Abstract
Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like ‘having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children’. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning in general. Christine Korsgaard relates the rational binding force of practical reasons to the various identities or self-conceptions under which we value ourselves. The problem is that it is not clear why such self-conceptions would necessitate us rationally, given the fact that most of our identities are simply given. Perhaps, Harry Frankfurt is right in arguing that we are not only necessitated by reason, but also, and predominantly by what we love. I argue, however, that “the necessities of love” (in Frankfurt’s phrase) are not to be separated from, but should be seen as belonging to the necessities of reason. Our loves, concerns and related identities provide for a specific and important structure to practical reflection. They function on the background of reasoning, having a specific default role: they would lose their character as concerns, if there was a need for them to be cited on the foreground of deliberation or if there was a need to justify them. This does not mean that our deep concerns cannot be scrutinised. They can only be scrutinised in an indirect way, however, which explains their role in grounding the normativity of agent-relative reasons. It appears that this account can provide for a viable interpretation of Korsgaard’s argument about the foundational role of practical identities.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Carroll, Lewis (C.L. Dodgson), What the Tortoise said to Achilles, Mind (1894).
Dancy, J., Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.
Frankfurt, H.G., The Importance of What We Care About, in The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988a, pp. 80–94.
Frankfurt, H.G., Identification and Wholeheartedness, in The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988b, pp. 159–176.
Frankfurt, H.G., On the Necessity of Ideals, in Necessity, Volition and Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999a, pp. 108–116.
Frankfurt, H.G., Autonomy, Necessity, and Love, in Necessity, Volition and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999b, pp. 129–141.
Frankfurt, H.G., On Caring, in Necessity, Volition and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999c, pp. 155–180.
Frankfurt, H.G., Some Mysteries of Love, Manuscript, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 2000.
Frankfurt, H.G., Replies tot Michael E. Bratman, David Velleman J., Watson Gary, Scanlon T.M., Moran Richard, Wolf Susan, Herman Barbara and Lear Jonathan, in S. Buss, L. Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2002.
Frankfurt, H.G., Disengaging Reason, in: R.J. Wallace, Ph. Pettit, S. Scheffler and M. Smith (eds.), Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. pp. 119–128.
Herman, B., Bootstrapping, in S. Buss and L. Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 253– 274.
Korsgaard, C.M., The Reasons We Can Share, An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values, Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1993), pp. 24– 51, reprinted in Korsgaard, C.M., Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 275–310.
Korsgaard, C.M., The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996a.
Moran, R., Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life, in S. Buss, L, Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 189–217.
Nagel, Th., The View from Nowhere. New York: University Press, 1986
Pettit, Ph., and Smith, M., Backgrounding Desire, The Philosophical Review XCIX (1990), pp. 569–592.
Scanlon, T.M., What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Scheffler, S., Project, Relationships, and Reasons, in: R.J. Wallace, Ph. Pettit, S. Scheffler, M. Smith (eds.), Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. pp. 247–269.
Seidman, J., Rationality and Reflection, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6/2 (2003), pp. 201–214.
Watson, G., Volitional Necessities. in S. Buss and L. Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 129– 159
Wiggins, D., The Concern to Survive, in Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 303–311.
Willigenburg, T. van, Shareability and Actual Sharing: Korsgaard’s Position on the Publicity of Reasons, Philosophical Investigations 25/2, 2002, pp. 172–189.
Willigenburg, T. van, Being Bound by Reasons: Practical Identity and the Authority of Self-Legislation, in M.M.S.K. Sie, M. Slors and B. van den Brink (eds.) Reasons of One’s Own. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp. 39–55.
Wolf, S., The True, the Good and the Lovable: Frankfurt’s Avoidance of Objectivity, in S. Buss and L. Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency. Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 227–244.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Willigenburg, T.V. Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 8, 45–62 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-3299-z
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-3299-z