Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Problems in the Theory of Democratic Authority

  • Published:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper identifies strands of reasoning underlying several theories of democratic authority. It shows why each of them fails to adequately explain or justify it. Yet, it does not claim (per philosophical anarchism) that democratic authority cannot be justified. Furthermore, it sketches an argument for a perspective on the justification of democratic authority that would effectively respond to three problems not resolved by alternative theories—the problem of the expert, the problem of specificity, and the problem of deference. Successfully resolving these problems is at least evidence for the viability of a justification of democratic authority. This perspective integrates procedural concerns with those about the quality of democratic outcomes. It shows that democratic authority, if there is such a thing, requires reliable democratic procedures as the only sort citizens could rationally accept.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. By “democratic authority,” I refer only to “legitimate” authority—democratic authority de jure, not de facto. I grant that the entailment noted may be an oversimplification. The reader should keep in mind, however, that I will be using these sets of claims primarily as heuristics for the purposes of organizing some ideas about democratic authority and developing a point of view. On the other hand, I will give at least an indirect defense of the idea that democratic authority is necessary and sufficient for a general duty on the part of citizens to obey. In this respect democratic authority is “the moral power to require obedience” (Estlund 2008). Even this account presents conceptual difficulties. It seems that there could be such a power without it being exercised. In that case, no duty to obey follows from it. The fact there is no duty to obey would indicate only the non-exercise of democratic authority, not its non-existence. So at least the exercise of democratic authority would be sufficient for a duty to obey.

  2. For instance, religious views sometimes assert duties to obey political authority on the ground of “deeper” ecclesiastical authority. A duty to obey is justified in terms besides the fact of democratic authority as such.

  3. One might wonder what would be sufficient for democratic authority. Any decisive and persuasive response would be difficult to defend and remain within the scope of the paper. However, the conclusions drawn strongly lean towards the view that consent (of a normative type) would be sufficient for democratic authority. In this light the conclusions may be regarded as showing what would be necessary for consent of this sort.

  4. An epistemic case will be defined as one that (a) exhibits a relatively high degree of moral complexity, (b) about which moral conflict and disputation is typical, and (c) for which a solution should not be achieved by a random procedure. I will consider cases like the general permissibility of abortion, the death penalty, or the decision to go to war as paradigms of morally complex cases about which citizens have deep disagreements in judgments about what is correct, not simply in their interests. Cases like those presented by games where we decide who gets the ball first or who wins the lottery are “non-epistemic” and might be rightly resolved authoritatively (I will assume) in purely procedural terms. It should also be kept in mind that the essay tries only to justify the epistemic relation of democratic authority, leaving the details of how a democratic procedure might reliably track this standard for another time.

  5. As Mill recognized, the liberty to speak should be regarded as an epistemic standard since it enables democracy to track the truth. The rule proposed above is not regarded as an enabler in this way.

  6. Of course, some democratic theorists (Schumpeter 1976; Posner 2003) would dispute the claim I considered less controversial. On their skeptical, non-cognitivist view, democratic deliberation could not be epistemic in this way since either there are no objects of deliberation or because deliberators cannot know what they are. This may make it seem as though I am defending a certain sort of general cognitivist moral theory. While I doubt all the reasons can be defended here, I do not view this essay as offering such a defense or think that one is necessary.

  7. I will not discuss social choice theory in detail, largely because I do not regard these views as primarily concerned with democratic authority at all. To the extent that political agents act from perceived self-interest, they are not concerned with even the possibility of moral motivation.

  8. “Non-specificity” is what Simmons calls the particularity problem. Simmons also regards this problem as a difficulty of natural duty as a basis for authority where natural duties are considered as primary ones (Wellman and Simmons 2005, 166). I have used the expression “non-specificity” to begin to differentiate my approach from his own—a different that can be seen more clearly at the end of the essay.

  9. I am not convinced these alternatives are exhaustive. To the extent they are, however, that would strengthen my thesis.

  10. Among these, it is not compatible with philosophical anarchism which holds there is a principled incompatibility between democracy and autonomy, denying there could be democratic authority at all. For comparison, see also Wellman and Simmons, 2005.

  11. This sort of de facto anarchism is distinct from Wolff’s philosophical anarchism, which holds that no political authority could in principle be legitimate. So the thesis is not compatible with the latter at least to the extent it holds out the possibility of legitimate democratic authority. One could consider the view for which I will argue to be philosophically authoritarianism as opposed to philosophically anarchist.

  12. I take it this proposal is different from the one that it could never possibly be satisfied. Thus, the proposition taken by itself could not show that democratic authority violates and ought implies can constraint on adequate principles.

  13. Note that philosophical anarchism would reserve that right even if a particular anarchist remains agnostic about when, if ever, it should be deployed.

  14. It is a matter of some consequence how this procedural reason itself is established. I will argue that establishing it requires an extra-procedural (i.e. epistemic) appeal and not by moral arguments alone.

  15. There is of course a sense in which one does not defer even in cases like this. We could say that one simply judges that one should let someone better situated make a judgment. In this way, we could say that one delegates certain kinds of judgments, most commonly in matters about which one is not expert.

  16. Some religious and philosophical expression can be considered an exercise in deference. Descartes writes of God’s superiority vis a vis providence in this vein: “For since I now know that my own nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible and infinite, I also know without more ado that he is capable of countless things whose causes are beyond my knowledge” (Descartes [1641]1984).

  17. I assume that the positive law includes the claim of a right to issue commands; but as suggested, that does not entail a general moral duty to obey them. A general moral duty to obey a law would entail not simply a motivation to obey it, but a justification for obeying it.

  18. Granted, this command may be one only grammatically. For now, however, I will not distinguish between directive that are commands only grammatically and those that have genuine authority. The point will be to consider various ways of modeling legitimate authority. I take for granted the possibility that some models will be based upon “grammatical illusions.”

  19. I hope the reader understands that I am trying to formulate these models abstractly enough to reasonably classify a wide variety of views—even those with substantively different theories of democracy. So I might not always give a satisfying account of who in the contemporary literature holds what. It would not be easy, for instance, to say who if anyone in contemporary philosophical literature might be an expert reliabilist in political cases. Historically, it is at least arguable that Plato and Rousseau have held this position. Plato regarded “the philosopher” as the expert whereas Rousseau may be read as attributing expertise to the majority (understood a certain way). Yet, the attraction of (ER) as a possible model of democratic authority seems rooted in a more widespread sentiment about expertise in relation to what “one should do.” There is a perfectly appropriate sense in which I should fix my car because the expert (my mechanic) tells me what to do. But on this basis, it seems false that I am obligated do it because my mechanic tells me to do so. In the case of duty reliabilism discussed later, I believe that views as different as those held by Wolff, Misak can be suitably identified as kinds of duty reliabilism.

  20. John Simmons presents (and criticizes) a view of duty reliabilism where “original duties” are specified as natural ones. A natural duty as defined by Simmons is one grounded in “(a) the moral importance of advancing some impartial moral good, or (b) in some moral duty thought to be owed by all person to all others as moral equals regardless of roles, relationships, or transactions” (Wellman and Simmons 2005, 103).

  21. For a defense of justice as a natural duty see Allen Buchanan (2002, 689–719). Philosophical anarchism could be considered a form of duty reliabilism. This is because it aims to discover whether or not there could be a political means by which to discharge one’s original duty of autonomy. More recent pragmatist theories of democracy are also quite possibly forms of duty reliabilism. However, they emphasize the epistemic duties of citizens to the extent they view democracy as the social and political condition under which they could be discharged. See Misak (2000) and Talisse (2005). These cases are worth independent discussion, but I have no space to do so here.

  22. This criticism may also apply to Buchanan (2002).

  23. This view will no doubt call up comparisons to Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness (Rawls 2001). This comparison is not completely unfounded. However, I doubt Rawls’s work will be that useful for helping explaining democratic authority as intended in (EC). In part, this is because justice as fairness is presented more abstractly than (EC). It is not completely clear how it is meant to applied to democracy. It is clear that Rawls discloses a duty to obey fair outcomes as prima facie. This duty seems somewhat shallower than the one proposed in (EC).

  24. Emphasis added. I should also emphasize that The Constitution of Equality (2008) appears to formulate its view of a democratic duty to obey in this way. “The more precise statement says that is because the decision is made by a process that embodies public equality that the decision must be obeyed by citizens” (2008, 244).

  25. Rousseau’s answer is in certain important respects a reliabilist one. Democracy, at least under certain conditions, tracks (or represents, depending on one’s interpretation) the General Will. Thus, to obey democratic outcomes is, in effect, to obey what one has willed one’s self. Democracy does not compromise autonomy. Indeed, it manifests and expresses it.

  26. Additionally, the majority rule (as opposed to a unanimity rule) does not promise to entrench the status quo by permitting only one voter to determine the outcome. The unanimity rule in this way turns out to be less egalitarian than we may have initially believed.

  27. This is notably different from saying that each individual receives an equal hearing. So we can see how the equal consideration of interests view offers a basis for representative democracy.

  28. One might question whether or not equal consideration is robust enough of a principle to support an understanding of deliberation aimed at truth. However, this will not be the critical concern here. Instead, the challenge is aimed at the implication that if the deliberative part of the democratic procedure is aimed at correctness according to a procedure independent standard, the adversarial part is not.

  29. Emphasis added.

  30. At first glance, one might notice a favorable comparison between this view and duty reliabilism. One’s duty to obey arises in relation to another prior moral requirement, viz. justice. Yet, the relation between equal consideration and democracy does not seem to be instrumental. Instead, we might say that it is expressive. Democratic procedures have an intrinsic quality—possessed one assumes by no other political form—that expresses the value of justice.

  31. I am assuming here that the rule of the majority is the only workable democratic principle for general purposes in large, complex democracies.

  32. “…it is clear why democracy might constitute at least a partial realization of equality of resources since democracy involves the equal distribution of those means (e.g. votes) for influencing the collective decision-making procedure” (Christiano 1996, 82). This does not mean that democracy is unconditionally prior to any other value.

  33. I doubt that David Estlund (2002) holds this view; but “epistemic” criticisms of political egalitarianism that follow his own in some ways may take matters this far.

  34. There may be concerns raised about question begging here and some may object to this sort of restriction on input for other reasons, but I will glide over these problems for now.

  35. This does not mean it is random in the way a single coin flip might be, since it presupposes a relatively rigorous means by which alternatives are presented for choice.

  36. I do not deny here the possibility of cases in which a non-epistemic procedure can create authority. So, non-epistemic cases look something this: “Who should win the bingo game?” “Who should get the ball first to begin the game?” In game where the questions is decided by a coin flip, etc., we seem to assume there is no objectively correct answer to these questions, so a non-epistemic decision procedure seems perfectly appropriate. One may reply that there are no objectively correct answers to moral cases either. However, that does not seem to be how citizens comport themselves with respect to these cases, and so how they regard their political inputs.

  37. This refers to her second-order judgments about correct outcomes.

  38. This is a problem for (EC) only because it wants to maintain that the duty to obey either follows from or is correlated to democratic authority on the basis of the fair procedure. I have searched The Constitution of Equality for some indication that Christiano’s most recent view accommodates the epistemic requirement. He does write, “Even though democracy is intrinsically valuable there are still procedure-independent standards for evaluating the democratic process” (2008, 231). However, to leave things at this does not disambiguate an epistemic view from (DR). (DR) could appeal to procedure independent standards, too; but not in the way I will argue consent reliabilism does. In particular, Constitution does not explain the epistemic nature of democratic decisions.

  39. “Magic 8 Balls” are toys made popular in the 1970s. There is a window in the 8 Ball. One is supposed to ask the question, and turn the 8 Ball over. An “answer” to the question appears on the window.

  40. Objections will be raised here. But the claim makes no appeal to numerical superiority alone. It is far more modest, suggesting only that democratic voting procedures may be epistemic insofar as they can be transitive with respect to the epistemic benefits of deliberation. As Seyla Benhabib writes, “It is not the sheer numbers which support the rationality of the conclusion, but the presumption that if a large number of people see certain matters a certain way as a result of following certain kinds of rational procedures and decision-making, then such a conclusion has a presumptive claim to be rational until shown to be otherwise” (Benhabib 1996, 72). I do not necessarily endorse this view in its entirety or believe it is complete. However, it is suggestive of how the value of democratic voting can be understand as epistemic, not merely as fair.

  41. Now, the defender of (EC) may want to say that the outcomes of such a procedure are not merely random. As discussed, the outcomes of an (EC) procedure are not morally arbitrary. This is true. However, the fact they are not morally arbitrary does not show that they are epistemic in the way required—better than random among the fair alternatives. On the other hand, if (EC) wants to say that the outcome of a fair procedure is better than random, it holds simply that democratic procedures do meet some epistemic standards according to which their outcomes may be evaluated.

  42. See also Wolff (1998, 59) and Estlund (1989). Historically, the problem of the minority voter is well-tilled soil with some discussion of it (direct or indirect) discoverable in Condorcet, Hodgson (aka Lewis Carroll), and Richard Wollheim. Wolff seems to assume a particular model of voting as the expression of preferences. The strongest evidence he holds this view can be found on pp. 59–60.

  43. “Being content with majority decisions” is understood here as being roughly equivalent to “accepting outcomes as legitimate.” Though the idea of contentment is psychological, and that of legitimacy is normative, legitimacy can be a cause of contentment. Simmons criticizes views that depend upon natural duties as the final source of legitimacy (Wellman and Simmons 2005).

  44. It is much less clear that if someone else decided you would be married, the same duties would apply.

  45. There may be a useful comparison made here between an intrinsically moral procedure discussed in the form of (EC) and an intrinsically epistemic procedure. The view presented does not depend upon a democratic procedure (in the narrow sense) having intrinsic properties of either sort.

  46. Indeed, a democratic procedure may be irrational in other ways. As Wolff explains, democratic procedures seem to be incapable of rational preference orderings in group decision-making (1998, 60–61). Wolff seems to suppose a view of voting as preferences—not as judgments about the correct outcome.

  47. While I introduce this tradition broadly and definitively appeal to it, I do not regard either Rousseau or Kant as having given a satisfactory account of democracy. If Rousseau seems “too epistemic,” then, Kant often seems “too liberal.” Habermas expresses a similar point in Between Facts and Norms (1996, 100). Habermas is concerned largely with the deeper social and political conditions that could make democratic procedures epistemic. I am concerned more narrowly with democratic decision procedures as necessary for some type of normative consent, hence for democratic authority.

  48. In this way, liberal constraints upon democracy may be understood as deviations from it, justified as conditions necessary for the possibility of constituting epistemic democratic procedures, and so as a procedure worthy of one’s consent.

  49. See again, Wolff (1998) and Wellman and Simmons (2005). Christiano (2008) challenges consent theories; but seems to rely upon the notion that what is required is actual consent. Estlund (2008) gives an account of normative (hypothetical) consent. There is no time to give a critical analysis here, though the sketch here insists that normative consent is necessarily hypothetical. There remains a deeper question I will not address about the positive account of how hypothetical consent can obligate.

References

  • Benhabib S (1996) Democracy and difference. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan A (2002) Political legitimacy and democracy. Ethics 112:689–719

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christiano T (1996) The rule of the many. Westview, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Christiano T (2008) The constitution of equality: Democratic authority and its limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Christiano T, Sect. 7 (2004) Authority. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, (Fall edition). Zalta EN (ed), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/authority/#7

  • Descartes R ([1641] 1984) Meditations, Vol. 2, Trans. Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Estlund, David (1989) The persistent puzzle of the minority voter. Am Phil Q 26(2)

  • Estlund D (2002) Political quality. In Estlund D (ed), Democracy. Blackwell Publishing

  • Estlund D (2008) Democratic authority: A philosophical framework. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J (1996) Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Trans. William Rehg, MIT Press

  • Kant I ([1793] 1991) Theory and practice. In Reiss H (ed). Kant: Political writings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Misak C (2000) Truth, politics, morality: Pragmatism and deliberation. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner R (2003) Law, pragmatism, and democracy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (2001) Justice as fairness. In Collected papers. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

  • Raz J (1986) The morality of freedom. Clarendon, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Rousseau J-J ([1762] 1968) The social contract. trans. Maurice Cranston Penguin Books, London

  • Schumpeter J (1976) Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. HarperCollins, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Talisse RB (2005) Democracy after liberalism. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Wellman C, Simmons AJ (2005) Is there a duty to obey the law? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Wolff, RP ([1970] 1998) In Defense of Anarchism, 2nd edn. Harper and Row, New York

Download references

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Rob Talisse for commenting on earlier versions of this manuscript and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christopher S. King.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

King, C.S. Problems in the Theory of Democratic Authority. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 431–448 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9301-z

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9301-z

Keywords

Navigation