Abstract
Richard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I explore how the concept is ascribed and withheld in ordinary situations, and show that it is essentially future-oriented. Since the suicide victim has no future, it makes no sense to call his act rational or irrational. The more appropriate reaction to a declared desire for suicide, or to the news of a successful suicide, is horror and pity, and these are absent from Brandt’s account, as is a humble acknowledgement of the profound mystery at the heart of any suicide.
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Notes
For a wide-ranging discussion of these arguments, together with discussions of rationality, see Battin 1996.
There is a distinction to be made between the rationality of a belief (that Prague is the capital) on the basis of evidence, and the rationality (reasonableness) of an action (bungee-jumping) on the basis of reasons. However, any judgements about reasonableness will be partly based on some relevant beliefs. This paper, however, focuses mainly on the rationality of action.
This point was made by one of the anonymous referees of this paper.
The short story turns on Gabriel’s (Gretta’s husband) sudden realisation that he had never felt that degree of passion for any woman.
References
Battin M (1996) The death debate: Ethical issues in suicide. Prentice-Hall, London
Brandt R (1975) The morality and rationality of suicide. In Perlin S (Ed) A handbook for the study of suicide. Oxford University Press, Oxford (reprinted as ‘The rationality of suicide’)
Cavell S (1979) The claim of reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Clark B (1989) Whose life is it anyway? In Speakerman (Ed) Heinemann, Oxford
Diamond C (1991) Anything by argument? In The realistic spirit. MIT, Boston
Joyce J (1996) Dubliners. Penguin Popular Classics, London
Williams B (1981) Internal and external reasons. In Moral luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Winch P (1972) Moral integrity. In Ethics and action. Macmillan, London
Acknowledgment
My thanks to Marina Barabas for the idea behind this paper.
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The first version was submitted in April 2005. A revised version was then submitted 12 December 2005 based on the comments from a reviewer dated 18 November 2005. This is a third version, dated 11 July 2006, and incorporates minor changes to the format of the references.
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Cowley, C. Suicide is Neither Rational nor Irrational. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 9, 495–504 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9031-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9031-9