Abstract
I develop an account of homology and homoplasy drawing on their use in biological inference and explanation. Biologists call on homology and homoplasy to infer character states, support adaptationist explanations, identify evolutionary novelties and hypothesize phylogenetic relationships. In these contexts, the concepts must be understood phylogenetically and kept separate: as they play divergent roles, overlap between the two ought to be avoided. I use these considerations to criticize an otherwise attractive view defended by Gould, Hall, and Ramsey & Peterson. By this view, homology and homoplasy can only be delineated qua some level of description, and some homoplasies (parallelisms) are counted as homologous. I develop an account which retains the first, but rejects the second, aspect of that view. I then characterize parallelisms and convergences in terms of their causal role. By the Strict Continuity account, homology and homoplasy are defined phylogenetically and without overlaps, meeting my restriction. Convergence and parallelisms are defined as two types of homoplasy: convergent homoplasies are largely constrained by external factors, while parallelisms are due to internal constraints.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
To an extent I attribute this to Rosenberg & Neander because Ramsey & Peterson do. I don’t think many philosophers before Ramsey & Peterson have taken talk of homology as ‘the same’ trait, versus homology as ‘similar’ traits particularly seriously. In Rosenberg & Neander’s paper they do make some claims about similarity: “… similarity judgements, or at least specifications of the traits or characters judged to be homologous, are prior to homology claims (330).”
Part of the justification of this turns on an empirical claim about the relative similarity, and level of constraint, between convergences and parallelisms. Following Gould and Griffiths, I think that functional continuities are relatively coarse, while ancestral continuities are finer grained—convergent similarities are ‘shallow’, while parallel similarities are ‘deep’. If that is right, then because developmental continuities tightly constrain the space of possible phenotype expression, I should be quite confident in inferring between model and target. Moreover, shallow similarities probably belie less constraint in phenotype expression, meaning that projectability from model to target is less secure (see Currie 2012b for discussion of the ‘shallowness problem’). This claim, then, is merely ceteris paribus and based on the empirical claim that most of the time, functional similarities are shallower than ancestral ones. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
But surely a lineage’s phenotype is as it is in part due to its genotype? Why don’t phenotypic constraints collapse into developmental constraints? Here’s why: in cases of developmental constraint, the developmental system’s inability to achieve certain forms constrains morphospace. In phenotypic constraint, it is the phenotypic failings to (for instance) fly to islands which explain why certain evolutionary paths are closed. Naturally part of the proximate explanation of why any particular phenotype is as it is appeals to developmental systems, but ‘being flightless’ is multiply realizable across such systems. In cases of phenotypic constraint, it is phenotype, not development, which explains the contrast (thanks to Kim Sterelny and an anonymous referee for pressing this point).
A referee points out that structural constraints (for instance, those which appeal to geometry) could, if they are classed as internal, count as parallelisms without any developmental at all. How we precisely delineate internal and external constraints, and what to say about structural constraints, is left for further investigation.
References
Amundson, R., & Lauder, G. (1994). Function without purpose: The uses of causal role function in evolutionary biology. Biology and Philosophy, 9(4), 443–470.
Arendt, J., & Reznick, D. (2007). Convergence and parallelism reconsidered: What have we learned about the genetics of adaptation? Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 23(1), 26–32.
Brigandt, I. (2007). Typology now: Homology and developmental constraints explain evolvability. Biology and Philosophy, 22, 709–725.
Brigandt, I., & Griffiths, P. (2007). The importance of homology for biology and philosophy. Biology and Philosophy, 22(5), 633–641.
Brigandt, I., & Love, A. (2012). Conceptualizing evolutionary novelty: Moving beyond definitional debates. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 318(6), 417–427.
Brown, R. (2013). What evolvability really is. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(3), 1–24.
Conway Morris, S. (2003). Life’s solution: Inevitable humans in a lonely universe. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Currie, A. (2012a). Convergence as evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (online first).
Currie, A. (2012b). Convergence, contingency & morphospace. Biology and Philosophy, 27(4), 583–593.
Currie, A., & Levy, A. (forthcoming). Model species are not (theoretical) models. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Gianechini, F. A., Agnolı′n F. L., & Ezcurra, M. D. (2011). A reassessment of the purportedly venom delivery system of the bird-like raptor Sinornithosaurus. Pala¨ontologische Zeitschrift , 85(1), 103–107.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996). Complexity and the function of mind in nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gong, E., Martin, L. D., Burnham, D. A., & Falk A. R. (2011). Evidence for a venomous Sinornithosaurus. Paläontologische Zeitschrift, 85, 109–111.
Gong, E., Martin, L. D., Burnham, D. A., & Falk, A. R. (2009). The birdlike raptor Sinornithosaurus was venomous. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 766–768.
Gould, S. J. (1989). Wonderful life: The burgess shale and the nature of history. New York: W W Norton & co.
Gould, S. J. (2002). The structure of evolutionary theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Griffiths, P. E. (1994). Cladistic classification and functional explanation. Philosophy of Science, 61(2), 206–227.
Griffiths, P. E. (2006). Function, homology, and character individuation. Philosophy of Science, 73(1), 1–25.
Griffiths, P. E. (2007). The phenomena of homology. Biology and Philosophy, 22(5), 643–658.
Hall, B. K. (2003). Descent with modification: the unity underlying homology and homoplasy as seen through an analysis of development and evolution. Biological Reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 78(3), 409–433.
Hall, B. K. (2005). Consideration of the neural crest and its skeletal derivatives in the context of novelty/innovation. Journal of Experimental Zoology, Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 304(6), 548–557.
Hall, B. K. (2007). Homoplasy and homology: Dichotomy or continuum? Journal of Human Evolution, 52(5), 473–479.
Hall, B. K. (2012). Parallelism, deep homology, and evo-devo. Evolution & Development, 14, 33–39.
Leander, B. (2008). Different modes of convergent evolution reflect phylogenetic distance: A reply to Arendt and Reznik. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 9, 481–482.
Lewis, D. (2000). Causation as influence. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(4), 182–197.
Lockwood, C. A. (1999). Homoplasy and adaptation in the atelid postcranium. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 108, 459–482.
McGhee, G. R. (2011). Convergent evolution: Limited forms most beautiful. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Neander, K. (2002). Types of traits: The importance of functional homologues. In A. Ariew, R. Cummins, & M. Perlman (Eds.), Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology (pp. 390–415). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pearce, T. (2011). Evolution and constraints on variation: Variant specification and range of assessment. Philosophy of Science, (78), 739–751.
Pearce, T. (2012). Convergence and parallelism in evolution: A Neo-Gouldian account. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63, 429–448.
Powell, R. (2007). Is convergence more than an analogy? Homoplasy and its implications for macroevolutionary predictability. Biology and Philosophy, 22(4), 565–578.
Powell, R. (2012). Convergent evolution and the limits of natural selection. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2(3), 355–373.
Ramsey, G., & Peterson, A. (2012). Sameness in biology. Philosophy of Science, 79(2), 255–275.
Rosenberg, A. (2006). Darwinian reductionism; or, how to stop worrying and love molecular biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rosenberg, A., & Neander, K. (2009). Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function free? Philosophy of Science, 76(3), 307–334.
Salmon, W. (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sansom, R. (2003). Constraining the adaptationism debate. Biology and Philosophy, 18, 493–512.
Scotland, R. W. (2011). What is parallelism? Evolution & Development, 13(2), 214–227.
Wagner, G. P. (1994). Homology and the mechanisms of development. In B. K. Hall (Ed.), Homology: The heirarchical basis of comparative biology (pp. 273–299). San Diego: Academic Press.
Wake, D. B., Wake, M. H., & Specht, C. D. (2011). Homoplasy: From detecting pattern to determining process and mechanism of evolution. Science, 331, 1032–1035.
Waters, K. (2007). Causes that make a difference. Journal of Philosophy, 104, 551–579.
West-Eberhard, M. J. (2003). Developmental plasticity and evolution. New York: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2010). Causation in biology: Stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation. Biology and Philosophy, 25(3), 287–318.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Russell Powell and Brian Hall for comments on earlier drafts. Versions of this paper has been presented at both the ANU and Otago Philosophy departments, I am grateful for the discussion and comments I received.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Currie, A.M. Venomous Dinosaurs and Rear-Fanged Snakes: Homology and Homoplasy Characterized. Erkenn 79, 701–727 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9533-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9533-5