Abstract
Is it possible that one and the same object x has opposing dispositions at the same time? One’s first reaction might be that it is evidently impossible. On the assumption that x is incombustible, it seems to follow that it is not combustible. Surprisingly enough, however, it is claimed that there are a number of examples in support of the possibility of simultaneous co-instantiation of opposing dispositions. In this paper, I will bring under scrutiny some of the examples and come to the conclusion that none of them achieve the desired goal. This will give support to the initial intuition that opposing dispositions cannot be co-instantiated by one and the same object at the same time.
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Notes
In what follows, I will chiefly focus on deterministic dispositions, investigating the possibility of simultaneous co-instantiation of deterministic opposing dispositions. But I note that the definition of opposing dispositions presented here can be naturally extended to probabilistic dispositions. Such an extension will require an articulation of the characteristic stimulus and manifestation of a probabilistic disposition, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
I acknowledge that Bird (2007, 26)’s notion of acausal fink is almost the same as the notion of non-standard-type fink. But he doesn’t go over its relevance to the possibility of intrinsic finks or antidotes to dispositions.
In fact, Clarke, a vehement supporter of the possibility of intrinsically finkable or maskable dispositions, explicitly subscribes to the view in question.
For an excellent exposition of how this second issue is importantly relevant to numerous areas of philosophy, see (Bird manuscript).
For instance, there seems to be nothing disputable about the thought that Clarke is disposed to have the chance of 2/3 to score and, at the same time, is also disposed to have the chance of 1/3 to drop the ball.
Clarke does not explicitly suppose that his disposition to score is masked by a simple lapse of attention in particular.
Surely there is a continuous spectrum from trying maximally hard to trying a little. For convenience, however, I will simplify the example by assuming the bipartite division into ‘trying a little’ and ‘trying maximally hard’. I will below use the simple expression ‘trying hard’ for ‘trying maximally hard’.
I thank one of the anonymous referees for this journal for this example.
We may also suppose that Peter often forgets that he tends to forget the rules, which is why his enthusiasm for the game remains high. I thank one of the referees for this journal for giving this example.
In (Choi forthcoming_a), I make a similar point to this one and conclude that no such explanation is forthcoming.
The muscle may be what Manley and Wasserman (2008) call an ‘Achilles’ heel’.
This is in accord with my claim made in (Choi forthcoming_b) that, despite Manley and Wasserman’s view, Achilles’ heels can’t be dispositional antidotes or maskers.
Thanks to one of the referees for this journal for pressing for this point.
This example is due to Clarke (2009, 338).
This example was brought to my attention by one audience member in the Metaphysics of Science conference held in Melbourne 2009.
Schrenk’s formulation assumes that the object O 1 has mass m. That said, what Schrenk means by the ceteris paribus clause must be that no masses but x exist, not that no masses whatsoever exist.
It might be objected that, assuming that component forces themselves are dispositional properties, x’s experiencing the gravitational and electrostatic component forces at the same time suffices for simultaneous co-instantiation of opposing dispositions. I don’t think, though, that this objection will go through. First of all, the assumption that component forces are dispositional properties is a highly disputable one (Massin 2009). Granted this assumption, further, I suspect, the gravitational and electrostatic component forces on x won’t come out opposing dispositions. For, it seems an easy matter to demonstrate that when they are naturally construed as dispositional properties their characteristic stimuli are inconsistent with each other in much the same manner as is the case for (C) and (G). In fact, Schrenk himself suggests that y’s electrostatic and gravitational component forces on x be identified with the dispositions attributed by (C) and (G), in which case, as we have seen earlier, they can’t be opposing dispositions.
Surely my argument owes much to Schrenk for his paraphrasing of fundamental laws like Coulomb’s law on behalf of Cartwright. As already noted, he has convinced me that his paraphrasing is best suited for Cartwright’s purpose, which justifies my use of his paraphrases. For those who would cast doubt on Schrenk’s paraphrasing, however, it is worth noting that his paraphrases don’t decide the success or failure of my argument. In fact, Schrenk canvasses a number of alternative paraphrases of Coulomb’s law on behalf of Cartwright before he obtains his paraphrases. I believe, though, that I can carry out basically the same reasoning for the most promising of them as I have done for Schrenk’s paraphrases, for, they ineluctably involve ceteris paribus clauses akin to the ones that occur in Schrenk’s paraphrases.
I thank one of the referees for pressing for this point.
Surely the impossibility of simultaneous co-instantiation of opposing dispositions doesn’t serve as a reductio basis for rejecting the possibility of non-standard-type intrinsic finks and antidotes to dispositions. But this is of no much interest or dialectical import since, as already noted, it is evident, and therefore, not a matter of controversy that dispositions can be co-instantiated along with their non-standard-type intrinsic finks and antidotes to dispositions.
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Acknowledgments
My special thanks to Randolph Clarke for his valuable advice and encouragement. Also, I am much indebted to two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. This work was supported by a grant from the Kyung Hee University in 2012 (KHU-20120798).
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Choi, S. Can Opposing Dispositions be Co-instantiated?. Erkenn 78, 161–182 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9380-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9380-9