhoe’s (2000) introduction and chapter on Xunzi, as well as the introductions in Knoblock (1999) and Watson (2003). For an interesting interpretation of Xunzi and a comparison with Augustine, see Stalnaker (2006).

  12. Xunzi argues that ritual is “the utmost in patterning….Those under Heaven who follow it will have good order. Those who do not follow it will have chaos. Those who follow it will have safety. Those who do not follow it will be endangered. Those who follow it will be preserved. Those who do not follow it will perish” (Hutton Ch. 19:145–150). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 276); Knoblock (1999, p. 611); Watson (2003, p. 98).

  13. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 279–280); Knoblock (1999, p. 623); Watson (2003, p. 103).

  14. Ritual also serves to constrain or limit the expression of emotion. Xunzi explains that the standard practice of limiting mourning to a 3-year period is to set “a limit for the utmost hurt….After the 25 months of the 3-year mourning period, the worry and hurt are not yet done, and the feelings of longing and remembrance are not yet forgotten. Nevertheless, ritual breaks off the mourning at this time….in order that there may be a proper stopping point for sending off the dead and proper regulation for resuming one’s normal life” (Hutton Ch. 19:465–475). See also Knoblock (1999, p. 637); (Watson, p. 109).

  15. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 262); Knoblock (1999, p. 27); Watson (2003, p. 26).

  16. Tu notes that “in the Confucian context it is inconceivable that one can become truly human without going through the process of ‘ritualization,’ which in this particular connection means humanization” (1972, p. 198).

  17. Lai (2006) argues that there are three stages of self-cultivation within the Analects. She argues that “the first is the novice’s stage during which li [rituals] are essential in inculcating correct forms of behavior. At this stage, adherence to the dictates of li introduces the learner to the appropriate proprieties in different contexts. The second stage is an experimental one during which the learner extracts principles from these behavioral forms through constant practice. The emphasis at this stage is on the learner testing out his application of moral principles….The third phase is marked by the deliberations of the mature, cultivated person, who has a good grasp of the principles and ideals encoded and realized in meaningful social interaction. At this stage, li have a different significance…they do not function as instruments of rote learning but rather are channels for meaningful self-expression” (p. 69). Although I agree with Lai’s emphasis on the changing role of li (see Tu 1972 for a similar account), we disagree on the nature of Confucian moral development. Lai takes moral development to be the increasing understanding and application of moral principles found within rituals, but I argue that the very fact that rituals are type-level models means that they do not contain extractable principles applicable to token situations. Although it is an interesting question as to the extent of contrast between the Analects (authored by Confucius) and the Xunzi (authored by Xunzi), such a comparison beyond the scope of this essay.

  18. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 277); Watson (2003, p. 100).

  19. Xunzi is clear that humans all have the same nature, but that differences in moral development depend on one’s willingness to engage in moral self-cultivation: “Someone says: sageliness is achieved through accumulation, but why is it that not all can accumulate thus? I say, they can do it, but they cannot be made to do it. Thus, the petty man can become a gentleman, but is not willing to become a gentleman” (Hutton Ch. 23:290). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 305); Knoblock (1999, p. 767); Watson (2003, p. 171).

  20. For detailed information on the Confucian program of moral education, please see Ivanhoe (2000) and Stalnaker (2006).

  21. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 264); Knoblock (1999, p. 39); Watson (2003, p. 30).

  22. Hutton argues persuasively that Confucian non-liberal political philosophy may explain the emphasis on character and global character traits. He notes that “one can see how acknowledging situationist concerns might actually drive one to emphasize the importance of robust, virtuous character even more, rather than less, because it may be that only if some people really do have robust character [i.e., the sages as exemplars and teachers] can society turn out well” (2006, p. 51). Hutton is right that Confucian political philosophy attends to situationist concerns, but the emphasis derives from the model of moral development assumed and not the political ideals. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, I would counter that the embeddedness model of moral development I argue for here, as a psychological model, explains both the emphasis on ritual for moral education and the ideals within Confucian political philosophy.

  23. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 276); Knoblock (1999, p. 615); Watson (2003, p. 98).

  24. Xunzi expounds on such descriptive and normative labels at length. For example: “to endorse what is right and condemn what is wrong is called ‘wisdom.’ To endorse what is wrong and condemn what is right is called ‘stupidity.’….To injure a good person is called ‘villany.’ To call the right as right and wrong as wrong is called ‘righteousness.’….To conceal one’s actions is called ‘deceptiveness’” (Hutton Ch. 2:55–65). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 262); Knoblock (1999, p. 29); Watson (2003, p. 27).

  25. Xunzi notes that “sounds and music enter people deeply and transform people quickly” and has a lengthy discourse on the character of sound: how it affects individuals’ emotional states, moods, and behaviors, and how it may be used for political purposes to ensure social order. For example, he notes that “if music is balanced and peaceful, then the people will be harmonious and not degenerate. If music is solemn and majestic, then the people will be uniformly ordered and not cause chaos….If music is dissolute and dangerous, then the people will be degenerate, arrogant, vulgar, and base” (Hutton Ch. 20:60). See also Knoblock (p. 655); Watson (2003, p. 117).

  26. Xunzi also notes the subtle effect others have on our attitudes and behaviors: “If you obtain a worthy friend to befriend, then what you see will be conduct that is loyal, trustworthy, respectful, and deferential. Then you will make daily progress toward ren and yi and you will not even realize it….Now if you live alongside people who are not good, then what you hear will be trickery, deception, dishonesty, and fraud. What you will see will be conduct that is dirty, arrogant, perverse, deviant, and greedy….A saying goes, ‘If you do not know your son, observe his friends….’ Everything depends on what you rub up against!” (Hutton Ch. 23:390). See also Knoblock (1999, p. 773); Watson (2003, p. 174). Similarly, Merritt (2000) notes the “sustaining social contribution” of situations to moral behavior, and Sarkissian (2010) also highlights the interconnectedness of social behavior through the influence of our behavior on others and vice versa.

  27. One might think that this is simply a redescription of Doris’s notion of local character traits. Recall that local character traits such as “battlefield physical courage” are productive of behavior in very narrowly specified conditions, and simply are not causally operative during storms on the high seas, while being tortured, or upon stepping into a den of snakes. I argue (see below in the main text) that traditional Western virtues such as “honesty” are descriptive and normative behavioral labels, so I have no problem agreeing that we can parse them as finely as we want based on whatever behavioral patterns we identify. The level of descriptive grain we prefer is governed by our pragmatic interests in prediction and explanation. (See Jacobson 2005 for a related argument about parsing virtues.) However, my hunch is that Doris is after a much more fine grained and limited dispositional entity than Xunzi promotes, and I address the causal role of psychological entities and their conception extensively later. For an immediate difference, note that Doris is positing narrowly specified traits, while Xunzi endorses type-level comprehensive models as implicit, abstract, emotive, interpretive, and procedural knowledge structures (which may support but are not merely dispositions, nor dispositions of a simple sort). The only thing they seem to have in common is that they are each indexed to situational types, and hence, given Doris’s definition, stable. Using this simplistic comparison, one may still attempt to argue that Xunzi is merely endorsing something akin to Doris’s local character traits. But even granting this for the sake of the argument would not deflate Xunzi’s account: Doris endorses the ethical development of local character traits while Xunzi holds that type-level psychological models are “training tools” that are transcended in moral development.

  28. These are behavioral labels insofar as one only has observational evidence of behavior. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the mental states of others; I do not know when someone feels sorrow internally unless I can observe some external or behavioral manifestation of it.

  29. Indeed, one might wonder what purpose attributing a global character trait of “honesty” would serve in this case. Clearly I might describe her as “honest” because she routinely returns money, but this is an accurate description as well as a commendation of her behavior. Insofar as she exemplifies a type-level pattern or model that I can identify via a label, at the least, I can make fairly accurate predictions on the basis of her past behavior, and at most, I can be an instrumentalist about such type-level psychological models. But for Xunzi, attributing a psychological entity to her is less explanatory than one might assume: first, the type-level psychological models are only stable (hence, they would not yield viable predictions across situation types anyway), and second, as is detailed in the main text below, the observed regularity in her behavior is a consequence of the joint regularity between type-level psychological models and situations (hence, there is little temptation to attribute psychological entities—with a strong form of realism no less—if what we observe is a consequence of a causal nexus).

  30. Merritt (2000) argues for the sustaining social contribution to character (SSC) against strong forms of the motivational self-sufficiency of character (MSC). Doris claims that “the notion of socially sustained virtue seems to be predicated on the realization that robust traits are deeply problematic” (2002, p. 91). However, as Merritt notes, the degree of social contribution versus internal sufficiency in virtue ethics is itself a normative issue. I argue further that it is deeply problematic to assume a sharp divide between situational and psychological causal relations, quite apart from the normative assumptions one makes. I address this point at length later in the paper.

  31. Merritt (2000) argues that character can be sustained through social contribution and relations with others (e.g., the death of one’s drinking partner can minimize one’s disposition to drink), and Sarkissian (2010) argues that we influence situations through our effects on others (e.g., social signaling, tone, mannerisms, etc.). My point here is not merely pragmatic, but ontological.

  32. Note that the regularity of situations (as complex event types) is not to be confused with the recurrent appearance of individual situational features, factors, or components across situational types. I address this point at length later in the paper.

  33. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 299); Knoblock (1999, p. 743); Watson (2003, p. 162).

  34. Studying music is clearly an important part of Xunzi’s program of moral education; music complements ritual in eliciting moods and emotions (e.g., think of the contrasts between classical, techno, or elevator music), focusing attention via suggestive interpretive frameworks (e.g., hearing a funeral dirge while viewing caskets of fallen soldiers versus hearing patriotic music), and providing models for proper thought and action (e.g., thinking of the families of the fallen soldiers and their loss rather than ruminating on the nature of patriotism). However, music is secondary to ritual: “nothing is more direct than following ritual, nothing is more important than having a good teacher, and nothing works with greater spirit-like efficacy than to like it with single-minded devotion” (Hutton Ch. 2:85). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. X); Knoblock (1999, p. 31); Watson, p. 28).

  35. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 259); Knoblock (1999, p. 17); Watson (2003, p. 20).

  36. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 264); Knoblock (1999, p. 39); Watson (2003, p. 31).

  37. The Romanized word “yi” used here is a different Chinese word than “yi” of “appropriateness” or “righteousness” discussed in the context of ren and yi as developing attitudes and virtues.

  38. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 260); Knoblock (1999, p. 25); Watson (2003, p. 22).

  39. See also Knoblock (1999, p. 213); Watson (p. 37).

  40. As Jacobson notes, “skill development primarily involves learning how to apply these maxims to particular cases and, eventually, knowing when to ignore them” (2005, p. 309).

  41. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 264); Knoblock (1999, p. 39); Watson (2003, p. 31).

  42. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 277); Knoblock (1999, p. 615); Watson (2003, p. 99).

  43. See also Knoblock (1999, p. 213); Watson (p. 37).

  44. Although Doris and Harman urge attention to situational features, this largely appears to be gathering knowledge of features that instigate one’s moral failings and avoiding those particular things. Harman offers some specific advice: “if you are trying not to give into temptation to drink alcohol, to smoke, or to eat caloric food, the best advice is….Don’t go to places where people drink! Do not carry cigarettes or a lighter and avoid people who smoke! Stay out of the kitchen!” (2003, p. 91). Doris and Harman urge attention to particular situational features, but neither urge the development of situational perceptiveness akin to moral perception as urged by Cua or Xunzi.

  45. Kamtekar agrees on this point: “the difference between the situationist concern with behavioral consistency and the virtue ethics concern with consistent success raises the question: relative to what standard of consistency ought people to be judged consistent or not? If one’s purpose is to evaluate folk psychology, then it is reasonable to take ordinary people’s expectations as the standard. But if one’s purpose is to evaluate virtue ethics, then the standard will have to be different and to take account of the fact that we are thinking, goal-oriented creatures” (2004, p. 484).

  46. Miller makes a similar point from the perspective of Aristotelian accounts of virtue. He argues that “the results that Harman takes to be a reductio of character-based explanations, may actually turn out to be precisely what one should expect on a sufficiently nuanced understanding of virtue ethics” (2003, p. 370).

  47. See also Knoblock (1999, p. 235); Watson (2003, p. 46).

  48. Achieving moral perfection requires great effort. Xunzi explains that “if the people on the streets were to submit themselves to study and practice learning, if they were to concentrate their hearts and make single-minded their intentions, if they were to ponder, query, and thoroughly investigate—then if they add to this days upon days and connect to this long period of time, if they accumulate goodness without stopping, then they will break through to spirit-like powers and understanding….Thus, becoming a sage is something that people achieve through accumulation” (Hutton Ch. 23:280). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 305); Knoblock (1999, p. 765); Watson (2003, p. 171).

  49. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 291); Knoblock (p. 695); (Watson, p.137).

  50. Xunzi explains that “when one can deliberate and be firm, and adds to this fondness for it, then this is to be a sage” (Hutton Ch. 19:170). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 277); Knoblock (1999, p. 615); Watson (2003, p. 99).

  51. Xunzi notes that “in every selection that people make, the object of their desire does not come pure. In what they reject, their object of dislike does not go away pure. Thus for every action people make, they must come prepared with a balance….The Way is the correct balance from ancient times to the present” (Hutton Ch. 22:350). See also Knoblock (1999, p. 735); Watson (2003, p. 157).

  52. Bias and over-focus distort one’s deliberation and yield inaccurate moral judgments. Xunzi explains that “almost always, the problem for people is that they become fixated on one twist and are deluded about the greater order of things….In whatever respect the myriad things are different, they can become objects of fixation to the exclusion of each other” (Hutton Ch. 21:1, 30). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 286, 287); Knoblock (1999, p. 671); Watson (2003, p. 125).

  53. The word for “fixated” is translated alternatively as “blindness” or “obsession.” One’s over-focus on an idea or approach can be blinding, and Xunzi thought that many competing schools of thought (such as the Mohists) were missing the Dao because of such obsessional theoretical focus. He notes that “if one speaks of it in terms of usefulness, then the Way will consist completely in seeking what is profitable. If one speaks of it in terms of desires, then the Way will consist completely in learning to be satisfied. If one speaks of it in terms of laws, then the Way will consist completely in making arrangements. If one speaks of it in terms of power, then the Way will consist completely in terms of finding what is expedient. If one speaks of it in terms of wording, then the Way will consist in discoursing on matters….These various approaches are all merely one corner of the Way. As for the Way itself, its substance is constant, yet it covers all changes. No one corner is sufficient to exhibit it fully” (Hutton Ch. 21:115). See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 287); Knoblock (1999, p. 679); Watson (2003, p. 129).

  54. See also Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005, p. 287–288); Knoblock (1999, p. 681); (Watson, p. 130).

  55. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, I take it that this is the insight behind Hursthouse (1991) discussion in reconceiving the abortion debate as a focus not on biological facts or moral concepts. She argues that there are more facts that need to be considered, and that once one does, this raises consideration of still more facts (see p. 229 in particular). I take this to be an example of deliberative situational embeddedness that attends to the minute and unique features of the situation that distinguish it from other situations and which matter—such that if these additional details were ignored, one would be in danger of making the wrong judgment. One might also see other positions in the debate as suffering from fixated thinking: an over-focus on biological facts or concepts such as personhood yields inaccurate moral judgments.

  56. See also Knoblock (1999, p. 227); (Watson, p. 44).

  57. McDowell notes that a “kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement that situations impose on behavior. The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; and there are idioms according to which the sensitivity itself can appropriately be described as knowledge: a kind person knows what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity (1998, p. 51).

  58. Indeed, Doris proposes local character traits as an alternative to global traits because he assumes there must be a property correspondence between behavior and psychological traits. However, there is no motivation or reason to posit local character traits or fragmented character in the absence of this assumption. Exposing the assumptions that gird the empirical challenge to global character traits destroys any support for local character traits as a theoretical alternative.

  59. Merritt (2000) argues that the sustaining social contribution to character (SSC) and the motivational self-sufficiency of character (MSC) are competing normative conceptions of virtue. Note that Xunzi emphasizes different norms at different stages of moral development: he endorses the sustaining social contribution to character (in the sense that Merritt presents it) strongly for those at the first stage of moral development, with a gradual transition for those at the second stage, to the strong endorsement of the motivational self-sufficiency of character for those at the third stage of moral development. Merritt suggests that our interests in stability might favor SSC as a normative conception of virtue. However, our preferences may depend more on which virtues one considers: ren and yi would offer what Merritt seems most interested in (and indeed why she favors a Humean account), yet they are a conception of virtue which is strongly motivationally self-sufficient.

  60. The point here is not about how to characterize behaviors (e.g., what counts as “honesty” within a situational type), but is rather about how to characterize the concept of stability as a property attributed to a virtue and, hence, the nature of the evidence used to make inferences about the robustness of a virtue.

  61. See Weilenberg (2006) for some interesting differences in Socratic, Kantian, and Aristotelian assumptions about consistency.

  62. Understood as whatever particular actions we choose to identify via descriptive and normative labels such as “honesty, “civility,” “respectfulness,” “generosity,” etc.

  63. There is an important distinction to keep in mind here between a situation as a complex event, and individual factors or components that may be salient, causally effective, etc. For example, the fragrant smell of baking bread (see Doris, pp. 30–31) or the stirring rhythms of patriotic music are highly causally effective factors to alter moods. A factor may be present and reliably causally effective across many situational types, but its presence does not make them all instances of the same “situation.” My point here is not about whether, or which, individual factors are reliably causally effective, but rather, about the regularity within situations as types: the regularity of a collection of essential factors or components, their combination or structure, the order or sequence of the components, etc. in virtue of which the situation is an instance of a specified type. For example, refer back to the case of attending a lecture.

  64. See the infamous “dime study” done by Isen and Levin (1972). As noted in the introduction, virtue ethicists have taken aim at such studies, challenging the design, results, assumptions, etc. For the sake of the discussion here, I will assume the correctness of such research.

  65. Such features can be harnessed within a political system as well. As noted previously, Xunzi details the effect of music and sound on individuals, and exhorts political leaders to attend to such features.

  66. See Merritt (2000) for an argument that Aristotelian accounts of virtue may rely on this problematic assumption. While there are Aristotelian scholars who do seem to make this assumption, I doubt it is inherent to an Aristotelian account of virtue ethics. I leave this defense and debate to Aristotelian scholars.

  67. Given Xunzi’s account of moral development, it may be the case that the sages will be less susceptible to the distorting effects of particular situational factors and their corresponding induction of emotional responses, moods, etc. While Xunzi’s program of moral education is designed to forestall some effects and to cultivate others through the power of ritual, there is no reason to expect sages to be completely immune from the effects of all situational factors. First, one should be careful not to read a dichotomy between situational and psychological factors back into Xunzi. Second, Confucian moral development is a life-long process, even for sages.

  68. In an excellent article, Slingerland (2011) offers an account of Confucian moral education and how such a program of explicit and lifelong environmental manipulation and character training inculcates stable and consistent virtues that can meet the situationist “high-bar” argument. He correctly focuses on the role of perpetual (life-long) situational support through “immersion in carefully designed cultural forms” (p. 414) (i.e., ritual), but then mischaracterizes (at times) the nature of the developing virtues for the gentleman and the sage (p. 413). The consequence of Confucian moral education is not independence from situational forces simpliciter, but an alteration in the effect of specific and particular situational factors. Despite a few small disagreements, our positions are complementary. The operation of ren and yi within deliberative situational embeddedness and the regularity within situations yields behavior that very highly reliably co-varies with situational features, thereby offering additional theoretical resources to explain why Confucians may meet the “high-bar” argument (reconceived as reliable flexibility rather than mere regularity).

  69. One might wonder how avoiding situational influences suffices for moral development. As Wielenberg points out, “there are definite limits to what Doris’s situation-management strategy can accomplish. We cannot always control the kinds of situations in which we find ourselves” (2006, p. 489). Sarkissian makes a similar point by noting that first, “in order to avoid a certain type of situation, one needs be aware of its eliciting a particular pattern of behavior” and second, “certain relationships or situations, even if known to elicit undesirable behavior, may nonetheless be practically unavoidable” (2010, p. 5). Beyond these pragmatic concerns for one’s own personal practice, Doris and Harman’s tactic of avoidance seems completely unrealistic on a broad scale for social policy or enacting a program of moral education.

  70. Clearly an ancient Chinese program of moral education cannot meld seamlessly with modern educational policy, but there are rich theoretical resources and empirical insights to glean from Xunzi’s account of moral development and program of moral education.

  71. One might interpret Xunzi as holding additional virtues beyond ren and yi. While I do not claim that ren and yi are the only virtues, I have only argued for a realist interpretation of ren and yi. Addressing the status of other possible virtues (e.g., filial piety) and at the various stages of moral development is far beyond the scope of this paper. A reviewer helpfully noted that filial piety may qualify as a virtue on my account. Indeed, it may, but in the absence of extended discussion and textual analysis, I take no position. However, given the sloppiness of the debate between virtue ethicists and situationists and varied conceptions of virtue, I predict that, in general, what may appear to be virtues are more likely to be (1) the descriptive and normative labels found at the first stage of moral development, (2) instrumental characterizations at the first and second stages of moral development, or (3) a mischaracterization of the changing function of rituals within moral education throughout the stages of moral development. Clearly, much more work needs to be done.

  72. As Kristjansson (2008) notes, “some moral particularists have been eager to enlist Aristotle as their ally. The trouble for them is that in Aristotle’s view, phronesis adjudicates moral conflicts, and phronesis relies not only upon situational appreciation but also upon general moral truths. Thus, when Aristotle uses particular examples, he does not abandon generalizations and tell us to attend only to the particularities of the described situation; rather he describes the generalisations we should seek” (p. 65.) In contrast, Hutton (2002) notes that this type of deliberation “involves carefully weighing and mutually adjusting the reasons at work in a given situation within the broader framework of the end constituted by the Dao, which, like the role of eudaimonia in Aristotelian practical reasoning, is an overall conception of how to live upon which deliberation focuses” (p. 372). If Kristjansson is right, then perhaps Aristotle is not proposing a model of moral development similar to Xunzi’s, in which case, Aristotelian accounts of virtue ethics may pose a target for some situationist challenges. However, Hutton argues quite persuasively for a high degree of similarity between Xunzi’s and Aristotle’s accounts of virtue. Not being an Aristotelian, I will leave this issue to those who are.

  73. One may worry that learning which features of situations are significant would reduce their effectiveness in just the same way as learning what panic attacks are and how they are caused tends to reduce the severity of their effects. However, if Xunzi is right that particular situational features induce emotion and are important for moral education, some may be cognitively impenetrable: a straight stick inserted into water looks bent, and it will continue to look bent despite my knowledge that the stick is straight. The effect of moral education through ritual may be similarly cognitively impenetrable, regardless of one’s knowledge of the causal efficacy or the significance of situational features. However, whether there are such cognitively impenetrable situational features or factors is an empirical question, and it is an empirical question that can only be answered through extensive long-term analysis throughout phases of moral education and stages of moral development. Discovering such information would be fascinating and could inform moral education in interesting ways by suggesting alternative strategies for addressing and responding to such situational features in moral education.

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Correspondence to Deborah S. Mower.

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Mower, D.S. Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16, 113–137 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9312-9

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