Skip to main content
Log in

Freedom and Practical Reason

  • Published:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's imperiling practical reason.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. On the Consequence Argument, see, for e.g., Van Inwagen (1983).

  2. On the conditional sense of ‘could,’ an agent could have done something other than what she did if and only if had she wanted, or tried, or chosen to do otherwise, she would have done otherwise.

  3. See, for example, Haji (1998).

  4. R1 is consistent with the condition that if one is rationally at fault for doing A, then one believes (or culpably fails to believe given what else one believes) that it is reasons-wise wrong to do A.

  5. One may be praiseworthy for an action that is supererogatory and, thus, permissible for one but not obligatory for one. See Haji (2002), Chapter 10.

  6. For a recent defense of the “ought” implies “can” principle, see, for e.g., Zimmerman (1996), Chapter 3, Section 3.1; and Haji (2002), Chapter 4.

  7. On Frankfurt-type examples, see Frankfurt (1969).

  8. For elaboration, see Haji (2002).

  9. Expressions such as “it is reasons-wise wrong for you to do A” may be thought to do too much violence to ordinary language—at least too much given that there are readily available alternatives such as “you have decisive reason not to do A.” I ask the reader to put up with the strained terminology in the interests of appreciating the analogy I’m trying to highlight between the deontic predicates familiar in moral discourse and those familiar in discourse about practical rationality and practical reason.

  10. Here’s the argument: If it is reasons-wise obligatory for one to refrain from doing A, then it is reasons-wise wrong for one to do A (from Reason-1). Further, if it is reasons-wise wrong for one to do A, then one can do A (from the reasons-wise “wrong” implies “can” analogue of (KR)).Therefore, if it is reasons-wise obligatory for one to refrain from doing A, then one can do A.

  11. I don’t quite know what to say about intrinsic neutrality.

  12. It is possible to interpret this claim—that goodness gives us reasons—in a “benign” fashion. As Jonas Olson proposes, one might hold that you have a reason to x is to be analyzed, roughly, as your x-ing would be intrinsically good; this analysis of reasons in terms of intrinsic goodness is consistent with the view that reasons are provided by the natural properties that ground the goodness. See Olson (2006), pp. 528–29.

  13. There is a distinction between intrinsic value and final value. I agree, though, with Michael Zimmerman (2001, pp. 60–64) that all and only final value is intrinsic value.

  14. See, for instance, Vayrynen (2006) for concerns with this sort of value pluralism.

  15. Regarding BPS1, some buck-passers may opt for the view that something is intrinsically good only if it has properties that give us reason to favor it for its own sake.

  16. For simplicity, I’ve omitted temporal indices.

  17. Many thanks to Leonard Khan, Michael J. Zimmerman, and anonymous referees for this journal for their valuable comments and suggestions. This paper was completed during my tenure of a 2008–2011 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Grant. I am most grateful to this granting agency for its support.

References

  • Fischer JM (2007) Compatibilism. In: Fischer JM, Kane R, Pereboom D, Vargas M (eds) Four views on free will. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 44–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt HG (1969) Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. J Philos 66:829–839

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haji I (1998) Moral appraisability: puzzles, proposals, and perplexities. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Haji I (2002) Deontic morality and control. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson J (2006) G.E. Moore on goodness and reasons. Australas J Philos 84:525–534

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (2001) Rationality and reasons. In: Egonsson D, Peterson B, Josefsson J, Ronnow-Rasmussen T (eds) Exploring practical philosophy: from action to values. Aldershot, Ashgate, pp 17–39

    Google Scholar 

  • Rabinowicz W, Ronnow-Rasmussen T (2004) The Strike of the demon: on fitting pro-attitudes and value. Ethics 114:391–423

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rabinowicz W, Ronnow-Rasmussen T (2006) Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons. Philos Q 56:114–120

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scanlon TM (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Stratton-Lake P (2005) How to deal with evil demons: comment on Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen. Ethics 115:788–798

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen P (1983) An essay on free will. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Vayrynen P (2006) Resisting the buck-passing account of value. In: Shafer-Landau R (ed) Oxford studies in metaethics. vol. II. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 295–324

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmerman MJ (1996) The concept of moral obligation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmerman MJ (2001) The nature of intrinsic value. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ishtiyaque Haji.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Haji, I. Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 12, 169–179 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9132-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9132-8

Keywords

Navigation