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The Problem of Phantom Functions

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Abstract

This paper discusses a recent solution to the problem of artifact phantom functions by Beth Preston. A phantom function is a function associated with a kind of artifact that it is structurally incapable of performing. Preston proposes a criterion of artifact proper function according to which phantom functions can be proper functions. This paper argues that Preston’s criterion cannot ground the teleological and normative aspects definitive of proper functions and that the proposed criterion is not consistent with Preston’s account of how copies of novel prototypes acquire proper functions. The paper defends an understanding of phantom functions suggested in earlier work by Preston.

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Notes

  1. Preston does not use the expression “artifact” but “material culture.” However, for ease of exposition, I will use “artifact.”

  2. I use this case as a parallel to Preston’s fengshui mirror case. I think it is helpful to consider a case that is not based on an actual practice in order to avoid prejudging the issue of whether we should take phantom functions to be proper functions.

  3. See Buller (1998) for an excellent discussion of versions of etiological theories and the role of selection and reproduction.

References

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Correspondence to Sune Holm.

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Holm, S. The Problem of Phantom Functions. Erkenn 82, 233–241 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9814-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9814-x

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